Authoritarian regime types, political and socio-economic outcomes, and democratic survival by Yan, Huang-Ting
  
 
 
 
 
Authoritarian Regime Types, Political and Socio-Economic 
Outcomes, and Democratic Survival 
Huang-Ting Yan 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Government 
 
University of Essex 
 
Year of Award: 2020 
 
1 
 
Summary 
This dissertation addresses the question of which factors shape 
outcomes in autocratic regimes, and, in turn, what influences the 
survival of democratic regimes in light of their authoritarian legacies. I 
argue that regimes which are able to curtail the dictator’s powers, 
compared to uncontested autocracies, are associated with better 
institutional and socio-economic outcomes during the authoritarian 
rule as well as a higher survival rate upon transition to democracy. 
The first two papers of this dissertation provide evidence that regimes 
where the leader’s power is constrained either by an organised 
opposition or by a strong regime party are more likely to have an 
independent judiciary and experience higher levels of health 
expenditure. A third paper provides evidence that the mechanisms 
which protect contested autocracies also lay the foundation for an 
institutional framework in which the subsequent democratic regimes 
are more likely to survive. This dissertation offers a mixed-methods 
approach to confirm the three arguments. In conclusion, only with 
checks and balances in place, those in power can stay humble, take 
care of people, and promote good governance, compared to the ruler 
with unlimited power. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation addresses the question of which factors shape outcomes in 
autocratic regimes, which, in turn, influence the survival of democratic 
regimes in light of their authoritarian legacies. To explain the difference in the 
lifespan of young democracies, scholars have compiled a list of causal 
factors and their mechanisms that affect these democracies. These seminal 
works, however, ignored the influence of antecedent authoritarian rule on 
these explanatory factors. Although many studies have explored the lasting 
effects of preceding authoritarian regimes on political dynamics in new 
democracies, little is known about their effect on the survival of these 
democracies. To fill this research gap, the present dissertation combines two 
dimensions of research and explores how the legacy of the previous 
authoritarian regime influences the survival of subsequent democracies. 
Many nascent democracies have emerged from authoritarian regimes, 
the influence of which shapes their institutions, party politics, and social 
structure. It is thus reasonable to infer that political outcomes during the 
period of autocratic rule affect the survival of ensuing democracies. 
Furthermore, scholars have analysed how the political outcomes, shaped by 
distinct dictatorships, affect autocratic survival (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 
2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Levitsky and Way 2012; Magaloni 2008; 
Roberts 2015; Slater and Wong 2013; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012). We 
consider that after the democratisation of an authoritarian regime, these 
political outcomes become divergent legacies, which, in turn, determine the 
longevity of ensuing democracies. Figure 1 presents the framework of my 
basic ideas. 
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Figure 1 Framework for Analysing the Survival of Nascent Democracies 
  
 
Source: the author. 
Existing research has explored the lasting effects of preceding 
authoritarian regimes on new democracies in terms of party politics (Dinas 
and Northmore-Ball 2020; Frantz and Geddes 2016; Grzymala-Busse 2002, 
2006, 2007; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011; Kitschelt 1995; Riedl 2014), which 
relates to democratic survival. Scholars have associated post-authoritarian 
party politics with the following: (1) how preceding dictators shape party 
politics, and how these party configurations are inherited by subsequent 
democracies (Frantz and Geddes 2016; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011), and (2) 
how dictators dominate or develop distinct strategies for political transition 
(Grzymala-Busse 2006; Kitschelt 1995; Riedl 2014). 
Here, two points merit further discussion. First, no comparative study 
other than Grzymala-Busse (2007) has examined the interplay between 
authoritarian successor parties (ASPs), defined as former ruling parties or 
parties newly created by high-level authoritarian incumbents in preceding 
ruling parties in response to democratic transitions (Loxton 2015: 158-159), 
and their opponents. For example, when a dictator seeks to co-opt local elites, 
dominating transitional politics and limiting electoral competition, the high 
barrier to entry during the transition period causes the opposition to 
cooperate, which leads to higher party system institutionalisation (Riedl 2014). 
This argument, however, fails to explain why these ‘anti-incumbent alliances’ 
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do not lose the incentive to remain united even after winning the battle. A 
possible explanation is that there is no room for new ruling parties to be 
divided because ASPs are still veto players. In other words, ASPs achieving 
significant success in post-authoritarian politics can prevent fragmentation of 
the new ruling parties, thus reducing the likelihood of an unstable party 
system. 
Second, these seminal works introduce the concept of the hegemonic 
status of a dictator during democratic transitions into the study of the 
determinants of post-authoritarian party politics. The origin of the dictator’s 
dominant status, however, remains unclear. This is likely to be attributed to 
the fact that the dictator and his party possess and inherit substantial 
antecedent political strengths and resources. Therefore, this dissertation 
argues that the resources that old regime elites inherit determine the 
performance of the ASPs, which affects the post-authoritarian party system. 
Beyond the scope of party politics, alternative causal relationships are 
also possible. An independent judiciary, for example, aims to solve the 
incumbent leader’s commitment problems, thus laying a solid foundation for 
democratic durability (Reenock et al. 2013). That is, an independent judiciary 
has a monitoring function, helping the masses in the absence of information 
to observe the defection of leaders from agreements (Carrubba 2005), and a 
coordination function, allowing individuals to mobilise and challenge 
government action, raising the cost of transgression (Weingast 1997). An 
independent judiciary is also likely to deter executives from using a crisis 
situation as an opportunity to gain power by buttressing the political power of 
other regime elites and the opposition against executive incursions (Gibler 
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and Randazzo 2011). Thus, independent judiciaries decrease the likelihood 
of regime reversions toward authoritarianism. 
Since a democracy inherits legal institutions from its preceding 
authoritarian regime, this dissertation examines the origin of judicial 
independence in authoritarian regimes. This topic, except for a few seminal 
works (Epperly 2017; Ríos-Figueroa and Aguilar 2018), has not been 
considered comparatively. 
Democratic stability is enhanced when the government is held 
accountable to popular demands, especially through the provision of 
economic opportunities and public goods (Graham et al. 2017), partly 
because greater public goods provision leads to a more engaged and 
supportive civil society. Existing research has argued that expenditure on 
healthcare provision significantly improves population health status (Alisa et 
al. 2014; Nixon and Ulmann 2006; Novignon et al. 2012), which encourages 
political participation of citizens (Burden et al. 2017; Mattila and 
Papageorgiou 2017; Mattila et al. 2013). Participation in democratic 
decision-making processes, in turn, helps citizens strengthen their 
democratic political attitudes (Quintelier and van Deth 2014). 
Similar to the judicial institution, the current level of health expenditure 
(and thus the provision of health care) in democracies depends on the past 
levels in an authoritarian regime. To my knowledge, although recent research 
has examined the determinants of health expenditure from the perspective of 
political economy, such as political regime types, characteristics, and 
transitions (Bousmah et al. 2016; Kotera and Okada 2017); the ideology of 
governing parties, opposition parties, and the electorate (Bellido et al. 2019; 
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Datta 2020); fiscal decentralisation or regions with particular fiscal 
arrangements (Arends 2017; Prieto and Lago-Peñas 2014); women’s political 
representation (Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; Mavisakalyan 2014), there is a 
lack of comparative studies on how governance types influence health 
expenditure and cross-national analyses of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, 
this dissertation examines the determinants of health expenditure in 
dictatorships. 
In sum, this dissertation examines the determinants of judicial 
independence and health spending in dictatorships, both of which affect the 
longevity of succeeding democracies, and revisits the pathway that links 
preceding authoritarian regimes and post-authoritarian party politics to the 
survival of subsequent democracies. Figure 2 presents the research 
question. 
Figure 2 The Research Question 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: thick line: known relationship and not the primary focus of the 
dissertation; thin line: unknown relationship and the core research question. 
Source: the author. 
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2. CONTESTED AND UNCONTESTED AUTOCRACIES 
To analyse the dynamics of dictatorships, scholars have proposed multiple 
classifications of authoritarian regimes based on whether or not elections are 
held (Schedler 2006), the degree to which the ruling elite competes with the 
opposition in elections (Levitsky and Way 2010), the extent of social pluralism 
and organisational independence (Linz 2000), where the power is 
concentrated (Geddes et al. 2014), and whether the authoritarian parties are 
established (Wahman et al. 2013). However, apart from studying the effects 
of competitive and non-competitive authoritarianism on democratic survival 
(Shirah 2014), there is a lack of comparative work on types of authoritarian 
regimes and their association with political and socioeconomic outcomes, 
and, in turn, the durability of the subsequent democratic regimes. It is 
important to conduct research from this perspective since the institutional 
legacy is not based on the existence of competitive electoral experience 
alone. Thus, we need to choose an appropriate typology of authoritarianism 
for the analysis of autocratic governance. 
The dissertation chose a binary classification of dictatorship, namely, 
contested and uncontested autocracies. An uncontested autocracy emerges 
when a dictator is able to amass enough power at the expense of other 
political actors and institutions and gets more loyal supporters through 
charismatic leadership or/and a strong divine or natural source, thus ruling 
uncontested. By contrast, a contested autocracy is one where a dictator 
faces at least some competition from actors inside or/and outside the ruling 
coalition or/and needs to enlarge the size of regime supporting groups to 
sustain its rule. 
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There are two key distinguishing features of this definition: power 
distribution and the pattern of legitimation. Power distribution refers to the 
extent to which power is shared between dictators and elites and whether the 
dictator’s discretionary power is constrained by the opposition; in short, 
whether power is concentrated in the dictator. In some dictatorships, elites 
can prevent the dictator from changing the status quo to his advantage, while 
in others, power is highly concentrated in the dictator and his narrow group of 
supporters. Furthermore, in some autocratic regimes, the dictator is not likely 
to face any major threat from the opposition, thus acting in accordance with 
his wishes, while in others, there is a well-organised opposition that can 
impose constraints on the dictator’s discretion. 
A well-organised opposition constrains the actions of the dictator by 
either of the following two ways. The first is material concessions or rights 
concessions that the dictator decides to offer the opposition (Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2006). Dictators are less likely to respond to unorganised political 
opposition with concessions, given their activity is relatively easy and 
inexpensive to control with low levels of repression. On the other hand, 
dictators may respond to organised opposition groups with concessions to 
mollify their demands (Conrad 2011:1171). For example, when opposition 
power is concentrated in a single leader, as in Cambodia, more extensive 
negotiations between the incumbent and the opposition and the follow-up 
partisan electoral reforms are likely. In contrast, when opposition power 
cannot be coordinated and is dispersed across multiple actors, as in Malaysia, 
there tends to be only technical reforms to the electoral process (Ong 2018). 
The second option comprises electoral fraud that the dictator commits 
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to abdicate responsibility. During elections, organised opposition groups 
present themselves as a compelling alternative government to the electorate 
(Howard and Roessler 2006). Thus, voters facing electoral fraud are likely to 
switch and support the organised opposition group that calls for civil 
disobedience when polarisation emerges along the dimension of 
regime-related issues, thus making it harder for authoritarian leaders to steal 
the elections (Magaloni 2010). For example, results from Russia’s 83 regions 
during the 2011 parliamentary election suggest that local political 
competitiveness structures the mix of tools with which to manipulate the 
election: electoral fraud is more common in regions where unorganised 
opposition groups are incapable of developing widespread mobilisation, as 
authoritarian incumbents are less willing to invest in pro-regime patronage 
networks to mobilise supporters but utilise ballot stuffing or falsification to 
thwart opposition activity (Harvey 2016). 
A strong regime party is able to assist ruling elites in curtailing the 
dictator’s powers. This can happen in two ways. The first is based on the 
informational role of the party. The party can establish formal rules on 
intra-party transparency in terms of access to information, which reveals 
hidden secrets behind the actions of the dictator and breaks down the 
barriers to collective action by party elites (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011). The 
second is concerned with collective decision-making in these parties that 
prevents the dictator from using policy and patronage, independent of the 
ruling elites’ preferences (Boix and Svolik 2013; Frantz and Ezrow 2011; 
Magaloni 2008). For example, the party can create institutionalised 
mechanisms for leadership succession, discouraging the dictator from 
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arbitrarily appointing his offspring as the successor (Bialer 1982). This 
elite-level constraint can also protect the independence of the central bank, 
thus preventing the dictator from engaging in an expansionary fiscal policy 
that can be used for patronage distribution (Bodea et al. 2019). Further, the 
party constrains the dictator’s ability to arbitrarily dismiss cabinet ministers 
and has the final word on personnel administration, thus making credible 
power sharing more likely within the cabinet (Kroeger 2020). 
Dominant party regimes are a major type of modern autocracy with a 
strong regime party. Geddes et al. (2014: 318) categorise autocracies based 
on ‘whether control over policy, leadership selection, and the security 
apparatus is in the hands of a ruling party (dominant-party dictatorships), a 
royal family (monarchies), the military (rule by the military institution), or a 
narrower group centred on an individual dictator (personalist dictatorships)’. 
This classification is mainly based on the extent to which decision-making 
power is distributed within the ruling bloc. In dominant-party dictatorships, 
ruling party elites prevent the dictator from arbitrarily changing policy to his 
advantage as the party is a collective decision-making platform. A personalist 
leader may establish a ruling party. He and his narrow coalition, however, still 
can determine a potential successor (Brownlee 2007: 610-612) or engage in 
more extensive cabinet reshuffles with fewer constraints (Kroeger 2020), 
which marginalises the authoritarian party. A collective decision-making 
platform is identified in military dictatorships or monarchy if a ruling party is 
created to play such a role. However, because of the common interest of a 
junta or a royal family (Chin 2015; Nassif 2017), elites who have a place in 
decision-making but are not soldiers or royal members are incapable of 
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preventing the dictator from acting according to his wishes. 
The pattern of legitimation defines a political regime type reflecting the 
type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, 
and the mode of exercising authority. All rulers must develop legitimation 
strategies, such as rules, traditions or customs, regime performance, and 
charisma, to justify their right to rule. For example, some authoritarian 
regimes are not based on support from a specific social group and thus need 
to tie a large group of people to the regime elite, making politics more 
representative of different social groups. As the number of ruling elites whose 
consent is required to change the status quo increases, the decisions of 
dictators are constrained. Other dictators, however, rely on their charismatic 
leadership or a strong divine or natural source through which ordinary people 
believe their right to rule and obey them, thus legitimising their rule. 
Dictatorships with a strong regime party, or borrowing Geddes et al.’s 
(2014: 318) term, dominant party regimes, are based on support from a wide 
cross-section of the society (Kailitz 2013). A personalist dictatorship, however, 
relies on charismatic leadership or extractive institutions through which rents 
could be distributed to followers, thus legitimising its rule based on a 
narrower group centred on a dictator (Hyden 2013). Military regimes and 
monarchies represent institutions with specific foundations, and their priority 
is to guard the common interest of a specific group such as soldiers or the 
royal family. 
In sum, contested autocracies are regimes where the leader’s power 
is constrained either by an organised opposition or a strong regime party, 
while the leaders in uncontested autocracies face fewer constraints from 
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unorganised opposition groups and a weak regime party. 
Figure 3 Binary Classification of Dictatorship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author. 
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institutional and socioeconomic outcomes during the authoritarian rule as 
well as a higher survival rate upon transition to democracy. 
Regimes where the leader’s power is constrained by either an 
organised opposition or a strong regime party are more likely to have an 
independent judiciary and experience higher levels of health expenditure. In 
particular, the dissertation considers the level of opposition unity as a de 
facto constraint on the dictator’s discretion. The reasons behind this are as 
follows: first, it is less likely for dictators to use co-optation to differentiate 
political opposition; second, it is easier for this form of opposition politics to 
mobilise popular support, making it harder for the incumbent leaders to alter 
the electoral outcome through extensive vote buying; third, it reduces the 
dictator’s dependency on aid that would help the opposition find evidence of 
electoral misconduct or mobilise public support. Opposition unity, therefore, 
compels authoritarian leaders to change their strategies of repression and 
patronage (strategy shifting effect), to not commit electoral fraud (alternative 
governing effect), and to stop antagonisation of donors attempting to 
implement democracy aid projects (donor antagonising effect), thus making it 
likely for leaders to win public support by playing the role of an independent 
judiciary in property rights protection. A solid foundation of judicial 
independence exerts a positive influence on the survival of succeeding 
democracies (Gibler and Randazzo 2011; Reenock et al. 2013). 
Regimes where the dictator’s power is constrained by a strong regime 
party are associated with a higher level of health expenditure. A strong 
regime party is based on support from a wide cross-section of the society. 
Instead of relying on a narrower supporting group, the dictator needs to 
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improve governance by broadening the constituencies, making public policy 
more encompassing, and prioritising public goods and services, benefiting a 
wider population. Thus, legitimation strategies under which more voices are 
involved in policymaking exert a positive influence on the dictator’s 
willingness to increase health expenditure. This argument suggests that 
dictatorships where the leaders pay close attention to the public health 
outcomes on which the legitimate rule is based result in increasing public 
health expenditure. A country’s health expenditure significantly improves its 
population health status, as well as other forms of public goods provisions, 
which will, in turn, reduce revolutionary threats to succeeding democracies. 
The mechanisms that protect contested autocracies also lay the 
foundation for an institutional framework in which the subsequent democratic 
regimes are more likely to survive. A strong regime party prevents the 
dictator from acting peremptorily, thus lowering the intention of elites to 
replace the existing institutions and encouraging them to create positive 
resources to ensure their and the party’s survival. After democratisation of 
the authoritarian regime, the ASPs often inherit these valuable resources 
from their past autocratic regime. Thus, the ASPs which emerge from 
autocracies, where the leader’s power was constrained by a strong regime 
party, achieve great success in post-authoritarian politics. The strong 
performance of the ASPs, on the one hand, can encourage cooperation 
within the opposition (if it wins in the democratic elections) or reduce 
fragmentation of the new ruling parties (if it emerges as a strong contender in 
the democratic elections), and on the other hand, can prevent the new ruling 
parties from crossing the line between democracy and authoritarianism, thus 
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reducing the risk of regime collapse. 
In sum, this dissertation argues that leaders are likely to seek public 
support through the role of an independent judiciary in contested autocracies, 
where an organised opposition compels authoritarian leaders to change their 
strategies of repression and patronage, abdicate electoral fraud, and 
antagonise donors attempting to implement democracy aid projects. Further, 
leaders in contested autocracies with a strong regime party based on support 
from a wide cross-section of the society will pay closer attention to the 
population health status on which the legitimate rule is based and tend to 
increase health expenditure. Finally, a strong regime party leads to a strong 
performance of ASPs through valuable resources inherited from its past 
autocratic regime, which will, in turn, increase the stability of succeeding 
democratic regimes. Figure 4 combines the three core arguments. 
This dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 attempts to answer 
why judicial independence varies across dictatorships, Chapter 3 examines 
the determinants of health expenditure in dictatorships, and Chapter 4 turns 
to an examination of regime survival following democratisation in light of 
post-authoritarian party politics. The conclusion is presented in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 4 Three Core Arguments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: thick line: known relationship and not the primary focus of the 
dissertation; thin line: unknown relationship and the core research question. 
Source: the author. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines why judicial independence varies across 
authoritarian regimes with multiparty elections. The two conventional 
wisdoms, political insurance theory and strategic pressure theory, 
offer contrasting interpretations, and so they remain inconsistent. 
This paper proposes a theory according to which credible 
commitment to the masses as the role of authoritarian judicial 
institutions and opposition unity as the causal factor that accounts for 
high levels of judicial independence. The theory hypothesizes that a 
more cohesive opposition increases the dictator’s willingness to seek 
public support through the role of an independent judiciary in 
securing property rights in the case of mass defects. This study tests 
the hypotheses using data on dictatorships with multiparty elections 
between 1975 and 2010. 
Keywords authoritarian regimes, judicial independence, multiparty elections, 
property rights, opposition unity 
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INTRODUCTION 
Independent courts that can check and constrain the operations and power of 
the legislature and executive are essential for the fundamental principles of 
the rule of law and consolidation of democracy. Compared to democracies, 
there might be little to no variation in the levels of judicial independence across 
dictatorships because authoritarian institutions usually do not include a 
nominally independent judiciary. The literature, however, has demonstrated 
that dictators use judicial institutions to manage problems of social control and 
power-sharing (Barros 2002; Moustafa and Ginsburg 2008; Pereira 2005; 
Ríos-Figueroa and Aguilar 2018). Additionally, dictatorships exhibit 
considerable variations in their judicial independence (Epperly 2017). This 
variation begs the question: under what circumstances do authoritarian 
leaders tolerate an independent judiciary? 
This paper presents a credible commitment to the masses as the role of 
authoritarian judicial institutions and opposition unity as the causal factor that 
accounts for high levels of judicial independence. Three mechanisms might 
explain the alleged link between opposition unity and the level of judicial 
independence. It argues that a more united opposition compels authoritarian 
leaders to change their strategies from dealing with the opposition to vie for 
popular support (strategy shifting effect), abdicate vote buying, which is 
expensive when the opposition presents itself as a credible alternative 
(alternative governing effect), and antagonize foreign donor’s (e.g., the EU) 
direct investment in democracy promotion to help a united opposition indentify 
electoral misconduct or develop widespread public mobilization (donor 
antagonizing effect). It thus makes it likely for leaders to attempt to win public 
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support through the role of an independent judiciary securing property rights. 
In short, opposition unity has a positive impact on judicial independence. 
I choose dictatorships with multiparty elections as the object of the 
study. Elections may serve an informational role (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 
405) that provides regime incumbents, the masses, and foreign donors with 
information about opposition unity. It is closely associated with three 
mechanisms that link opposition unity to the level of judicial independence. 
First, the results of multiparty elections help regime incumbents identify their 
bases of support and opposition strongholds (Magaloni 2006). They may 
either target the latter, tying key opposition elites or societal groups to regime 
elites, or buy voters, which depends on whether the opposition joins together. 
Second, the extent to which the opposition is united in elections signals to the 
masses whether it can present itself as a compelling alternative government 
(Howard and Roessler 2006), thus determining the willingness of incumbents 
to alter the electoral outcome through extensive vote buying. Finally, elections 
provide foreign donors with information about opposition unity. A united 
opposition attracts aid that would decrease the incumbent’s ability to engage 
in electoral manipulation (Bunce and Wolchik 2006). 
My research speaks to several studies in comparative politics. First, this 
study provides one of the first cross-national empirical studies of judicial 
independence in the non-democratic context, supplementing single-country 
case studies on court systems in authoritarian regimes (Barros 2002; Pereira 
2005; Ríos-Figueroa and Aguilar 2018). Second, this research adds to the 
richness of existing scholarship on the relationship between political 
competition and judicial independence, that is, political insurance theory 
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(Aydin 2013; Epperly 2017; Hanssen 2004; Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009; 
Ginsburg 2003; Finkel 2008; Randazzo et al. 2016; Stephenson 2003) and 
strategic pressure theory (Faisman and Popova 2013; Popova 2010; 
Randazzo et al. 2016; Rebolledo and Rosenbluth 2009, etc.), implying that 
opposition unity drives authoritarian leaders to increase the level of judicial 
independence to reduce the mobilization of the civilian population against 
incumbents. Finally, it offers a new explanation into why higher levels of 
political competition from a united opposition incentivize dictators to respect 
courts and contributes to the study of judicial independence in 
non-democracies (Epperly 2017). 
A CREDIBLE COMMITMENT TO THE MASSES 
Autocrats face two types of threats to their rule: those that emerge from within 
the ruling elite and those that come from within society (Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2007, 1280). To survive, the dictator must credibly commit to share 
power with the ruling elites and control the masses (Svolik 2012). Either of 
these is achieved using parties, organizations, or legislature, which are tools of 
power-sharing. 
Judicial institutions also have the same power-sharing and controlling 
role (Moustafa and Ginsburg 2008). First, an impartial court provides a 
collective forum where intra-executive conflicts are solved, promoting a 
power-sharing pact between elites with divergent economic interests and 
cultural influences—or their own private army (Barros 2002). Second, the 
creation of multiple special jurisdictions provides elites with the opportunity to 
handle internal problems relevant to their respective groups (Ríos-Figueroa 
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and Aguilar 2018, 9). Third, following a turnover in leadership, autocrats tend 
to allow the independence of the judiciary to some extent to protect their 
interests making ex post punishment by the new leadership much more 
difficult (Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009; Ginsburg 2003; Finkel 2008; 
Randazzo et al. 2016). 
Autocrats depend on the justice system to address external opposition. 
Applying repression against opponents is institutionalized through the 
judiciary’s sentences, confiscation, deprivation of civil rights or capital 
punishment, which is heavily dependent on the willingness of the military 
justice system (Pereira 2005). Prosecutors under direct control of the 
executive are also used to investigate politically sensitive actors and issues 
and bring those cases to court for a trial, or threaten to do so to discourage the 
opposition from challenging the incumbent (Ríos-Figueroa and Aguilar 2018, 
6). 
While recent literature accepts the role of justice institutions in social 
control and power-sharing, this study argues that a better understanding of 
authoritarian judicial institutions should focus on the other dimension of 
choice—a credible commitment to the masses, an argument that has not, to 
my knowledge, been considered comparatively. This is important because 
empirical studies have also found unprecedented growth in the number of 
authoritarian electoral regimes after the end of the Cold War (Diamond 2002; 
Schedler 2006), and in these regimes, the pursuit of mass support in elections 
ensures dictatorial rule. Despite the finding that over two-thirds of leadership 
turnover in dictatorships are from regime insiders (Svolik 2012, 4), this type of 
removal is closely associated with mass electoral support of economic 
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performance. A declining economic performance leads to the loss of 
patronage (Magaloni 2006) and a change in voters’ evaluation of the regime’s 
hegemonic status, providing a motive for elites to defect from the regime 
(Reuter and Gandhi 2011). This can be prevented through the dictator’s 
credible commitment not to exploit the masses or by supplying public goods 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) to encourage investment into the regime. 
Autonomous courts ensure credible and enduring policies in the 
economic sphere and the protection of property rights. That is, an independent 
judiciary has a monitoring function, helping the masses in the absence of 
information to observe the defection of autocrats from agreements (Carrubba 
2005), and a coordination function, allowing individuals to mobilize and 
challenge government action, raising the cost of transgression (Weingast 
1997). Thus, the more effectively courts guard property rights and the rule of 
law, the more confident investors will be that a country will remain stable and 
that their assets will not be confiscated. 
Empirical evidence supports the role of independent courts in credible 
commitment to the masses. Voigt et al. (2015) found that the judiciary is able 
to make the state keep its promises on honoring private property rights, 
encouraging more productive investment, leading to faster economic growth, 
and also higher tax receipts for the state. A simple promise to secure property 
rights by ordinary law or even in the constitution is unlikely to be interpreted as 
a credible commitment. Instead, an independent judiciary is a tool that permits 
governments to make credible commitments to abide by the law. This insight 
led Voigt and Gutmann (2013) to confirm a positive economic growth effect of 
property rights once the judicial system is independent enough to guarantee 
29 
 
their enforcement. Singapore, for example, is known for its economic success 
because the rule of law enforced by an independent judiciary facilitates 
economic development. Judicial independence signals credible commitments 
by the state, as the former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew explained to the 
Singapore Parliament in 1995, ‘a country that has no rule of law, where the 
government acts capriciously is not a country wealthy men from other 
countries would sink money in real estate’. 
It does not necessarily follow that an independent court is solely active 
in establishing a credible commitment to the masses. Some economic elites 
are the most interested actors in greater judicial independence, and in fact 
push for or demand equal judicial treatment. However, others may attempt to 
subordinate judiciaries through bribery, corruption, smuggling, and/or other 
crimes committed for personal gain. It is doubtful that dictators are incentivised 
to signal a credible commitment to economic elites through an independent 
judiciary, especially given the mixed motives for judicial independence held 
among those economic elites. By contrast, the masses are motivated to 
observe institutional changes made to the judiciary. Foremost, it is unlikely for 
them to engage in manufacturing, service, trade, and agriculture without 
property rights protections or a willingness to invest in the regime unless the 
leader offers a credible commitment to not expropriate their assets. This paper 
therefore argues that judicial institutions can help dictators signal a credible 
commitment to the masses. 
In sum, this study argues that the purpose of creating the court system 
is to credibly commit to the masses that property rights protection will be 
maintained. 
30 
 
POLITICAL COMPETITION AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
This study answers why the level of judicial independence varies across 
authoritarian regimes with multiparty elections. The literature attributes the 
independence of the judiciary to intense political competition, and the two 
conventional wisdoms, political insurance theory (Aydin 2013; Epperly 2017; 
Hanssen 2004; Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009; Ginsburg 2003; Finkel 2008; 
Randazzo et al. 2016; Stephenson 2003, etc.) and strategic pressure theory 
(Faisman and Popova 2013; Popova 2010; Randazzo et al. 2016; Rebolledo 
and Rosenbluth 2009, etc.), offer contrasting interpretations of how political 
competition relates to the level of judicial independence. Proponents of the 
insurance theory argue that incumbents develop independent courts when 
faced with an imminent loss of power or powerful opposition, to protect their 
interests once they become political minorities. Scholars favoring strategic 
pressure theory suggest that intense political competition increases the 
incumbent’s willingness to manipulate the courts to stay in office, thus 
reducing rather than increasing judicial independence. Empirical evidence for 
the two hypotheses has remained inconsistent, and in some analyses, 
competition is associated with increased levels of independence while in 
others it curtails the independence of the courts. 
For the theoretical part, although the underlying logic of insurance 
theory is quite appealing, it seems inappropriate to assume that intense 
political competition inevitably leads authoritarian leaders to fall into minority 
status because they can use a variety of ways to defeat the opposition. While 
strategic pressure theory highlights the importance of managing the opposition 
in explaining judicial independence, two points merit further discussion. First, 
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the theory did not consider the role of the masses. Intense political competition 
leads the opposition to present it as a compelling alternative government, thus 
making it much easier to mobilize people’s vote against the incumbent—who 
is less likely to hold onto power without popular support. Second, an 
independent court helps autocrats to ride on a wave of popularity. An 
independent judiciary ensures the dictator’s credible commitment not to exploit 
the masses and by the protection of property rights to boost economic 
performance in the pursuit of mass support in elections, thus reducing the 
opposition’s mobilization of the civilian population against the incumbents. As 
a result, autocrats who face intense political competition are likely to promote 
the maintenance of independent courts. 
For mixed evidence, it can be attributed to the operationalization of the 
degree of political competition. Existing research has used government 
fractionalization (Faisman and Popova 2013; Randazzo et al. 2016), seat 
share of the party of the executive, or seat (or vote) difference between the 
winner and the runner-up in elections (Aydin 2013; Faisman and Popova 2013; 
Hanssen 2004; Popova 2010; Rebolledo and Rosenbluth 2009; Stephenson 
2003), which would be problematic when applied to non-democracies. 
Emphasizing the relative strength of an incumbent party’s hold on office 
vis-à-vis the opposition may ignore the inner dynamic of the opposition. Even if 
they hold a minority of the legislature seats or gain a lower percentage of votes, 
authoritarian leaders’ expectations of remaining in power are not low with a 
divided opposition because autocrats can easily use “divide and rule” tactics 
(e.g., buy the acquiescence of opposition elites; see Gandhi and Buckles 
2016). As Epperly (2017, 285) noted, multiple small opposition groups are not 
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as credible an electoral threat as a single opposition group with the same 
percentage of seats. 
A united opposition—despite its relative weakness (e.g., a large 
difference between seat shares of the ruling party [or blocs of parties] and the 
opposition)—can still pose a threat to a dictator. Three mechanisms might 
explain the alleged link between opposition unity and the level of judicial 
independence: the strategy shifting effect, the alternative governing effect, and 
the donor antagonizing effect. 
Autocrats can use a variety of ways to defeat the opposition and 
authoritarian leaders. Co-optation, for example, which ties key opposition 
elites or societal groups to the regime elites, is an effective strategy for 
demobilizing their supporters. Legislatures, for instance, either incorporate 
potential opposition forces that are granted access and control the flow of 
information for policy concessions, and thus broaden the basis of support for 
the ruler (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1282), or offer opposition elites access 
to the perks and spoils of office, and thus reduce their incentive to mobilize 
citizen populations (Reuter and Robertson 2015, 237). 
This strategy, however, cannot work as well when the opposition joins 
together, and it is less likely for dictators to use co-optation to differentiate 
political opposition, thus making divide and rule a less effective strategy. 
Instead, autocrats shift their strategies from dealing with the opposition to vie 
for popular support—a better measure is through an independent court to 
credibly commit to protecting property rights. This strategy legitimizes 
autocracies by promising economic security and acceptable economic 
performance in exchange for public support and delegitimizes the opposition’s 
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shared tools such as targeting the legitimacy of the incumbent’s reign and 
challenging their capacity to govern, thus buying political quiescence and 
relieving pressure for regime change from below. 
A close reading of the literature on electoral fraud suggests a second 
mechanism—the alternative governing effect. Many dictatorships resort to 
electoral fraud for their survival, but opposition unity can compel autocrats to 
abdicate fraud and hold clean elections. Magaloni (2010) identifies two 
possible routes to democracy, arguing that a divided opposition, when 
suffering electoral abuse, gains access to the spoils of office and remains 
silent instead of deciding to revolt due to its incapacity to organize mass 
demonstrations against fraud—which is expected to be more credible when 
the opposition endorses a single presidential candidate or coalesces prior to 
elections. Further, voters facing electoral fraud are likely to switch their support 
to the opposition that calls for civil disobedience when polarization emerges 
along the dimension of regime-related issues, thus making it harder for 
authoritarian leaders to steal the elections. 
The link of the two routes proposed by Magaloni—opposition unity to a 
credible threat from below—leads the masses to identify this form of 
opposition as a compelling alternative government. A common presidential 
candidate or allied opposition ensures electorates that if they are unsatisfied 
with government performance, they have a clear alternative. Additionally, the 
common goal of dismantling the government by denouncing gross violations of 
human rights against journalists or political activists, condemning economic 
collapse and failure to guarantee economic security, or revealing it is far 
removed from democracy induces the masses to coordinate around these 
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proposed alternatives, thus making it easier for this form of opposition politics 
to mobilize popular support and making it harder for incumbents to alter the 
electoral outcome through extensive vote buying. 
If dictators have no choice but to hold clean elections, the best strategy 
is to attract popular attention and support. A credible commitment must be 
made to protect a set of property rights arrangement, allowing asset holders to 
earn rent in exchange for their loyalty to the regime. This strategy is workable 
because asset holders cannot ensure that the opposition will support an 
independent judiciary if winning an election. Subsequently, an independent 
court thus emerges. 
The third possible cause—which I call the donor antagonizing 
effect—was derived from research on the international dimension of 
democratization (Dietrich and Wright 2015; Gibson et al. 2015; Hyde and 
Marinov 2014). Recent studies demonstrate that autocratic recipient 
governments use foreign aid at least partly for their survival, be it by 
redistributing additional rents to strategic groups (Ahmed 2012), financing 
repression (Bader and Faust 2014, 576), or stockpiling sustained aid flow for 
use in times of crisis (Kono and Montinola 2009). 
Aid, however, has a double-edged sword. Donor’s direct investment in 
democracy promotion through activities aimed at strengthening governance 
institutions, may check the abuses by government officials and decrease the 
incidence of electoral misconduct (Dietrich and Wright 2015). Further, an 
increase in donors’ use of technical assistance to monitor government 
spending and promote political reforms through filling a recipient country’s 
knowledge gap, improving bureaucratic procedures, and providing training to 
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country officials is associated with a decrease in the incumbent’s ability to 
engage in patronage, thus contributing to political liberalization (Gibson et al. 
2015). Finally, donors can increase the likelihood that citizens will punish those 
governments that fail to hold democratic elections by providing credible 
information about election quality (Hyde and Marinov 2014). 
Autocrats are likely to decline aid assistance from unwelcome “friends” 
who promote the democratic rules of the game when the opposition commits 
to unite. Donors tend to focus on countries where there are reasonable 
prospects for positive impact, for example, in states that hold regular and 
somewhat competitive elections, have parties, and exhibit short-term 
democratization-friendly trends such as cooperation among opposition groups 
(Bunce and Wolchik 2006, 14). When opposition groups seek to unite and 
present credible electoral threats to incumbents, increasing aid helps such 
opposition find electoral misconduct or develop widespread public mobilization, 
thus facilitating regime change. In short, a smaller increase in aid brings about 
a large impact when opposition parties unite. 
If autocrats must reduce their dependency on aid, an alternative way to 
stabilize the prevailing political structure is to push citizens toward the regime. 
Here, dictators do not lose power without using aid in repression or feeding 
patronage and clientele networks if they have a firm basis of popular support 
through an independent judiciary that ensures their economic rights. 
In sum, this study argues that opposition unity compels authoritarian 
leaders to change their strategies of repression and patronage, abdicate 
electoral fraud, and antagonize donors attempting to implement democracy 
aid projects, thus making it likely for leaders to win public support through the 
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role of an independent judiciary. In short, opposition unity has a positive 
impact on judicial independence. 
OPPOSITION UNITY AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
The unit of analysis in this research is “dictatorships with multiparty 
elections-year.” Regimes were defined as the rules that identify the group from 
which leaders can come and determine who influences leadership choice and 
policy (Geddes et al. 2014, 314). A dictatorship started if (1) an executive 
achieved power through undemocratic means, (2) the government achieved 
power through democratic means but subsequently changed formal or 
informal rules, or (3) competitive elections were held to choose government 
but one or more parties for which substantial numbers of citizens would be 
expected to vote were banned. A dictatorship ended when (1) a competitive 
election was won by another person rather than the incumbent, (2) the 
incumbent was ousted but replaced by a different regime, or (3) the ruling 
party changed the basic rules of leader selection (Geddes et al. 2014, 
317-318). 
Second, I follow Brownlee’s (2009, 524) operationalization of Levitsky 
and Way’s (2002) typology of dictatorships using data from the Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI). The DPI contains a 7-point measure of the 
legislative indices of electoral competitiveness (LIEC). An electoral regime 
was coded if a regime had a score greater than 4, which includes 5 = multiple 
parties are legal but only one party won seats, 6 = multiple parties won seats 
but the largest party won more than 75% of the seats, and 7 = the largest party 
held less than 75% of seats. I collected a sample of 1,187 pooled time series, 
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and cross-sectional observations between 1975 and 2010. 
To confirm my argument that autocrats allow an independent court to 
some extent in the face of more cohesive opposition, this study 
operationalized the variables as follows. First, this research used Latent 
Judicial Independence (LJI) scores constructed with the graded item response 
theory (IRT) model (Linzer and Staton 2015) as the level of judicial 
independence, which captures the extent to which a court depends on a 
government and its trends between 1975 and 2012. Second, I measured 
opposition unity using DPI’s HERFOPP variable (0-1), which calculated the 
sum of the squared seat shares of all parties except for those in the 
government; independents were calculated as if they were individual parties 
with one seat each. By this operationalization, the opposition is less 
fragmented if HERFOPP is close to 1.1 
There are two reasons for this choice of arithmetic definition for 
opposition unity, i.e., the sum of the squared seat shares in the opposition. 
First, the emergence of an electoral alliance to challenge the incumbent that 
reduces the likelihood of a fragmented opposition often demonstrates the 
opposition’s willingness to cooperate, increasing the probability of political 
liberalization (Howard and Roessler 2006, 371) or transitions to democracy 
(Donno 2013, 706). The autocrat, thus, needs to pay close attention to these 
strategic coalitions. Second, in non-democracies, parties frequently are not 
ideologically disciplined organizations formed to win elections, but rather 
groupings of notables who compete in elections to gain personal benefits 
                                                     
1
 If there is only one opposition party or electoral alliance in the parliament, HERFOPP is one. 
I did not use the sum of the squared vote shares of all opposition parties in an election 
because only those holding seats in parliament are likely to enact laws or check executive 
power. 
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(Gandhi and Reuter 2013, 142). The existing literature argues that the 
incentives of the opposition to build up electoral coalition are derived from the 
strength (Donno 2013, 706) or stability (Gandhi and Reuter 2013, 145-146) of 
the major opposition parties or their attitudes toward the dictator’s co-optation 
strategies (Gandhi and Buckles 2016) instead of ideological distance among 
them. I, thus, choose to use the arithmetic definition. 
An alternative measure of opposition unity was to use DPI’s OPPFRAC 
variable (0-1), which calculated the probability that two deputies picked at 
random from among the opposition parties will be from different parties. The 
results, however, may differ according to the real number of seats held by 
each opposition party. For example, if there are two opposition parties in the 
parliament, each with a corresponding 50% of the seat, HERFOPP is 0.5 and 
the value of OPPFRAC lies between 0.5 and 1.2 If there are four opposition 
parties in the parliament, each with a corresponding 25% of the seat, 
HERFOPP is 0.25 and the value of OPPFRAC lies between 0.75 and 1.3 If 
opposition parties have been extremely fragmented, HERFOPP is close to 0 
and OPPFRAC approaches or equals 1. As the total number of seats held by 
all opposition parties increase, OPPFRAC is approximately equal to 1- 
HERFOPP.4 However, due to the effects of seat size, it would be hard to 
distinguish political fragmentation of opposition parties if each party won a few 
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seats using OPPFRAC as a measure of opposition unity.5 
A list of control variables was added. First, Hayo and Voigt (2007) 
observe that presidential systems enjoy lower levels of judicial independence 
compared to parliamentary systems. This may be because concentrated 
executive power imposes substantial constraints on judicial independence 
(Herron and Randazzo 2003). Thus, two types of constitutional 
systems—presidentialism and parliamentarism—were included. Presidential 
constitutions stipulate that a president must be popularly elected for a fixed 
term and cannot be dismissed by the legislature, and the government and 
legislature serve fixed and independent terms. Similar to Roberts’s (2015) 
operationalization, the executive selection system was coded using the DPI 
system variable (Beck et al. 2001). Systems with presidents who are elected 
directly or by an electoral college whose only function is to elect the president, 
in cases where there is no prime minister or systems with both a prime 
minister and a president who has the power to veto legislation, or appoint and 
dismiss (prime) ministers and dissolve the parliament, were coded as 
presidential systems. 
Second, I used annual economic development and growth to study the 
effects of economic conditions on judicial independence. As levels of 
development and thus complexity of the economy increases, a state might 
enact and enforce laws for the protection of property rights, which is a vital 
function of independent courts (Haggard et al. 2008). Further, economic 
                                                     
5
 Some real-world electoral dictatorships are Gabon (2012- ): Rally for Gabon (3 seats) and 
Union for the New Republic (1 seat); Gambia (2002-2007): PDOIS (2 seats) and National 
Reconciliation Party (1 seat); Kazakhstan (2005-2007): Ak Zhol (1 seat) and Democratic 
Party Adilet (1 seat); Mauritania (1997-2001): Action for Change (1 seat) and Rally for 
Democracy and Unity (1 seat); Singapore (2001-2010): Singapore Democratic Alliance (1 
seat) and Workers’ Party (1 seat); Zimbabwe (1991-1995): Zimbabwe Unity Movement (2 
seats) and ZANU-Ndonga (1 seat). 
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development measured as the log of GDP per capita and growth 
operationalized as the annual percentage change in GDP from the World 
Bank’s Development Indicators reflects the likelihood of future violence 
(Jensen and Young 2008, 532), which affects a dictator’s incentive over the 
use of aid to invest in property right protection (Wright 2008b, 974). Following 
this logic, the stability and duration of political systems and the associated time 
horizons of leaders influence a dictator’s willingness to expropriate resources 
(Chang and Golden 2010, 5) or make credible commitments to property rights 
to encourage foreign investment. I thus included into the analysis the duration 
of an autocrat, measured as consecutive years in which the same autocratic 
regime has been in power in a particular country. 
This study also controlled personalist rule as a dummy variable where 1 
= personalist rule and 0 = other types of dictatorships, defined as the 
decision-making power in the hands of a narrower group centered on an 
individual dictator (Geddes et al. 2014, 318) where formal institutions are 
created to further the exchange of private goods for public support (Wright 
2008a, 323), causing reduced legal protection of property. I also included the 
log of total population to capture the country’s potential market size, commonly 
used as a foreign direct investment determinant (Harms and an de Meulen 
2013; Javorcik et al. 2011; Hayakawa et al. 2013) that possibly relates to the 
demand for the security of property rights and independent courts. Using data 
from Geddes et al. (2014), I also added previous democratic experiences to 
measure whether a regime has previously experienced democratic rule that 
can leave positive influences on the development of laws for securing private 
property. 
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Finally, I controlled for government unity measured as DPI’s HERFGOV 
variable (0-1), which reflects the level of political competition, in other words, a 
fragmented ruling camp increases the dictator’s willingness to control the 
judiciary while the dictator’s absolute control of government power through the 
ruling party decreases the likelihood of manipulating the judiciary.6 In order to 
understand factors associated with dictatorships’ level of judicial 
independence with a multi-party system, I ran a time-series cross-sectional 
regression model with country and time fixed effects. 
Regarding robustness testing, this study first changed the threshold for 
the determinant of authoritarianism with a multiparty system (LIEC>=6). First, 
this entailed an exclusion of regimes that allowed multiple parties, but in which 
only one party won seats due to a sweeping electoral victory achieved by the 
autocrat’s party. Such a circumstance can simultaneously be influenced by 
unobserved factors that determine the willingness of the opposition to join 
interests. Second, this study considered a list of authoritarian regime types as 
a control rather than using personalist dictatorships. For example, based on 
the findings discussed in the next chapter, dictators in dominant party regimes 
borrow their legitimacy from better governance and may therefore need to 
focus on the economic rights of the people. Finally, to allow some time for the 
effects of opposition unity on judicial independence to materialise, this study 
lagged the independent variable by one period. 
Before conducting empirical analyses, it is useful to identify whether 
dictatorships with multiparty elections exhibit considerable variations in judicial 
                                                     
6
 The other opposite reason is that government fragmentation increases the number of 
potential challengers, causing higher levels of political competition that will add to the 
dictators’ fears about turnover and willingness to develop judicial institutions as protection 
following a change in leadership (Randazzo et al., 2016, 586). 
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independence, especially because these specific types of autocracies are 
more prone to judicial independence. The results certainly show considerable 
variation in the independence of the judiciary (see Supplementary Figure 1). 
Table 1. Opposition Unity and Judicial Independence, 1975–2010 
 Model (1) 
JI 
Model (2) 
JI 
Model (3) 
JI 
Model (4) 
JI 
Opposition unity 0.036
***
 0.026
**
 0.029
***
 0.031
***
 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Government unity  0.029
**
 0.043
***
  
  (0.014) (0.014)  
Presidentialism  -0.066
***
 -0.070
***
 -0.067
***
 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Log GDP pc  0.047
***
 0.049
***
  
  (0.007) (0.007)  
Growth  0.000   
  (0.000)   
Autocratic duration  0.001  0.003
***
 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Personalist rule  -0.181
***
 -0.160
***
 -0.122
***
 
  (0.023) (0.017) (0.022) 
Log population  0.093
**
 0.054  
  (0.041) (0.041)  
Previous democratic exp.  -0.042  -0.004 
  (0.051)  (0.052) 
No. of subjects 966 938 944 966 
No. of groups 71 70 70 71 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8710 0.8968 0.8938 0.8902 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. 
Table 1 presents the results of four models of judicial independence in 
dictatorships with multiparty elections. Model 1 and 2 are univariate and 
multivariate fixed effects models. Model 3 omits covariates in Model 2 that are 
not statistically significant while Model 4 omits all control variables that have 
missing values in order to keep all cases in the data. As a result, Model 1 and 
4 have the same number of observations, 966. Results show preliminary 
support for my central hypothesis that opposition unity is highly associated 
with increased judicial independence in dictatorships with multiparty elections: 
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opposition unity was statistically significant at the .01 level, and the coefficient 
for opposition unity was still positive using multivariate models and restricted 
models. Government unity and economic development were estimated to 
have a statistically positive effect. Presidential systems and personalist 
dictatorships impose substantial constraints on judicial independence. 
Table 2. Opposition Unity and Judicial Independence, 1975–2010 
 Model (1) 
JI 
Model (2) 
JI 
Model (3) 
JI 
Opposition unity 0.028
***
 0.026
**
  
 (0.010) (0.010)  
Opposition unityt-1   0.029
***
 
   (0.010) 
Government unity 0.030
**
 0.024
*
 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Presidentialism -0.066
***
 -0.063
***
 -0.060
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Log GDP pc 0.048
***
 0.047
***
 0.049
***
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Autocratic duration 0.001 -0.000 -0.002
*
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Personalist rule -0.183
***
 -0.235
***
 -0.280
***
 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.035) 
Military dictatorships  -0.178
***
  
  (0.054)  
Monarchy    
    
Log population 0.092
**
 0.107
***
 0.113
***
 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) 
Previous democratic exp. -0.040 -0.079 -0.122
**
 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) 
No. of subjects 927 938 875 
No. of groups 69 70 72 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8978 0.8981 0.9019 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. Monarchy was 
omitted in model 2 because the samples did not include monarchies where multiparty 
elections were allowed. 
Table 2 also confirms the positive effects of opposition unity on judicial 
independence in dictatorships with multiparty elections when this study 
excluded regimes that allowed multiple parties, but in which only one party 
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won seats (Model 1), considered a list of authoritarian regime types as a 
control rather than using personalist dictatorships (Model 2), and lagged the 
independent variable by one period (Model 3). 
OTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Regarding other tests for robustness, this study used Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland’s (2010, 69, CGV) definition of democracy and dictatorship. A regime 
is classified as a democracy if (1) the chief executive is popularly elected or 
chosen by a body itself popularly elected, (2) the legislature is popularly 
elected, (3) multiple parties legally allowed can compete in elections, and (4) 
alternation in power takes place, and the rules under which it occurs are 
identical to those that brought incumbents to power. A dictatorship was 
defined when one of the four criteria were not met. The Cheibub et al. (2010) 
measure therefore presents a basic conceptualization of democracy: electoral 
contestation of power and an alternation in power under electoral rules. 
Compared to Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (GWF) coding, CGV’s dataset 
adds the alternation rule to classify a regime. In contrast to CGV’s coding, 
GWF’s classification scheme does not treat autocratic regime as a residual 
category by identifying periods of anarchy and provisional government from 
one autocratic regime to another and including other criteria as suffrage and 
party competition for coding regime type. Subsequently, coding 
disagreements between the two datasets on some cases emerge. 
To test the hypothesis, I included a list of control variables, including 
constitutional design, the log of GDP per capita, GDP growth, the duration of 
an autocrat, personalist rule, the log of total population, previous democratic 
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experiences, and government unity. Two points merit further elaboration. First, 
Cheibub et al. (2010, 84) classify dictatorship according to whether the leader 
is civilian, military (have ever worn a uniform), or monarchic (hereditary 
royalty), thus differing from GWF’s classifications based on whether control 
over policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus is controlled by a 
ruling party, a royal family, the military, or a narrower group centered around 
an individual dictator. This study thus included the three forms of dictatorship 
advanced by Cheibub et al. (2010, 84). Second, the duration of an autocrat 
and previous democratic experiences must be operationalized using CGV’s 
dataset. 
Second, I probed the robustness of using the alternative measure of 
opposition unity on my main results. The opposition organizes and creates a 
strategic coalition in the parliamentary election and the bid for presidency; 
these opposition leaders and civil society groups can choose to pre-commit to 
common candidates and mobilize their respective supporters to vote against 
the incumbent, maximizing their chances of winning elections (Magaloni 2010). 
By contrast, the more divided the opposition because of the failure to 
coordinate or collaborate leads to the unsuccessful defeat of dictators (Bunce 
and Wolchik 2010, 47). Subsequently, I measured opposition unity as the total 
number of votes of the top presidential candidate divided by that of other 
candidates of the opposition bloc using data of each election from the 
Psephos— Adam Carr’s Election Archive, Election Data Handbooks by Dieter 
Nohlen, and Wikipedia Election Lists by Country (see Appendix E).7 
In the analyses, I added government strengths that captured the 
                                                     
7
 Opposition unity is one if the opposition proposes a common presidential candidate. For the 
two-run system, I used the vote share in the first run. 
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popular base of the dictator as the president and coded this as the dictator’s 
vote share in each presidential election using Psephos’ data. Further, I 
controlled for the log of GDP per capita, GDP growth, the duration of an 
autocrat, personalist rule, the log of total population, and previous democratic 
experiences. 
 Third, I excluded elections that the major opposition had boycotted 
using self-collected data from the literature, conventional country reports, 
newspaper article, and election results archive (see Appendix C) because it is 
unknown if these opposition elites are willing to come together and form a 
single party or an electoral alliance in the parliament to challenge the 
incumbent. For the purpose of reliability, I compared the results of coding 
election boycotts with the NELDA14 variable in the National Elections across 
Democracy and Autocracy dataset, finding except for a very small number of 
cases, that results of cases that recorded boycott or not were consistent (see 
Appendix D). Finally, I excluded some cases where a few opposition parties or 
candidates boycotted but they were relatively insignificant ones using Varieties 
of Democracy’s v2elboycot variable. The results of coding in this study and the 
two comparative dataset, thus, can arrive at a consensus on a number of 
cases that recorded an election boycott. 
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Figure 1. The coefficient plot: Opposition unity promotes a more independent 
authoritarian judiciary 
Note: left panel: opposition unity measured as the sum of the squared seat shares of all 
parties except for those in the government; right panel: opposition unity measured as the total 
number of votes of the top presidential candidate divided by that of other candidates of the 
opposition bloc. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Results illustrated in left and right panel 
correspond to Supplementary Table 1 and 2. 
Figure 1 reports the coefficient plots of opposition unity in a series of 
robustness models, indicating the positive effects of opposition unity on 
judicial independence. This suggests that the opposition’s strategy to form a 
political party or electoral alliance in parliament, or have a common 
presidential candidate would promote an independent judiciary. The results in 
robustness models mirrored those of the original model with other control 
variables, but were slightly stronger: a rise of 0.028 (p < .01) in judicial 
independence scores from the model where CGV’s definition of democracy 
and dictatorship was used and scores of 0.032 (p < .01), 0.031 (p < .01), and 
0.034 (p < .01) from the three models where elections that the major 
opposition had boycotted were excluded. In short, the independence of the 
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judiciary is guaranteed when the opposition works on strategies to field their 
common presidential candidates or seek to construct electoral alliances. 
TEST OF THE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Although this evidence supported the argument that opposition unity compels 
authoritarian leaders to vie for popular support through the role of an 
independent judiciary, there may be alternative explanations for the pattern. 
Proponents of the political insurance theory argue that incumbents develop 
independent courts when faced with an imminent loss of power, while scholars 
favoring strategic pressure theory suggest that lower levels of political 
competition decrease an incumbent’s willingness to manipulate the courts to 
stay in office and thus increase rather than reduce judicial independence. The 
analysis should control for any effects of the two alternative explanations. 
To tap into the survival probability of the ruler, I used four possible 
measures: regime interruptions by coups in the previous year (Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2006), the magnitudes of armed conflicts (Chang and Golden 
2010), years in office for the chief executive (Hallagan 2010), and the actual 
regime duration (Clague et al. 1996).8 The reason for the choice was that 
countries that have many autocratic regime changes by coups elevate the 
propensity for another coup and, thus, are more unstable than countries that 
have had no or few autocratic regime changes. Further, any involvement in an 
armed conflict, whether international, civil, or ethnic, is likely to add political 
instability, thus shrinking the regime durations of autocrats. Finally, autocrats 
                                                     
8
 I used data from the DPI’s YRSOFFC variable (continuous); the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 
Autocratic Regimes dataset’s GWF_ Duration variable (continuous); major episodes of 
political violence (MEPV) and conflict regions’ ACTOTAL variable (ordinal); and Coup 
d’état Events’ SCOUP1 variable (binary). 
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learn how to use a variety of ways to contain challenges and threats to ensure 
their own regime’s survival, especially if they have stayed in power for some 
period of time. 
Instead of using proxy variables as mentioned above, for this research I 
followed Wright (2008b, 979–981) to use the probability of regime failures as a 
proxy for autocratic time horizons. I generated the predicted probability of 
failure for each regime-year using the following predictors to model regime 
failure: GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, ethnic and religious 
fractionalization, the magnitudes of armed conflict, a list of regime-type 
variables (military, monarchy, oligarchy, party, personalist, military-personal 
hybrid, party-military hybrid, party-personal hybrid, party-military-personalist 
hybrid), and a cubic polynomial of time to control for time dependence. The 
advantage to using this type of predicted probability is that, foremost, I can 
integrate factors influencing levels of judicial independence and transform the 
values into predictors of regime survival and, additionally, I do not have to 
assume that all incumbents hold the same expectations of regime duration at 
the same age of the regime. 
Figure 2 reports the coefficient plots of opposition unity and five 
measures of the survival probability of the incumbent, illustrating that the 
coefficient for opposition unity remained positive with statistical significance. 
However, the empirical work provided inconsistent results for political 
insurance theory. On one hand, the coefficients for the magnitudes of armed 
conflict and the predicted probability of regime failures were all negative and 
significant, indicating that as the probability of regime failure increased, judicial 
independence decreased. On the other hand, the coefficients for years in 
50 
 
office for the chief executive were also negative and significant, suggesting 
that when the incumbents believed that their majority status was in jeopardy, 
they promoted an independent judiciary as a type of insurance for ruling 
regimes. However, the actual regime duration exerted no significant effect on 
judicial independence. 
As for the test of strategic pressure theory, to operationalize the degree 
of political competition, I followed the lead of existing research for my 
measures—Aydin 2013; Faisman and Popova 2013; Hanssen 2004; Popova 
2010; Randazzo et al. 2016; Rebolledo and Rosenbluth 2009; Stephenson 
2003). (1) I first measured government fractionalization, calculated as the sum 
of the squared seat shares of all government parties; (2) I calculated the 
relative strength of an incumbent party’s hold on the top office vis-à-vis the 
opposition using the relative seat shares of the government parties and (3) the 
seat-share difference between the government and opposition parties; and (4) 
I chose the legislative indices of electoral competitiveness (LIEC) using data 
from DPI and rearranged the scores: 0 = multiple parties are legal but only one 
party won seats; 1 = multiple parties won seats but the largest party won more 
than 75% of the seats; and 2 = the largest party held less than 75%. Increases 
in the scores corresponded with increases in the degree of political 
competition. I would expect to find that a fragmented ruling camp, a weak 
government vis-à-vis the opposition, or higher levels of legislative electoral 
competitiveness would increase autocrats’ willingness to put the courts under 
strict control, thus reducing judicial independence. 
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Figure 2. The coefficient plot: Opposition unity and the survival probability of 
the ruler 
Note: Regression coefficient: Model 1: opposition unity: 0.026
**
, and actual regime duration: 
0.001, model 2: opposition unity: 0.021
**
, and years in office for the chief executive: -0.002
***
, 
model 3: opposition unity: 0.027
***
, and the magnitudes of armed conflict: -0.005
***
, model 4: 
opposition unity: 0.027
***
, and regime interruptions by coups in the previous year: 0.055
**
, 
model 5: opposition unity: 0.026
**
, and predicted probability of regime failure: -0.179
**
. 
Regression coefficient in the univariate analysis: actual regime duration: 0.001; years in office 
for the chief executive: -0.002
***
; the magnitudes of armed conflict: -0.008
***
; regime 
interruptions by coups in the previous year: 0.010; predicted probability of regime failure: 
-0.143
***
. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. Results illustrated in Figure 2 correspond to model 1, 
2, 3, 4, and 5 of Supplementary Table 3. 
Figure 3 reports the coefficient plots of opposition unity and four 
measures of political competition, illustrating that the effects of opposition unity 
are still in the predicted direction. Further, in multivariate models, although 
empirical evidence has supported the argument that intense political 
competition magnifies the benefits of courts being subservient to incumbents, 
the ruling bloc unity and legislative electoral competitiveness had no 
statistically significant effect on judicial independence in the analysis of 
univariate data. 
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Figure 3. The coefficient plot: Opposition unity and political competition 
Note: Regression coefficient: Model 1: opposition unity: 0.026
**
, and ruling bloc unity: 0.029
**
, 
model 2: opposition unity: 0.026
**
, and seat share of government parties: 0.087
***
, model 3: 
opposition unity: 0.024
**
, and seat share difference between government and opposition 
parties: 0.037
***
, model 4: opposition unity: 0.028
***
, and legislative electoral competitiveness: 
-0.015
***
. Regression coefficient in the univariate analysis: ruling bloc unity: 0.015; seat share 
of government parties: 0.040
***
; seat share difference between government and opposition 
parties: 0.014
*
; legislative electoral competitiveness: -0.002. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
Results illustrated in Figure 3 correspond to model 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Supplementary Table 4. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper examined why judicial independence varies across authoritarian 
regimes with multiparty elections. While recent literature accepts the role of 
justice institutions in power-sharing, this study argues that a better 
understanding of authoritarian judicial institutions should focus on other 
dimension of choice—a credible commitment to the masses. In this theory, an 
independent court constrains authoritarian leaders from expropriating private 
property and, subsequently, attracts investment, boosts economic growth, and 
further helps dictators gain public support. Opposition unity determines the 
independence of the judiciary: a united opposition incentivizes dictators, in 
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case of mass defections to this form of opposition, to drum up public support 
through an independent judiciary instead of resorting to co-optation or 
electoral fraud. This study confirms the positive effects of opposition unity on 
judicial independence. 
Other authoritarian institutions, such as legislatures and political parties, 
can reduce the risks of expropriation (Jensen et al. 2014), repression, and 
human rights violations (Rivera 2017). These institutions play roles similar to 
that of an independent judiciary, thereby potentially reducing the demand for 
independent courts. Also like the judiciary, however, these institutions are 
endogenous to opposition unity, as it leads to higher levels of political 
competition. For dictators, this will increase the willingness to create 
legislatures and political parties for the purpose of co-opting broader segments 
from within society (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). As such, this study did not 
control for the effects of other authoritarian institutions. 
Existing research confirms that the more independent judges are, the 
stronger are the protection of property rights (Berggren and Gutmann 2020; 
Voigt and Gutmann 2013), which is consistent with the finding that the role of 
the judiciary in property rights protection in dictatorships with multiparty 
elections (Figure S1, supplemental material). Thus, as democracies, the 
purpose of creating the court system in dictatorships with multiparty elections 
is to credibly commit to the masses that property rights protection will be 
maintained. Further, the literature finds that a positive economic growth effect 
of property rights once the judicial system is independent enough to guarantee 
their enforcement (Voigt and Gutmann 2013). Based on the proposed 
argument, a more cohesive opposition increases a dictator’s willingness to 
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seek public support through an independent judiciary under which property 
rights do spur positive economic growth. It is thus expected that the effect of 
property rights on economic growth should be conditional on the extent to 
which the opposition is united (Figure S2, supplemental material). 
Competition is shown to produce more independence in courts, as the 
insurance theory has argued, but restrict judicial independence, which is 
proposed by scholars of strategic pressure theory. The two theories, however, 
hone in on the interplay of dictators and the opposition, failing to consider the 
role of the masses and international actors. It is important because political 
competition signals to both actors that regime change is possible, which will, 
subsequently, lead dictators to increase or decrease the independence of the 
justice system for the active purpose of turning the tide. Following this logic, 
this study develops a more holistic approach in combining this strategic 
interaction of four political actors that can better reflect the effects of political 
competition on judicial independence. That is, based on the informational role 
of multi-party elections, it argues that opposition unity compels authoritarian 
leaders to vie for popular support through the role of an independent judiciary. 
Empirical analyses found mixed evidence for the two theories, but my 
theoretical expectations were confirmed even if this analysis controlled for any 
effects of the two alternative explanations. 
There is also the problem of reverse causality; that is, judicial 
independence is associated with the extent to which the opposition is united. 
An independent judiciary discourages autocrats from repressing opponents 
through judiciary sentences, confiscation, the deprivation of civil rights, and 
capital punishment, thus reducing the costs of the ruler’s punishment among 
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those who participated in a failed electoral alliance. This increases the 
oppositional willingness to create a single party, a broad-based electoral 
alliance, or jointly support a single presidential candidate against incumbents. 
To eliminate endogeneity and confirm my arguments, this study integrated an 
instrumental variable (Table M1 and M2, supplemental material). 
Future research should investigate in more detail the three causal 
pathways. One approach is to use identification strategies as a research 
design to solve the causal inference identification problem. For example, if the 
strategy shifting effect exists, I may observe the indirect effect of opposition 
unity on judicial independence through a decreased willingness to engage in 
co-optation. However, as not all causal mechanisms are present, the other 
approach would be to use a small-N analysis to find situations on which the 
three causal effects depend. 
Future directions of research can also integrate the study of courts 
across different regimes (Aydin 2013; Randazzo et al. 2016). Not all 
dictatorships that hold multiparty elections are the same, and the key 
distinguishing feature may be whether authoritarian leaders have the power to 
use a subservient or independent judiciary to ensure their survival. Even if a 
leader tends to tolerate or develop independent courts, the presence of 
powerful elites and, thus, multiple veto players, attempting to subordinate 
judiciaries in bribery, corruption, smuggling, or other crimes committed for 
personal gains, means that a change in the status of the court system is less 
likely. A powerful leader, on the contrary, controls the judiciary at will despite all 
the political incentives. Another distinguishing feature is the distinctive pattern 
of legitimation that influences whether the dictator needs to pay close attention 
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to political competition. For example, a monarch legitimizes him or herself by a 
strong divine or natural source, regardless of the political outcome of his or her 
rule (Kailitz 2013, 48-49). Thus, a monarch may have lower intention to 
manipulate the courts to stay in office in response to intense political 
competition. 
In sum, my results imply that opposition unity compels authoritarian 
leaders to legitimize their rules through the role of independent judiciaries in 
property right protections. At least two policy implications follow. First, efforts 
to influence the independence of the judiciary could start with increased 
coordination among opposition parties. Second, legal scholars of judicial 
independence in dictatorships with multiparty elections could pay close 
attention to how institutional design facilitates cooperation within the 
opposition (Gandhi 2008). 
References 
Ahmed, F. A. 2012. “The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and 
Government Survival.” American Political Science Review 106(1): 146–65. 
Aydin, A. 2013. “Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understanding the 
Varying Impact of Political Competition.” Law and Society Review 47(1): 105–34. 
Barros, R. 2002. Constitutionalism and Dictatorship Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 
Constitution. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., and Walsh, P. 2001. “New Tools in Comparative 
Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” The World Bank Economic 
Review 15: 165–76. 
Brownlee, J. 2009. “Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions.” 
American Journal of Political Science 53(3): 515–32. 
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R.M., and Morrow, J.D. 2003. The Logic of 
57 
 
Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Bader, J., and Faust, J. 2014. “Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Autocratic Survival.” 
International Studies Review 16(4): 575–95. 
Berggren, N., and Gutmann, J. 2020. “Securing Personal Freedom through Institutions: The 
Role of Electoral Democracy and Judicial Independence.” European Journal of Law and 
Economics 49: 165–86. 
Bunce, V. J., and Wolchik, S. L. 2006. “Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions.” 
Journal of Democracy 17(4): 5–18. 
Bunce, V. J., and Wolchik, S. L. 2010. “Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in 
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” World Politics 62(1): 43–86. 
Carrubba, C.J. 2005. “Courts and Compliance in International Regulatory Regimes.” Journal 
of Politics 67(3): 669–89. 
Chang, E. C. C., and Golden, M. A. 2010. “Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes.” 
Social Science Quarterly 91(1): 1-20. 
Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J., and Vreeland, J.R. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” 
Public Choice 143: 67–101. 
Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S., and Olson, M. 1996. “Property and Contract Rights in 
Autocracies and Democracies.” Journal of Economic Growth 1(2): 243-76. 
Diamond, L.J. 2002. “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy 13(2): 21–35. 
Dietrich, S., and Wright, J. 2015. “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in 
Africa.” Journal of Politics 77(1): 216–34. 
Donno, D. 2013. “Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal 
of Political Science 57(3): 703–16. 
Epperly, B. 2017. “Political Competition and De Facto Judicial Independence in 
Non‐democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 56(2): 279–300. 
Faisman, A., and Popova, M.D. 2013. “Political Competition, Judicial Independence, and 
Electoral Regime Age.” Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 
Mainz, Germany. 
Finkel, J.S. 2008. Judicial Reform as Political Insurance: Argentina, Peru, and Mexico in the 
1990s. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 
58 
 
Gandhi, J. 2008. “Coordination among Opposition Parties in Authoritarian Elections.” Paper 
presented at “Dictatorships: Their Governance and Social Consequences” conference, 
Princeton, New Jersey. 
Gandhi, J., and Przeworski, A. 2006. “Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion under 
Dictatorships.” Economics & Politics 18(1): 1-26. 
Gandhi, J., and Przeworski, A. 2007. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” 
Comparative Political Studies 40(11): 1279–1301. 
Gandhi, J., and Lust-Okar, E. 2009. “Elections under Authoritarianism.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 12: 403–22. 
Gandhi, J., and Reuter, O.J. 2013. “The Incentives for Pre-electoral Coalitions in 
Nondemocratic Elections.” Democratization 18(1): 1–26. 
Gandhi, J., and Buckles, G. 2016. “Opposition Unity and Co-optation in Hybrid Regimes.” 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, Illinois. 
Geddes, B., Wright, J., and Frantz, E. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: 
A New Dataset.” Perspective on Politics 12(2): 313–31. 
Gibson, C.C., Hoffman, B.D., and Jablonski, R.S. 2015. “Did Aid Promote Democracy in Africa? 
The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions.” World Development 68: 
323–35. 
Ginsburg, T. 2003. Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Haggard, S., MacIntyre, A., and Tiede, L. 2008. “The Rule of Law and Economic 
Development.” Annual Review of Political Science 11: 205–34. 
Hallagan, W. 2010. “Corruption in Dictatorships.” Economics of Governance 11(1): 27-49. 
Hanssen, F.A. 2004. “Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?” The 
American Economic Review 94(3): 712–29. 
Harms, P., and an de Meulen, P. 2013. “Demographic Structure and the Security of Property 
Rights: The Role of Development and Democracy.” European Journal of Political 
Economy 29: 73–89. 
Hayakawa, K., Kimura, F., and Lee, H.H. 2013. “How does Country Risk Matter for Foreign 
59 
 
Direct Investment?” The Developing Economics 51(1): 60–78. 
Hayo, B., and Voigt, S. 2007. “Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence.” International 
Review of Law and Economics 27(3): 269–90. 
Helmke, G., and Rosenbluth, F. 2009. “Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence 
in Comparative Perspective.” Annual Review of Political Science 12: 345–66. 
Herron, E.S., Randazzo, K.A. 2003. “The Relationship between Independence and Judicial 
Review in Post-Communist Courts.” Journal of Politics 65(2): 422–38. 
Howard, M.M., and Roessler, P.G. 2006. “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive 
Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 365–81. 
Hyde, S.D., and Marinov, N. 2014. “Information and Self-enforcing Democracy: The Role of 
International Election Observation.” International Organization 68(2): 329–59. 
Javorcik, B.S., Ö zden, Ç ., Spatareanu, M., and Neagu, C. 2011. “Migrant Networks and 
Foreign Direct Investment.” Journal of Development Economics 94(2): 231–41. 
Jensen, N. M., and Young, D.J. 2008. “A Violent Future? Political Risk Insurance Markets and 
Violence Forecasts.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(4): 527–47. 
Jensen, N. M., Malesky, E., and Weymouth, S. 2014. “Unbundling the Relationship between 
Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk.” British Journal of Political Science 44(3): 
655–84. 
Kailitz, S. 2013. “Classifying Political Regimes Revisited: Legitimation and Durability.” 
Democratization 20(1): 39–60. 
Kono, D.Y., and Montinola, G.R. 2009. “Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats or 
Both?” Journal of Politics 71(2): 704–18. 
Levitsky, S., and Way, L. 2002. “The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 
13(2):51–65. 
Linzer, D.A., and Staton, J. 2015. “A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1948–2012.” 
Journal of Law and Courts 3(2):223–56. 
Magaloni, B. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Magaloni, B. 2010. “The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule.” 
American Journal of Political Science 54(3): 751–65. 
60 
 
Moustafa, T., and Ginsburg, T. 2008. “Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian 
Politics.” In Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, edited by T. 
Moustafa and T. Ginsburg, 1–22, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Pereira, A. 2005. Political (In)justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and 
Argentina. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Popova, M.D. 2010. “Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence 
from Russia and Ukraine.” Comparative Political Studies 43(10): 1202–29. 
Randazzo, K.A., Gibler, D.M., and Reid, R. 2016. “Examining the Development of Judicial 
Independence.” Political Research Quarterly 69(3): 583–93. 
Reuter, O.J., and Gandhi, J. 2011. “Economic Performance and Elite Defection from 
Hegemonic Parties.” British Journal of Political Science 41(1): 83–110. 
Reuter, O.J., and Robertson, G.B. 2015. “Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in 
Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes.” The Journal of Politics 77(1): 235–48. 
Ríos-Figueroa, J., and Aguilar, P. 2018. “Justice Institutions in Autocracies: A Framework for 
Analysis.” Democratization 25(1): 1–18. 
Rivera Celestino, M. 2017. “Authoritarian Institutions and State Repression: The Divergent 
Effects of Legislatures and Opposition Parties on Personal Integrity Rights.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 61(10): 2183–2207. 
Roberts, T.L. 2015. “The Durability of Presidential and Parliament based Dictatorships.” 
Comparative Political Studies 48(7): 915–48. 
Rebolledo, J., and Rosenbluth, F.M. 2009. “Political Competition and Judicial Integrity: The 
Case of Mexico.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Toronto, Canada. 
Schedler, A. 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienners. 
Stephenson, M.C. 2003. ““When the Devil Turns…”: The Political Foundations of Independent 
Judicial Review.” The Journal of Legal Studies 32(1): 59–89. 
Svolik, M. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Voigt, S., and Gutmann, J. 2013. “Turning Cheap Talk into Economic Growth: On the 
61 
 
Relationship between Property Rights and Judicial Independence.” Journal of 
Comparative Economics 41(1): 66–73. 
Voigt, S., Gutmann, J., and Feld, L.P. 2015. “Economic Growth and Judicial Independence, A 
Dozen Years on: Cross-country Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators.” European 
Journal of Political Economy 38(1): 197–211. 
Weingast, B. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” American 
Political Science Review 91(2): 245–63. 
Wright, J. 2008a. “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic 
Growth and Investment.” American Journal of Political Science 52(2): 322–43. 
Wright, J. 2008b. “To Invest or Insure? How Authoritarian Time Horizons Impact Foreign Aid 
Effectiveness.” Comparative Political Studies 41(7): 971-1000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
Table S1. Opposition Unity and Judicial Independence, 1975–2010 
 Model (1) 
JI 
Model (2) 
JI 
Model (3) 
JI 
Model (4) 
JI 
Model (5) 
JI 
Opposition unity 0.026
**
 0.028
***
 0.032
***
 0.031
***
 0.034
***
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Government unity 0.029
**
 0.044
***
 0.027
*
 0.033
**
 0.025 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Presidentialism -0.066
***
 -0.110
***
 -0.058
***
 -0.057
***
 -0.067
***
 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Log GDP pc 0.047
***
 0.057
***
 0.045
***
 0.031
***
 0.050
***
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Growth 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Actual regime duration 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Personalist rule -0.181
***
  -0.206
***
 -0.205
***
 -0.196
***
 
 (0.023)  (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Military dictatorships  -0.069
***
    
  (0.014)    
Log population 0.093
**
 -0.065
**
 0.078
*
 0.062 0.101
**
 
 (0.041) (0.032) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) 
Previous democratic exp. -0.042 -0.256
***
 -0.056 -0.053 -0.055 
 (0.051) (0.036) (0.052) (0.051) (0.053) 
No. of subjects 938 1019 718 696 833 
No. of groups 70 82 62 63 66 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8968 0.9245 0.8981 0.9039 0.8927 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. Model 1 is original 
model. Model 2 used Cheibub et al.’s (2010, 69) definition of democracy and dictatorship. 
Model 3, 4, and 5 are restricted model where elections that the major opposition had 
boycotted were excluded using data from the author, the National Elections across 
Democracy and Autocracy dataset, and a consensus that the author and the two comparative 
dataset arrive at on a number of cases that recorded an election boycott. 
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Table S2. Opposition Unity and Judicial Independence (presidential elections), 
1975–2010 
 Model (1) 
JI 
Model (2) 
JI 
Model (3) 
JI 
Opposition unity 0.133
***
 0.124
***
 0.125
**
 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.057) 
Government strength -0.196
***
 -0.152
***
 -0.126 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.083) 
Log GDP pc  0.006 0.005 
  (0.011) (0.012) 
Growth  -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Autocratic duration  -0.000 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Personalist rule  -0.078
***
 -0.047
*
 
  (0.023) (0.027) 
Log population  0.000 -0.006 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
Previous democratic exp.  0.064
***
 0.091
***
 
  (0.024) (0.031) 
No. of subjects 142 139 97 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0993 0.1879 0.1638 
Prob>F 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. Model 3 is restricted 
model where elections that the major opposition had boycotted were excluded using data from 
the author (the results of coding same as that of the National Elections across Democracy and 
Autocracy dataset). 
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Table S3. Opposition Unity and Judicial Independence, 1975–2010 
 Model (1) 
JI 
Model (2) 
JI 
Model (3) 
JI 
Model (4) 
JI 
Model (5) 
JI 
Opposition unity 0.026
**
 0.021
**
 0.027
***
 0.027
***
 0.026
**
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Actual regime duration 0.001     
 (0.001)     
Years in office  -0.002
***
    
  (0.000)    
Armed conflicts   -0.005
***
   
   (0.002)   
Coupst-1    0.055
**
  
    (0.026)  
Probability of regime failures     -0.179
**
 
     (0.089) 
Government unity 0.029
**
 0.029
**
 0.030
**
 0.032
**
 0.029
**
 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Presidentialism -0.066
***
 -0.054
***
 -0.062
***
 -0.065
***
 -0.065
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Log GDP pc 0.047
***
 0.045
***
 0.047
***
 0.049
***
 0.048
***
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Growth 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Personalist rule -0.181
***
 -0.218
***
 -0.193
***
 -0.200
***
 -0.192
***
 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Log population 0.093
**
 0.093
**
 0.088
**
 0.091
**
 0.089
**
 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Previous democratic exp. -0.042 -0.090
*
 -0.062 -0.065 -0.063 
 (0.051) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
No. of subjects 938 938 938 938 933 
No. of groups 70 70 70 70 69 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8968 0.9005 0.8977 0.8972 0.8964 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Table S4. Opposition Unity and Judicial Independence, 1975–2010 
 Model (1) 
JI 
Model (2) 
JI 
Model (3) 
JI 
Model (4) 
JI 
Opposition unity 0.026
**
 0.026
**
 0.024
**
 0.028
***
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Government unity 0.029
**
    
 (0.014)    
Seat shares of gov. parties  0.087
***
   
  (0.018)   
Seat-share difference   0.037
***
  
   (0.010)  
LIEC    -0.015
***
 
    (0.005) 
Presidentialism -0.066
***
 -0.062
***
 -0.063
***
 -0.067
***
 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Log GDP pc 0.047
***
 0.040
***
 0.040
***
 0.044
***
 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Growth 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Autocratic duration 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Personalist rule -0.181
***
 -0.178
***
 -0.178
***
 -0.177
***
 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Log population 0.093
**
 0.071
*
 0.083
**
 0.088
**
 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Previous democratic exp. -0.042 -0.030 -0.032 -0.036 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
No. of subjects 938 943 943 943 
No. of groups 70 70 70 70 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8968 0.8996 0.8986 0.8976 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
Figure S1. The Variation in Judicial Independence in Dictatorships with 
Multiparty Elections, 1975–2010 
Note: all dictatorships: mean=0.235, standard deviation=0.159; dictatorships with 
multiparty elections: mean=0.296, standard deviation=0.176; dictatorships without 
multiparty elections: mean=0.189, standard deviation=0.125. Source: the author. 
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Supplemental material to “A credible commitment to the masses: how 
opposition unity affects judicial independence in authoritarian regimes 
with multiparty elections” 
The role of authoritarian judiciary 
To confirm my theoretical expectations of the role of the authoritarian judiciary 
in property rights protection, this study operationalized the variables as follows. 
First, this research used Latent Judicial Independence (LJI) scores as the level 
of judicial independence, which captures the extent to which a court depends 
on a government. Second, property right protection was coded using the 
property right components of the index of economic freedom from 1995 from 
the Heritage Foundation, which assesses the extent to which a country’s legal 
framework allows individuals to accumulate private property freely and the 
likelihood that private property will be expropriated by the state and provides a 
scale from 0 to 100 for measuring the degree to which a country’s laws protect 
private property rights. 
I included a list of control variables influencing the extent to which a 
state enacts and enforces laws for the protection of property rights. Economic 
development measured as the log of GDP per capita and growth 
operationalized as the annual percentage change in GDP from the World 
Bank’s Development Indicators reflects the likelihood of future violence 
(Jensen and Young 2008, 532), which affects a dictator’s incentive over the 
use of aid to invest in property right protection (Wright 2008b, 974), and 
influences a dictator’s willingness to expropriate resources (Chang and 
Golden 2010, 5). Following this logic, I included the duration of an autocrat into 
the analysis. This study also controlled personalist rule as a dummy variable 
68 
 
where 1 = personalist rule and 0 = other types of dictatorships, defined as 
decision-making power in the hands of a narrower group centered on an 
individual dictator (Geddes et al. 2014, 318) where formal institutions are 
created to further the exchange of private goods for public support (Wright 
2008a, 323), causing reduced legal protection of property. I also included the 
log of total population to capture the potential market size of the country, 
commonly used as a foreign direct investment determinant (Harms and an de 
Meulen 2013; Javorcik et al. 2011; Hayakawa et al. 2013) that possibly relates 
to the demand for the security of property rights. Finally, using data from 
Geddes et al. (2014), I also added previous democratic experiences to 
measure whether a regime has previously experienced democratic rule that 
can leave positive influences on the development of laws for securing private 
property. This study tested the hypotheses using panel data regression. 
Figure M1 confirms the role of authoritarian judiciaries in property right 
protection. In model without the inclusion of control variables, a rise in scores 
of judicial independence from 0 to 0.1 increased the index of property right 
protection by 4.28 (p < .01). When the explanatory variables were included, 
the judicial independence positively and statistically related to the degree to 
which a country’s laws protect private property rights. Compared to model 
without covariates, the effect declined from 4.28 to 3.89 (p < .01). Similarly, 
other models verified the theoretical expectations using CGV’s dataset as an 
alternative to GWF’s coding of democracy and dictatorship. 
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Figure M1. The positive role of authoritarian judiciary in property right 
protection in dictatorships with multiparty elections 
Note: Regression coefficient of judicial independence: left panel (use GWF’s definition): 
38.919
***
, right panel (use CGV’s definition): 28.016
***
. Regression coefficient in the univariate 
analysis: left panel: 42.822
***
, right panel: 37.207
***
. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
Opposition unity, property right protection and economic growth 
A more cohesive opposition increases a dictator’s willingness to seek public 
support through an independent judiciary under which property rights do spur 
positive economic growth. It is thus expected that the effect of property rights 
on economic growth should be conditional on the extent to which the 
opposition is united. To test the proposed argument, this study operationalized 
the variables as follows. First, this research operationalized property right 
protection using the property right components of the index of economic 
freedom from 1995 from the Heritage Foundation while opposition unity as the 
sum of the squared seat shares of all parties except for those in the 
government using DPI’s HERFOPP variable (0-1). The interaction term was 
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computed: “property rights protection × opposition unity.” Economic growth 
was measured as the annual percentage change in GDP from the World 
Bank’s Development Indicators. 
The following regressions are used to estimate a country’s economic 
growth. First, I included the 1-year lagged logarithm of real GDP per capita to 
account for diminishing returns to capital, based on the basic assumptions of 
the neoclassical model. Second, there is mixed evidence regarding the effects 
of constitutional design on economic growth (Benhabib and Przeworski 2010; 
Gerring et al. 2009; Knutsen 2011). Thus, two types of constitutional 
systems—presidentialism and parliamentarism—were included. Third, I 
included into the analysis the duration of an autocrat. This is because dictators 
with long time horizons have a greater incentive to invest in public goods, 
which is associated with positive growth (Wright 2008b). Fourth, personalist 
regimes are less dependent on investment in the productive economy (Wright 
2008a). This study thus controlled personalist rule as a dummy variable where 
1 = personalist rule and 0 = other types of dictatorships. Fifth, I included the 
log of total population to capture positive as well as negative effects of 
population on productivity (Beck et al. 1999). Finally, I added previous 
democratic experiences to measure whether a regime has previously 
experienced democratic rule that can leave positive influences on the 
development of public infrastructure. 
In Figure M2 displayed, the effect of property rights protection on 
economic growth was shown to be conditional on opposition unity. That is, the 
more united the opposition, the higher growth the effect, compared with its 
counterpart (e.g., at 1: 0.22, p < .01; at 0.8: 0.15, p < .01), and the results also 
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confirm my prediction of a positive growth effect of property rights protection 
conditional on opposition unity using CGV’s dataset as an alternative to 
GWF’s coding of democracy and dictatorship. 
 
Figure M2. Conditional effect of property rights protection on economic growth 
in dictatorships with multiparty elections 
Note: left panel, linear prediction (opposition unity=0.6): 0.069
**
; linear prediction (opposition 
unity=0.8): 0.146
***
; linear prediction (opposition unity=1): 0.223
***
. Right panel, linear 
prediction (opposition unity=0.6): 0.038; linear prediction (opposition unity=0.8): 0.122
***
; linear 
prediction (opposition unity=1): 0.207
***
. 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
The index of economic freedom from the Heritage Foundation does not 
span the full range between 1975 and 2010. It certainly constitutes with my 
research limitations. In future research, we could test theoretical expectations 
when data become available. The index, however, has advantage over other 
measures of property rights protection. For example, an alternative measure 
of property rights protection was from the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment, which measures the extent to which a country’s policy and 
institutional framework supports private economic activity and the respect for 
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property rights. However, it provides the data from 2005. Further, existing 
research has used constitutional property rights protection (Bjørnskov 2015; 
Voigt and Gutmann 2013), which would be problematic. This measure reflects 
the degree to which property is promised according to the (written) 
constitutions of the coded countries but does not reflect that is protected 
based on a country’s holistic legal framework such as the constitution, act, 
regulations, precedents, and judicial review. It is likely that judicial review, 
instead of the constitution, provide for a right to own property, transfer property 
freely, and limit the ability of the government to expropriate private property, 
especially for countries with common law in practice. For example, the 
Singaporean constitution does not provide for the right to property, but judicial 
review could have the effect of achieving economic freedom bringing against 
orders of compulsory land acquisition (Chua and Haynie 2016). 
The study speaks to several central studies in judicial independence, 
property rights protection, and economic growth. Existing research confirms 
that the more independent judges are, the stronger are the protection of 
property rights (Berggren and Gutmann 2020; Voigt and Gutmann 2013), 
which is consistent with the finding that the role of the judiciary in property 
rights protection in dictatorships with multiparty elections, as shown in Figure 
S1. Thus, as democracies, the purpose of creating the court system in 
dictatorships that hold multiparty elections is to credibly commit to the masses 
that property rights protection will be maintained. 
The literature finds that a positive economic growth effect of property 
rights once the judicial system is independent enough to guarantee their 
enforcement (Voigt and Gutmann 2013). For example, the economic success 
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of Singapore is built on the stability and fairness of its legal rules administered 
by impartial, independent and well-trained judges. The courts effectively 
protect investors’ property rights, which brought to Singapore good returns 
from the flood of capital to buy up properties in the country (Lee 1995). In 
Vietnam, however, one can have state-sanctioned property rights that are not 
necessarily enforced by the courts but rests on social norm, local political 
interests and culture for adopting a evolutionary legal terms of property rights 
(Kim 2007). Ambiguous property rights status is an inhibitor of investment and 
economic growth. Our results further show the effect of property rights on 
economic growth to be conditional on the extent to which the opposition is 
united, as shown in Figure S2, suggesting that opposition unity is the driving 
force behind the autocrat’s credible commitment to the masses. 
Instrumental variable analysis 
To eliminate endogeneity and confirm my arguments, this study integrated an 
instrumental variable (IV) consisting of the one-year lag of oil rents (% of GDP). 
A good IV should have a theoretical interpretation that it is expected to 
influence the endogenous variable but is unrelated to the outcome. However, 
finding valid instruments for opposition unity is by no means easy as political, 
economic and social variables that are correlated with opposition unity are 
very likely to influence the level of judicial independence. In this regard, a 
previous study examined how natural resources affected the severity of armed 
civil conflict, finding that opposition groups who wished to benefit from 
hydrocarbon production were more motivated to collaborate to achieve 
governmental defeat (Lujala 2009). Another study suggested that wealth 
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generated through oil receipts catalysed the creation and convergence of 
opposition, specifically through inequitable distribution and by providing 
potential opposition with the resources needed to overcome collective action 
against the regime (Okruhlik 1999). This makes it likely for huge oil rents to 
foster oppositional cooperation. 
This research used the difference between the total value of crude oil 
production at world prices and total costs of production as a share of GDP as 
oil rents. I lagged the independent variable by one period to allow some time 
for its effect on opposition unity to emerge. A list of control variables, including 
constitutional design, the log of GDP per capita, GDP growth, the duration of 
an autocrat, personalist rule, the log of total population, previous democratic 
experiences, and government unity, was added. This research used two-stage 
least squares regression analysis. 
Table M1 reveals a positive correlation between oil rents and the level 
of opposition unity between 1975 and 2010. A 10-percentage point increase in 
the value of one-year lag of oil rents (% of GDP) indicated a 0.06 increase in 
the level of opposition unity (0-1) (Model 2, p < .01). Our theoretical 
expectations were also confirmed omitting covariates in Model 2 that are not 
statistically significant (Model 3, 0.05 for a 10-percentage point increase in the 
value of one-year lag of oil rents, p < .01) or omitting all control variables that 
have missing values in order to keep all cases in the data (Model 4, 0.06 for a 
10-percentage point increase in the value of one-year lag of oil rents, p < .01). 
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Table M1. Oil Rents and Opposition Unity, 1975–2010 (First Stage) 
 Model (1) 
OU 
Model (2) 
OU 
Model (3) 
OU 
Model (4) 
OU 
Lagged oil rents (% of GDP) 0.005
***
 0.006
***
 0.005
***
 0.006
***
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Government unity  -0.025 -0.021  
  (0.049) (0.048)  
Presidentialism  -0.007 -0.013 -0.022 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Log GDP pc  0.022 0.018  
  (0.025) (0.025)  
Growth  -0.003
**
   
  (0.001)   
Autocratic duration  0.001  0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Personalist rule  -0.026 -0.032 0.003 
  (0.081) (0.058) (0.074) 
Log population  -0.148 -0.169 -0.126 
  (0.142) (0.138) (0.139) 
Previous democratic exp.  0.086  0.141 
  (0.175)  (0.175) 
No. of subjects 936 925 930 936 
No. of groups 70 70 70 70 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6168 0.6204 0.6213 0.6185 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. OU: opposition unity. 
Table M2 presents an original model committed to the problem of 
endogeneity by Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity. When using an IV, 
the results are similar to the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, with 
estimated coefficients much larger than in OLS (e.g., at Model 2, OLS: 0.026, 
p < .05; IV: 0.336, p < .01). The instrument was not weak comparing 
Cragg-Donald F Statistics with 10% relative bias of the 2SLS estimator we 
were willing to tolerate. Further, I can reject the weak instrument because the 
first-stage F statistics exceed 10. 
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Table M2. Opposition Unity and Judicial Independence, 1975–2010 (Second 
Stage) 
 Model (1) 
JI 
Model (2) 
JI 
Model (3) 
JI 
Model (4) 
JI 
Opposition unity 0.244
**
 0.336
***
 0.360
***
 0.312
***
 
 (0.112) (0.128) (0.131) (0.117) 
Government unity  0.037
*
 0.051
**
  
  (0.021) (0.022)  
Presidentialism  -0.067
***
 -0.068
***
 -0.070
***
 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Log GDP pc  0.043
***
 0.048
***
  
  (0.011) (0.011)  
Growth  0.001   
  (0.001)   
Autocratic duration  0.001  0.002
**
 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Personalist rule  -0.164
***
 -0.150
***
 -0.113
***
 
  (0.035) (0.026) (0.031) 
Log population  0.148
**
 0.120
*
 0.074 
  (0.065) (0.067) (0.061) 
Previous democratic exp.  -0.050  -0.026 
  (0.075)  (0.073) 
No. of subjects 936 925 930 936 
No. of groups 70 70 70 70 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8385 0.8174 0.8030 0.8228 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DWH endogeneity test 5.441
**
 14.100
***
 15.866
***
 12.301
***
 
Cragg-Donald F Statistics 12.030 11.271 11.616 12.659 
Sargan Statistics 0 (exact) 0 (exact) 0 (exact) 0 (exact) 
Note: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. JI: judicial 
independence. 
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APPENDIX 
A. list of dictatorships with multiparty elections, 1975-2010 (GWF) 
Country Start End Regime Types 
Algeria 1990 1992 Party 
 1997 2010 Military 
Angola 1993 1997 Party 
 2009 2010 Party 
Armenia 1995 1998 Personal 
 1999 2010 Personal 
Azerbaijan 1994 2010 Personal 
Bangladesh 1980 1982 Personal 
 1987 1990 Personal 
Belarus 1992 1994 Party 
 1995 1997 Personal 
 2005 2010 Personal 
Botswana 1975 2010 Party 
Brazil 1975 1985 Military 
Burkina Faso 1979 1980 Personal 
 1993 2010 Personal 
Burundi 1997 2003 Military 
Cambodia 1994 2010 Party 
Cameroon 1991 2010 Personal 
C.A. Republic 1993 1993 Military 
 2006 2010 Personal 
Chad 1998 2006 Personal 
Congo-Brazzaville 2003 2010 Personal 
Congo-Kinshasa 1991 1992 Personal 
 2007 2010 Personal 
Cote d'Ivoire 1991 1999 Party 
 2000 2000 Personal 
 2001 2010 Personal 
Dominican Republic 1975 1978 Personal 
Egypt 1980 2010 Party 
El Salvador 1975 1979 Party 
 1983 1994 Military 
Ethiopia 1996 2010 Party 
Gabon 1991 2010 Party 
Gambia 1975 1994 Party 
 1997 2010 Personal 
Georgia 1993 2003 Personal 
Ghana 1993 2000 Personal 
Guatemala 1975 1982 Military 
 1986 1995 Military 
Guinea 1996 2008 Personal 
Guinea Bissau 1995 1997 Personal 
 2003 2003 Personal 
Haiti 1980 1986 Personal 
 1992 1994 Military 
 2000 2004 Personal 
Indonesia 1975 1999 Party 
Iran 1975 1975 Monarchy 
 1981 2010 n.a. 
Iraq 1992 2003 Personal 
Jordan 1993 2009 Monarchy 
Kazakhstan 1994 1994 Personal 
 1996 2010 Personal 
Kenya 1975 1982 Party 
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 1993 2002 Party 
Kyrgyzstan 1996 2005 Personal 
 2006 2010 Personal 
Lao 2003 2010 Party 
Liberia 1986 1990 Personal 
 1998 2003 Personal 
Madagascar 1984 1993 Personal 
 2010 2010 Personal 
Malawi 1994 1994 Personal 
Malaysia 1975 2010 Party 
Mauritania 1992 2005 Personal 
 2007 2007 Military 
Mexico 1975 2000 Party 
Mongolia 1991 1993 Party 
Morocco 1978 2010 Monarchy 
Mozambique 1995 2010 Party 
Namibia 1991 2010 Party 
Nicaragua 1975 1979 Personal 
 1985 1990 Party 
Niger 1997 1999 Personal 
Nigeria 1993 1993 Military 
Pakistan 1976 1977 Personal 
 2003 2008 Military 
Panama 1985 1989 Military 
Paraguay 1975 1993 Party 
Peru 1979 1979 Military 
 1993 2000 Personal 
Philippines 1979 1986 Personal 
Republic of Korea 1975 1987 Military 
Russia 1994 2010 Personal 
Rwanda 1992 1994 Military 
 2004 2010 Party 
Senegal 1977 2000 Party 
Sierra Leone 1975 1978 Party 
 1992 1992 Party 
 1998 1998 Personal 
Singapore 1975 2010 Party 
South Africa 1975 1994 Oligarchy 
Soviet Union 1991 1991 Party 
Sri Lanka 1979 1994 Party 
Sudan 2001 2005 Personal 
Syria 1975 2010 Party 
Taiwan 1993 2000 Party 
Tajikistan 1995 2010 Personal 
Tanzania 1993 2010 Party 
Thailand 1980 1988 Military 
Togo 1993 2010 Personal 
Tunisia 1982 2010 Party 
Turkmenistan 1992 2010 Party 
Uganda 1981 1985 Personal 
 1997 2010 Personal 
Uzbekistan 2000 2010 Party 
Venezuela 2006 2010 Personal 
Yemen 1994 2010 Personal 
Yugoslavia 1993 2000 Party 
Zambia 1997 2010 Party 
Zimbabwe 1981 2010 Party 
Note: this study relied on the measure of democracy and dictatorship advanced by Geddes et 
al. (2014). Whenever a non-democratic regime started if (1) an executive achieved power 
through undemocratic means, (2) the government achieved power through democratic means 
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but subsequently changed the formal or informal rules, or (3) competitive elections were held 
to choose the government but one or more parties for which substantial numbers of citizens 
would be expected to vote were banned. In this dataset, Geddes et al. (2014: 318) classified 
authoritarian regimes into party-based dictatorships, military regimes, personalist dictatorships, 
and monarchies. Further, a multi-party system was coded if a regime had a score greater than 
4 on a 7-point measure of the legislative indices of electoral competitiveness (LIEC). 
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B. list of dictatorships with multiparty elections, 1975-2009 (CGV) 
Country Start End Regime Types 
Algeria 1990 1992 Military 
 1997 1999 Military 
 2000 2009 Civilian 
Angola 1993 1997 Civilian 
 2009 2009 Civilian 
Azerbaijan 1993 2009 Civilian 
Bahrain 2007 2009 Royal 
Bangladesh 1980 1982 Military 
 2009 2009 Civilian 
Belarus 1992 1997 Civilian 
 2005 2009 Civilian 
Bosnia–Herzegovina 2003 2009 Civilian 
Botswana 1975 2008 Civilian 
 2009 2009 Military 
Brazil 1975 1985 Military 
Burkina Faso 1979 1980 Military 
 1993 2009 Military 
Burundi 1997 2003 Military 
 2004 2005 Civilian 
Cambodia 1994 2009 Civilian 
Cameroon 1991 2009 Civilian 
C.A. Republic 1993 1993 Military 
 2006 2009 Military 
Chad 1998 2006 Military 
Chile 1990 1990 Military 
Comoro 1988 1990 Civilian 
 1996 1999 Civilian 
 2000 2004 Military 
Congo-Brazzaville 1992 1992 Military 
 2003 2009 Military 
Congo-Kinshasa 1991 1992 Military 
 2007 2009 Civilian 
Cote d'Ivoire 1991 1999 Civilian 
 2000 2000 Military 
 2001 2009 Civilian 
Cyprus 1975 1983 Civilian 
Djibouti 1978 1981 Civilian 
 1993 2009 Civilian 
Ecuador 2001 2002 Civilian 
Egypt 1980 2009 Military 
El Salvador 1975 1979 Military 
 1983 1984 Military 
Equatorial Guinea 1993 2009 Military 
Ethiopia 1996 2009 Civilian 
Fiji 1975 1987 Civilian 
 2002 2006 Civilian 
Gabon 1991 2009 Civilian 
Gambia 1975 1994 Civilian 
 1997 2009 Military 
Georgia 1993 2004 Civilian 
Ghana 1993 1993 Military 
Guatemala 1986 1986 Military 
Guinea 1996 2008 Military 
Guinea Bissau 1995 1997 Military 
 2000 2000 Military 
Guyana 1975 2009 Civilian 
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Haiti 1980 1986 Civilian 
 1991 2009 Civilian 
Honduras 1982 1982 Military 
Indonesia 1975 1999 Military 
Iran 1975 1975 Royal 
 1981 2009 Civilian 
Iraq 1992 2003 Civilian 
 2006 2009 Military 
Jordan 1993 2009 Royal 
Kazakhstan 1994 1994 Civilian 
 1996 2009 Civilian 
Kenya 1975 1982 Civilian 
 1993 1998 Civilian 
Kyrgyzstan 1996 2005 Civilian 
Lao 2003 2009 Military 
Lebanon 1977 1977 Civilian 
 1994 1998 Civilian 
 1999 2007 Military 
 2008 2008 Civilian 
 2009 2009 Military 
Lesotho 1994 2009 Civilian 
Liberia 1986 1990 Military 
 1998 2003 Civilian 
 2006 2006 Civilian 
Madagascar 1984 1993 Military 
Malawi 1994 1994 Civilian 
Malaysia 1975 2009 Military 
Mauritania 1992 2005 Military 
 2007 2007 Military 
Mexico 1975 2000 Civilian 
Morocco 1978 2009 Royal 
Mozambique 1995 2009 Civilian 
Namibia 1991 2009 Civilian 
Nicaragua 1975 1979 Military 
Niger 1997 2000 Military 
Nigeria 1993 1993 Military 
Pakistan 2003 2008 Military 
Panama 1985 1989 Military 
Paraguay 1975 1989 Military 
Peru 1979 1979 Military 
 1991 2001 Civilian 
Philippines 1979 1986 Civilian 
Republic of Korea 1975 1988 Military 
Russia 1992 2009 Civilian 
Rwanda 1992 1994 Military 
 2004 2009 Military 
Samoa 1983 2009 Royal 
Senegal 1977 2000 Civilian 
Sierra Leone 1975 1978 Civilian 
 1992 1992 Military 
 1998 1998 Military 
Singapore 1975 2004 Civilian 
 2005 2009 Military 
South Africa 1975 2009 Civilian 
Soviet Union 1991 1991 Civilian 
Sri Lanka 1978 1989 Civilian 
Sudan 2001 2005 Military 
Suriname 1988 1988 Military 
 1991 1991 Military 
Syria 1975 2009 Military 
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Taiwan 1993 1996 Civilian 
Tajikistan 1995 2009 Civilian 
Tanzania 1993 2005 Civilian 
 2006 2009 Military 
Thailand 2008 2008 Military 
Togo 1993 2005 Military 
 2006 2009 Civilian 
Tunisia 1982 1987 Civilian 
 1988 2009 Military 
Turkmenistan 1992 2009 Civilian 
Uganda 1997 2009 Civilian 
Uruguay 1985 1985 Military 
Uzbekistan 2000 2009 Civilian 
Yemen 1994 2009 Military 
Yugoslavia 1993 2000 Civilian 
Zambia 1992 2009 Civilian 
Zimbabwe 1975 1979 Civilian 
 1981 2009 Civilian 
Note: regarding a test for robustness, this study used Cheibub et al.’s (2010) definition of 
democracy and dictatorship. A democracy was defined if (1) the chief executive is popularly 
elected or chosen by a body itself popularly elected, (2) the legislature is popularly elected, (3) 
multiple parties legally allowed can compete in elections, and (4) alternation in power occurs, 
and the rules under which it occurs are the same as those that brought incumbents to power. 
In this dataset, Cheibub et al. (2010) classified authoritarian regimes into civilian dictatorship, 
military, and royal dictatorship. Further, a multi-party system was coded if a regime had a 
score greater than 4 on a 7-point measure of the legislative indices of electoral 
competitiveness (LIEC). 
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C. list of legislative elections the major opposition boycotted in 
dictatorships with multiparty elections, 1975-2010 
Country NELDA Author’s coding Vdem 
Algeria 1997  No 
 2002 Five opposition parties boycotted the election, including the 
Socialist Forces Front (FFS), Rally for Culture and 
Democracy (RCD), Republican National Alliance (ANR), 
Movement of Democrats and Socialists (MDS), and the 
Socialist Workers’ Party (PST)
1
 
No 
 2007 Several opposition parties, including the FFS, the main 
factions of the Movement for National Reform (MNR), and the 
leftist MDS, boycotted the election
2
 
No 
Azerbaijan 1995/1996  No 
 2000/2001  No 
Bangladesh 1986 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) boycotted the election
3
 Yes 
 1988 Three leading opposition groups, including the Awami 
League (an eight-party alliance) headed by Sheikha Hasina 
Wajed, the Moslem Jammai-i-Islami, and the right-wing BNP, 
boycotted the election
4
 
Yes 
Belarus 2008  No 
Cambodia 1993 The Party of Democratic Kampuchea, a political continuation 
of the radical Khmer Rouge guerrilla group that ruled in the 
1970s, boycotted the election
5
 
Yes 
Cameroon 1992 Three large opposition parties, including the Social 
Democratic Party, the Democratic Union, and the Union of 
Democratic Forces, boycotted the election
6
 
Yes 
Chad  2002: two important opposition parties, the Union for 
Democracy and the Republic (UDR), and the Party for Liberty 
and Development (PLD), boycotted the election
7
 
Yes 
Congo-Brazzaville 2002 The three leaders of Pan-African Union for Social Democracy 
(UPADS), the Congolese Movement for Democracy and 
Integral Development (MCDDI), and Rally for Democracy and 
Development (RDD) issued a joint request to their militants to 
boycott the legislative polls 
Yes 
 2007 About 40 opposition parties, including the Reflection for a 
New National Order and the General Movement for the 
Construction of the Congo, boycotted the election
8
 
Yes 
Congo (DRC)  2006: É tienne Tshisekedi and his party, the Union for 
Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), boycotted the 
election
9
 
Yes 
Cote d'Ivoire 2000/2001 The former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara barred from 
standing in the legislative elections urged voters for his party, 
Rally of the Republicans (RDR), to boycott the election
10
 
Yes 
Dominican Republic 1974 The “Santiago Agreement”, an opposition coalition of 
extreme right and left-wing groups, carried out its threat to 
boycott unless the Central Electoral Board reversed its ruling 
allowing citizens to vote at any of the nation’s 5,000 polling 
booths
11
 
Yes 
Egypt 1990 The main opposition, including Al-Wafd Party, Socialist 
Labour Party (SLP), and Liberal Socialist Party (LSP), which 
claimed that the reformed Electoral Law failed to guarantee 
free elections and boycotted the election
12
 
1984: Yes 
1987: Yes 
1990: Yes 
 2010 Former Director General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency Mohamed ElBaradei urged all opposition forces to 
boycott the elections. Former presidential candidate, Ayman 
Nour, announced that his Al-Ghad Party would boycott, while 
Al-Wafd Party and the Muslim Brotherhood disavowed 
boycott
13
 
1995: Yes 
2010: Yes 
El Salvador 1976 All the opposition boycotted the election as a result of 
massive electoral fraud
14
 
Yes 
 1978 The National Opposition Union (UNO) boycotted the election, 
and only one opposition party, the right-wing 
People's Party (PPS), contested with the ruling National 
Conciliation Party (PCN)
15
 
No 
 1982 Leftist parties boycotted the election
16
 No 
 1985 The armed left-wing Frente Farabundo Marti para la 
Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) insurgency refused to 
participate 
Yes 
 1988 The Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), an leftist 
guerrillas movement, called for an election boycott
17
 
Yes 
Ethiopia 1995 Four of the seven national parties boycotted the election, 
alleging unequal conditions for the various contending 
Yes 
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groups
18
 
Gabon 1990 The leader of the largest opposition party, the Bûcherons (a 
MORENA breakaway faction), declared that the party would 
boycott the second round of the new elections 
1990: No 
1996: Yes 
 2001 Some ten opposition parties boycotted the election
19
 2001: Yes 
2006: Yes 
Gambia 2002 Several opposition parties, including the Ousainou Darboe’s 
United Democratic Party (UDP), boycotted the election
20
 
No 
Georgia  1995: Some leftist parties, especially the “Zviadists”, 
supporters of the late Communist president Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, boycotted the election
21
 
Yes 
Ghana 1992 The four parties, including People’s National Convention, 
National Independence Party, People’s Heritage Party, and 
New Patriotic Party boycotted the election
22
 
Yes 
Guatemala   1974: Yes 
1978: Yes 
Guinea 2002 The so-called “radical” opposition parties, including the 
Guinean People's Rally (RPG) and the Union of Republic 
Forces (UFR), refused to take part in which they viewed as 
an “electoral farce”
23
 
Yes 
Haiti 2000 All the major opposition parties boycotted the second round 
of the election after having denounced incidents involving 
fraud in the first round
24
 
1979: Yes 
1984: Yes 
1991: Yes 
2000: Yes 
Iraq   1996: Yes 
2000: Yes 
Jordan 1997 Islamic Action Front (IAF) boycotted the election to protest 
election reforms
25
 
No 
Kazakhstan 1995 Many opposition parties boycotted the election
26
 No 
Mauritania 1992 Six opposition parties, including the largest, the Union of 
Democratic Forces (UFD), boycotted the election 
Yes 
 1996 The UFD boycotted the second round of the election
27
 Yes 
Morocco 1977 Some opposition parties, including the National Union of 
Popular Forces (UNFP), boycotted the election 
No 
 1993 Some leftists opposition called for boycott No 
Nicaragua 1984 The leading right-wing parties, Nicaraguan Democratic 
Coordinating Committee (CDN), boycotted the election
28
 
Yes 
Niger 1996 Eight opposition parties, grouped within the Front for the 
Restoration of Democracy (FRDD), decided to boycott the 
election due to several of their unfulfilled conditions
29
 
No 
Pakistan   2002: Yes 
Paraguay 1983 The Authentic Liberal Radical Party (PLRA), which aligned 
with three other small centrist parties, boycotted the 
election
30
 
Yes 
 1988 Opposition groups persuaded Paraguayans to boycott the 
presidential and legislative elections
31
 
Yes 
Peru 1978 Fernando Belaúnde Terry's Popular Action Party (AP) 
boycotted the constituent assembly election
32
 
Yes 
  1992: The main opposition parties, including the two largest, 
the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance and the Popular 
Action Party, called on Peruvians to boycott the election
33
 
Yes 
Philippines 1984 Many opposition leaders, including Agapito Aquino, brother of 
the opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino Jr. who was 
assassinated, boycotted the election
34
 
Yes 
Republic of Korea 1981  No 
Rwanda 2008 All the opposition boycotted the election
35
 No 
Senegal 1978 The National Democratic Rally (RND) leader, Cheikh Anta 
Diop, called for a boycott
36
 
No 
 1983 Six recently-legalized smaller parties, mostly of the far Left, 
namely the Senegalese Republican Movement (MRS), the 
Revolutionary Movement for the New Democracy (And-Jëf), 
and the Workers’ Communist League, boycotted the election 
No 
 1988 Part of the opposition decided to boycott the election
37
 No 
Singapore 1980 Barisan Sosialis opposed elections from 1965 up to 1980 
because they did not agree with separation from Malaysia 
No 
South Africa 1981 The Natal Indian Congress led Indians who reject the 
Government’s brand of ethnic politics to boycott
38
 
No 
 1984 United Democratic Front (UDF) led Indian community to 
boycott the election over the creation of a tricameral 
parliament consisting of White, Coloured, and Indian 
chambers
39
 
No 
 1987 Several anti-apartheid leaders issued calls for an election 
boycott
40
 
No 
 1989 Indians and coloreds boycotted, and black South Africans 
called for boycotts
41
 
No 
Sri Lanka 1989 The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the extremist Yes 
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Sinhala organisation, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE), the militant Tamil group demanding a separate 
homeland in the north-east, called for a boycott of the 
election
42
 
Sudan 2000 All the main opposition parties, including the Umma Party, the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the Popular National 
Congress (PNC), boycotted the election
43
 
Yes 
Syria 1981 The Muslim Brotherhood was leading an armed insurgency 
against the government at the time 
1977: Yes 
1981: Yes 
  2003: Five new opposition political groupings boycotted the 
poll, arguing the process was not democratic
44
 
1986: Yes 
1990: Yes 
1994: Yes 
1998: Yes 
2003: Yes 
 2007 The opposition in exile boycotted elections, describing it as a 
farce
45
 
Yes 
Tajikistan 1995 The elections were widely boycotted by opponents to 
President Rakhamanov, including the newly formed Party of 
Popular Unity and Justice headed by Abdumalik 
Abdullojanov
46
 
Yes 
Tanzania 2000 The second round of legislative elections in Zanzibar was 
held because the first round results were annulled in this 
area. The Civic United Front (CUF) boycotted this round due 
to concerns that there were irregularities in the election
47
 
No 
Togo 1994 One major opposition party, the Union of the Forces of 
Change (UFC), called for a boycott of the polls
48
 
Yes 
 1999 All eight opposition parties boycotted the election
49
 Yes 
 2002 Under the umbrella of the “Coalition of Democratic Forces”, 
nine opposition parties urged the public to boycott the 
elections
50
 
Yes 
Tunisia 1986 All opposition parties boycotted the poll due to alleged 
electoral irregularities
51
 
Yes 
 1994  Yes 
 1999  Yes 
 2004 The Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), an opposition 
party, boycotted the election
52
 
Yes 
Venezuela 2005 Five major opposition parties boycotted the election
53
 No 
Yemen 1997 Several opposition parties, including the Yemeni Socialist 
Party, boycotted the election
54
 
Yes 
Yugoslavia 1992 Political parties of ethnic Kosovo Albanians, namely the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), boycotted the 
election
55
 
No 
 1996 Several parties, including the Democratic Party, the 
Democratic Party of Serbia, the Civic Alliance, and most 
Kosovo Albanians boycotted the election
56
 
No 
Zambia 1996 The main opposition party, the United National Independence 
Party (UNIP), led by former Zambian President Kenneth 
Kuanda, boycotted the election
57
 
Yes 
Zimbabwe 1980  No 
 1990  No 
 1995 Four parties boycotted the elections due to their displeasure 
with the Constitution and the Electoral Act which they felt 
gave too much power to the ruling party in deciding the 
conduct of the polls
58
 
No 
 2000  No 
Note: the study coded elections that the major opposition had boycotted using data obtained from the following 
sources. Further, I used National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA)’s NELDA14 variable in which 
a “Yes” was coded if at least some opposition leaders announced and carried out a public boycott of the election while 
a “No” was coded if not. Finally, I used Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)’s v2elboycot variable (ordinal, 0-4). I 
converted it into a binary variable where a “Yes” was coded if (1) all opposition parties and candidates boycotted the 
election; or (2) some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted, and they were not relatively insignificant 
ones while a “No” was coded if (1) no parties or candidates boycotted the election; or (2) a few opposition parties or 
candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones. 
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D. Comparison of different coding on legislative elections the major 
opposition boycotted in dictatorships with multiparty elections, 
1975-2010 
NELDA boycott not coded as 
Author’s coding on boycott 
Author’s coding on boycott not 
coded as NELDA boycott 
NELDA, Vdem, and Author’s coding 
on boycott 
Algeria 1997 Chad 2002 Bangladesh 1986 
Azerbaijan 1995/1996 Congo (DRC) 2006 Bangladesh 1988 
Azerbaijan 2000/2001 Georgia 1995 Cambodia 1993 
Belarus 2008 Peru 1992 Cameroon 1992 
Republic of Korea 1981 Syria 2003 Congo-Brazzaville 2002 
Tunisia 1994  Congo-Brazzaville 2007 
Tunisia 1999  Cote d'Ivoire 2000/2001 
Zimbabwe 1980  Dominican Republic 1974 
Zimbabwe 1990  Egypt 1990 
Zimbabwe 2000  Egypt 2010 
  El Salvador 1976 
  El Salvador 1985 
  El Salvador 1988 
  Ethiopia 1995 
  Gabon 2001 
  Ghana 1992 
  Guinea 2002 
  Haiti 2000 
  Mauritania 1992 
  Mauritania 1996 
  Nicaragua 1984 
  Paraguay 1983 
  Paraguay 1988 
  Peru 1978 
  Philippines 1984 
  Sri Lanka 1989 
  Sudan 2000 
  Syria 1981 
  Syria 2007 
  Tajikistan 1995 
  Togo 1994 
  Togo 1999 
  Togo 2002 
  Tunisia 1986 
  Tunisia 2004 
  Yemen 1997 
  Zambia 1996 
Note: see Appendix C. 
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E. list of presidential elections in dictatorships with multiparty elections, 
1975-2010 
Country Date President (% in all candidates) Runner-up (% in other candidates) Boycott 
Afghanistan 2009 Hamid Karzai (2001-, 49.67%) Abdullah Abdullah (60.78%) 
Note: The Taliban called for a boycott 
of the election 
Yes 
Algeria 1995 Liamine Zéroual (1995-1999, 61%) Mahfoud Nahnah (65.59%) 
Note: three major parties boycotted 
the election 
Yes 
1999 Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999-, 73.8%) Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi (53.64%) 
Note: major opposition boycotted, but 
their names remained on the ballot 
papers 
Yes 
2004 Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999-, 85%) Ali Benflis (42.8%) 
Note: the Kabyle population boycotted 
the election 
Yes 
2009 Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999-, 90.24%) Louisa Hanoune (43.89%) 
Note: The Rally for Culture and 
Democracy boycotted the election 
Yes 
Angola 1992 José Eduardo dos Santos (1979-, 49.57%) Jonas Malheiro Savimbi (79.46%) No 
Armenia 1996 Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1991-1998, 51.3%) Vazgen Mikaeli Manukyan (84.19%) No 
1998 Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008, 38.5%) Karen Demirchyan (49.54%) No 
2003 Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008, 49.48%) Stepan Demirchyan (55.87%) No 
2008 Serzh Sargsyan (2008-, 52.82%) Levon Ter-Petrosyan (45.6%) No 
Azerbaijan 1993 Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003, 98.8%) Kerar Abilov (86.84%) 
Note: almost all opposition leaders 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
1998 Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003, 77.6%) Etibar Mammadov (52.83%) 
Note: five opposition leaders 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
2003 Ilham Aliyev (2003-, 75.38%) Isa Gambar (61.29%) No 
2008 Ilham Aliyev (2003-, 87.34%) Igbal Aghazade (25.4%) 
Note: several major opposition parties 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
Bangladesh 1978 Ziaur Rahman (1977-1981, 76.6%) Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani 
(92.86%) 
No 
1981 Abdus Sattar (1981-1982, 65.5%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Kamal Hossain (75.41%) No 
1986 Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1983-1990, 
84.1%) 
Mauluna Mohammadullah (36.65%) 
Note: Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
Belarus 1994 Alexander Lukashenko (1994-, 45.8%) Vyacheslav Kebich (32.62%) No 
2001 Alexander Lukashenko (1994-, 77.4%) Uładzimir Hančaryk (86.3%) No 
2006 Alexander Lukashenko (1994-, 84.4%) Alaksandar Milinkievič (51.75%) No 
2010 Alexander Lukashenko (1994-, 79.7%) Andrei Sannikov (18.74%) No 
Bolivia 1978 Juan Pereda (1978-1978, 50.9%) 
Note: the Electoral Court annulled the 
results, followed by a military coup 
Hernán Siles Zuazo (51.94%) No 
Burkina Faso 1978 Sangoulé Lamizana (1978-1980, 42.2%) Macaire Ouédraogo (43.6%) No 
1998 Blaise Compaoré (1987-, 87.5%) Ram Ouédraogo (53.03%) 
Note: the umbrella of the February 14 
Group boycotted the election 
Yes 
2005 Blaise Compaoré (1987-, 80.35%) Bénéwendé Stanislas Sankara 
(24.82%) 
No 
2010 Blaise Compaoré (1987-, 80.2%) Hama Arba Diallo (41.35%) No 
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Burundi 1993 Melchior Ndadaye (1993-1993, 65.68%) 
Note: assassinated during a military coup by 
elements of the predominantly Tutsi army. 
Pierre Buyoya (95.74%) No 
Cameroon 1992 Paul Biya (1982-, 40%) John Fru Ndi (59.92%) No 
1997 Paul Biya (1982-, 92.57%) Henri Hogbe Nlend (33.71%) 
Note: three main opposition parties 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
2004 Paul Biya (1982-, 70.92%) John Fru Ndi (59.85%) No 
C.A. Republic 1981 David Dacko (1979-1981, 51.10%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Ange-Félix Patassé (79.27%) 
Note: another potential candidate, 
Jean Tandalet Ozi Okito of the Central 
African Socialist Party, withdrew his 
candidature, stating that the elections 
were being held prematurely 
Yes 
 2005 François Bozizé (2003-, 42.97%) Martin Ziguélé (41.26%) No 
Chad 1996 Idriss Déby (1990-, 43.82%) Wadel Abdelkader Kamougué 
(22.07%) 
No 
2001 Idriss Déby (1990-, 63.17%) Ngarlejy Yorongar (44.39%) No 
2006 Idriss Déby (1990-, 64.67%) Delwa Kassiré Koumakoye (42.83%) 
Note: most parties boycotted in 
response to Déby’s decision to run for 
a third term 
Yes 
Congo 2002 Denis Sassou Nguesso (1997-, 89.4%) Kignoumbi Kia Mboungou (26.42%) 
Note: the main opposition leaders 
were in exile, prevented from returning 
to Congo by legal convictions. The 
only important opposition figure, André 
Milongo of the Union for Democracy 
and the Republic, withdrew before the 
election 
Yes 
2009 Denis Sassou Nguesso (1997-, 78.6%) Kignoumbi Kia Mboungou (34.89%) 
Note: six opposition leaders boycotted 
the election 
Yes 
Congo (DRC) 2006 Joseph Kabila (2001-, 44.81%) Jean-Pierre Bemba (32.81%) No 
Cote d'Ivoire 1990 Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993, 
81.68%) 
Note: died in office 
Laurent Gbagbo (100%) No 
1995 Henri Konan Bédié (1993-1999, 96%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Francis Wodié (100%) 
Note: the FPI and RDR boycotted the 
election in protest of new electoral 
rules 
Yes 
2000 Laurent Gbagbo (2000-2011, 59.4%) Robert Guéï (80.51%) 
Note: the RDR and PDCI-RCA 
boycotted the election in response to 
the exclusion of their candidates 
Yes 
2010 Laurent Gbagbo (2000-2011, 38.04%) 
Note: arrested by backers of Alassane 
Ouattara after a short period of civil conflict 
Alassane Ouattara (51.76%) No 
Egypt 2005 Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011, 88.6%) 
Note: resigned in anti-Mubarak protesters, 
and power was turned over to the Egyptian 
military 
Ayman Nour (72.28%) No 
El Salvador 1977 Carlos Humberto Romero (1977-1979, 
67.3%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Ernesto Antonio Claramount Roseville 
(100%) 
No 
1984 José Napoleón Duarte (1984-1989, 43.41%) 
Note: hand power over constitutionally, and 
died in 1990 
Roberto D’ Aubuisson (52.60%) 
Note: Leftist leaders boycotted the 
election. 
Yes 
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1989 Alfredo Cristiani (1989-1994, 53.82%) 
Note: retired from politics in 1994 
Fidel Chávez Mena (79.02%) 
Note: FSLN called for a boycott of the 
election 
Yes 
Gabon 1993 Omar Bongo Ondimba (1967-2009, 51.2%) Paul Mba Abessole (34.69%) No 
1998 Omar Bongo Ondimba (1967-2009, 66.9%) Pierre Mamboundou (49.81%) No 
2005 Omar Bongo Ondimba (1967-2009, 79.18%) 
Note: died in office 
Pierre Mamboundou (65.37%) No 
2009 Ali Bongo Ondimba (2009-, 41.73%) André Mba Obame (44.41%) No 
Gambia 1982 Dawda Jawara (1970-1994, 72.44%) Sheriff Mustapha Dibba (100%) No 
1987 Dawda Jawara (1970-1994, 59.18%) Sheriff Mustapha Dibba (67.39%) No 
1992 Dawda Jawara (1970-1994, 58.48%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Sheriff Mustapha Dibba (53.48%) No 
1996 Yahya Jammeh (1994-, 55.77%) Ousainou Darboe (81.03%) No 
2001 Yahya Jammeh (1994-, 52.84%) Ousainou Darboe (69.11%) No 
2006 Yahya Jammeh (1994-, 67.3%) Ousainou Darboe (81.65%) No 
Georgia 1991 Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1991-1992, 71.5%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Valerian Advadze (66.06%) No 
1995 Eduard Shevardnadze (1995-2003, 77%) Jumber Patiashvili (87.35%) No 
2000 Eduard Shevardnadze (1995-2003, 71.5%) 
Note: resigned in mass demonstrations 
Jumber Patiashvili (95.14%) No 
Ghana 1992 Jerry Rawlings (1981-2001, 58.4%) Albert Adu Boahen (72.80%) No 
1996 Jerry Rawlings (1981-2001, 57.4%) John Kufuor (93.07%) No 
Guatemala 1978 Fernando Romeo Lucas García (1978-1982, 
40.33%) Note: No candidate received more 
than 50% of the vote, elected by the 
Congress 
Enrique Peralta Azurdia (56.85%) No 
1982 Á ngel Aníbal Guevara (1982-1982, 38.86%)   
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Mario Sandoval Alarcón (46.20%) 
Note: the left-wing United 
Revolutionary Front (FUR) decided 
not to participate in the presidential 
elections because of the numerous 
assassinations of many of its leaders 
and activists in recent previous years 
Yes 
1985 Vinicio Cerezo (1986-1991, 38.65%) Jorge Carpio Nicolle (32.97%) No 
1990 Jorge Serrano Elías (1991-1993, 24.1%) 
Note: resigned in strong protests, combined 
with international pressure, and the army's 
enforcement of the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court 
Jorge Carpio Nicolle (33.90%) No 
Guinea 1993 Lansana Conté (1984-2008, 51.70 %) Alpha Condé (40.49%) 
Note: Changement Démocratique, a 
coalition of 30 parties, called for a 
boycott of the poll 
Yes 
1998 Lansana Conté (1984-2008, 56.1%) Mamadou Bah (56.11%) No 
2003 Lansana Conté (1984-2008, 95.6%) 
Note: died in office, followed by a coup d'état 
Mamadou Bhoye Barry (100%) 
Note: the main opposition parties 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
2010 Alpha Condé (2010-, 18.25%) Cellou Dalein Diallo (53.44%) No 
Guinea Bissau 1994 João Bernardo Vieira (1984-1999, 46.2%) 
Note: went into exile after a civil war 
Kumba Ialá (40.66%) No 
Haiti 1988 Leslie Manigat (1988-1988, 50.2%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Hubert de Ronceray (39.56%) 
Note: four leading opposition 
candidates formed the Committee for 
Democratic Understanding with the 
aim of campaigning for a boycott of 
the election 
Yes 
 2000 Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2001-2004, 91.7%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Arnold Dumas (24.10%) 
Note: the opposition parties, 
Yes 
94 
 
organised into the recently created 
Convergence Démocratique, 
boycotted the election after disputing 
the results of the parliamentary 
elections 
Iran 1989 Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997, 
94.51%) 
Abbas Sheibani (100%) No 
1993 Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997, 
64%) 
Ahmad Tavakkoli (67.5%) No 
1997 Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005, 69.07%) Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri (80.54%) No 
2001 Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005, 76.90%) Ahmad Tavakkoli (72.97%) No 
2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-, 19.43%) Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (27.66%) No 
2009 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-, 62.63%) Mir-Hossein Mousavi (92.92%) No 
Kazakhstan 1999 Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991-, 81%) Serikbolsyn Abdildin (66.85%) 
Note: the RPPK boycotted the election 
because its leader, Akezhan 
Kazhegeldin, was denied a spot on 
the ballot 
Yes 
2005 Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991-, 91.15%) Jarmahan Tuyaqbay (74.73%) No 
Kenya 1992 Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002, 36.6%) Kenneth Matiba (40.54%) No 
1997 Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002, 40.4%) Mwai Kibaki (51.83%) No 
Kyrgyzstan 1995 Askar Akayev (1990-2005, 72.4%) Absamat Masaliyev (93.41%) No 
2000 Askar Akayev (1990-2005, 76.4%) 
Note: resigned in mass demonstrations 
Omurbek Tekebayev (62.10%) No 
2005 Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010, 88.9%) Tursunbai Bakir Uulu (34.23%) No 
2009 Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-2010, 76.12%) 
Note: resigned in mass demonstrations 
Almazbek Atambayev (46.59%) No 
Liberia 1985 Samuel Doe (1980-1990, 50.93%) 
Note: assassinated in a civil war 
Jackson Doe (53.90%) No 
1997 Charles Taylor (1997-2003, 75.33%) 
Note: went into exile in a civil war 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (38.83%) No 
Madagascar 1982 Didier Ratsiraka (1975-1993, 80.16%) Monja Jaona (100%) No 
1989 Didier Ratsiraka (1975-1993, 62.71%) Manandafy Rakotonirina (51.83%) No 
Mauritania 1992 Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya (1984-2005, 
62.7%) 
Ahmed Ould Daddah (88.60%) No 
1997 Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya (1984-2005, 
90.94%) 
Chbih Ould Cheikh Malainine 
(77.51%) 
Note: the main opposition parties 
boycotted the election in response to 
the government’s refusal to allow the 
establishment of an independent 
electoral commission 
Yes 
2003 Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya (1984-2005, 
67.0%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla 
(57.45%) 
No 
2009 Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (2008-, 52.58%) Messaoud Ould Boulkheir (34.35%) No 
Mexico 1976 José López Portillo (1976-1982, 100%) Note: the opposition party PAN was 
going through internal conflicts, 
refusing to put forward a candidate in 
the election 
Yes 
1982 Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988, 74.3%) Pablo Emilio Madero (63.89%) No 
1988 Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994, 
50.36%) 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (62.50%) No 
1994 Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000, 48.69%) Diego Fernández de Cevallos 
(53.64%) 
No 
Mozambique 1994 Joaquim Chissano (1986-2005, 53.30%) Afonso Dhlakama (72.23%) No 
1999 Joaquim Chissano (1986-2005, 52.29%) Afonso Dhlakama (100%) No 
2004 Armando Guebuza (2005-, 63.74%) Afonso Dhlakama (87.02%) No 
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2009 Armando Guebuza (2005-, 75.01%) Afonso Dhlakama (65.64%) No 
Nicaragua 1984 Daniel Ortega (1979-1990, 66.97%) Clemente Guido Chavez (42.52%) 
Note: the leading right-wing coalition, 
Coordinadora Democratica 
Nicaraguense, boycotted the election 
Yes 
Niger 1996 Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara (1996-1999, 
66.97%) 
Note: assassinated at the airport of Niamey 
Mahamane Ousmane (41.34%) No 
Nigeria 1993 Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola 
(1993-1993, 58.36%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Bashir Tofa (100%) No 
Panama 1984 Nicolás Ardito Barletta (1984-1985, 46.98%) 
Note: resigned after serious discrepancies 
with the commanders at Defense Forces 
Headquarters 
Arnulfo Arias (88.10%) No 
Paraguay 1978 Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989, 90.8%) Germán Acosta Caballero (59.74%) 
Note: many opposition leaders 
advocated that their supporters turn in 
blank ballots 
Yes 
1983 Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989, 91.0%) Enzo Doldan (63.47%) 
Note: most of the legal opposition 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
1988 Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989, 89.6%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d'état 
Luis María Vega (69.23%) 
Note: most of the legal opposition 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
1989 Andrés Rodríguez (1989-1993, 76.59%) Domingo Laíno (89.60%) No 
Peru 1995 Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000, 64.3%) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (60.27%) No 
Philippines 1981 Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986, 88.02%) 
Note: resigned after the snap elections of 
1986 and in mass demonstrations, return to 
democracy in 1987 
Alejo Santos (68.88%) 
Note: most opposition parties 
boycotted the election as a sign of 
protest over the 1978 elections for the 
National Assembly 
Yes 
Russia 1996 Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999, 35.8%) 
Note: resigned in 1999 
Gennady Zyuganov (51.86%) No 
2000 Vladimir Putin (1999-2008, 53.44%) Gennady Zyuganov (63.32%) No 
2004 Vladimir Putin (1999-2008, 71.31%) Nikolay Kharitonov (49.14%) No 
2008 Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012, 71.2%) Gennady Zyuganov (62.73%) No 
Rwanda 2003 Paul Kagame (2000-, 95%) Faustin Twagiramungu (73.21%) No 
2010 Paul Kagame (2000-, 93.08%) Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo 
(74.38%) 
No 
Senegal 1978 Léopold Sédar Senghor (1960-1980, 82.2%) 
Note: resigned by the end of 1980 
Abdoulaye Wade (100%) 
Note: RND leader, Cheikh Anta Diop, 
called for a boycott 
Yes 
1983 Abdou Diouf (1981-2000, 83.45%) Abdoulaye Wade (89.38%) 
Note: MDP leader, Mamadou Dia, 
called for a boycott 
Yes 
1988 Abdou Diouf (1981-2000, 73.20%) Abdoulaye Wade (96.27%) 
Note: part of the opposition boycotted 
the election 
Yes 
1993 Abdou Diouf (1981-2000, 58.40%) Abdoulaye Wade (77.00%) No 
Serbia 1992 Slobodan Milošević (1991-1997, 53.24%) Milan Panić (81.44%) 
Note: political parties of ethnic Kosovo 
Albanians boycotted the election 
Yes 
1997 Milan Milutinović (1997-2002, 43.7%) 
Note: return to democracy in 2000 
Vojislav Šešelj (57.17%) 
Note: several parties, including most 
Kosovo Albanians, boycotted the 
election by several parties, claiming 
that the elections would not be held 
Yes 
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under fair conditions 
Sri Lanka 1982 J. R. Jayewardene (1978-1989, 52.91%) Hector Kobbekaduwa (82.97%) No 
1988 Ranasinghe Premadasa (1989-1993, 
50.43%) 
Note: assassinated in Colombo 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike (90.67%) No 
Sudan 1996 Omar al-Bashir (1989-, 75.40%) Abd al-Majid Sultan Kijab (0.99%) 
Note: the main opposition parties, 
including the Umma Party and the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
2000 Omar al-Bashir (1989-, 86.5%) Gaafar Nimeiry (72.73%) 
Note: all the main opposition parties 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
2010 Omar al-Bashir (1989-, 68.24%) Yasir Arman (68.29%) 
Note: several of the biggest opposition 
parties boycotted the election 
Yes 
Taiwan 1996 Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000, 54.00%) Peng Ming-min (100%) No 
Tajikistan 1991 Rahmon Nabiyev (1991-1992, 59.5%) 
Note: deposed by a coup d’état 
Davlat Khudonazarov (69.84%) No 
1994 Emomali Rahmon (1992-, 59.5%) Abdumalik Abdullajanov (100%) 
Note: the opposition forces boycotted 
the election because they were not 
allowed to form political parties and 
were effectively shut out of political 
activity prior to the election 
Yes 
1999 Emomali Rahmon (1992-, 97.6%) Davlat Usmon (100%) No 
2006 Emomali Rahmon (1992-, 79.3%) Olimzhon Boboyev (31.91%) 
Note: the Islamic Renaissance Party 
of Tajikistan, the Democratic Party, 
and the Social Democratic Party all 
boycotted the elections, refusing to 
accept the constitutional changes that 
allowed Rahmon to seek a third term 
Yes 
Tanzania 1995 Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005, 61.82%) Augustino Mrema (72.74%) No 
2000 Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005, 71.74%) Ibrahim Lipumba (57.56%) No 
2005 Jakaya Kikwete (2005-, 80.28%) Ibrahim Lipumba (59.21%) No 
2010 Jakaya Kikwete (2005-, 62.83%) Willibrod Peter Slaa (72.77%) No 
Togo 1993 Gnassingbé Eyadéma (1967-2005, 96.5%) Jacques Amouzou (53.20%) 
Note: two main opposition parties 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
1998 Gnassingbé Eyadéma (1967-2005, 52.08%) Gilchrist Olympio (71.32%) No 
2003 Gnassingbé Eyadéma (1967-2005, 57.79%) 
Note: died in office 
Emmanuel Bob-Akitani (79.80%) No 
2005 Faure Gnassingbé (1967-2005, 60.22%) Emmanuel Bob-Akitani (96.01%) No 
2010 Faure Gnassingbé (1967-2005, 60.9%) Jean-Pierre Fabre (86.77%) No 
Tunisia 1999 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011, 99.45%) Mohemed Belhaj Amor (57.41%) 
Note: illegal parties boycotted the 
elections 
Yes 
2004 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011, 94.49%) Mohamed Bouchiha (68.49%) 
Note: illegal parties boycotted the 
elections 
Yes 
2009 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011, 89.62%) 
Note: ousted from mass demonstrations 
Mohemed Belhaj Amor (48.27%) No 
Turkmenistan 2007 Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow (2007-, 
89.23%) 
Amanýaz Atajykow (29.80%) No 
Uganda 1996 Yoweri Museveni (1986-, 74.2%) Paul Ssemogerere (91.99%) No 
2001 Yoweri Museveni (1986-, 69.33%) Kizza Besigye (90.71%) No 
2006 Yoweri Museveni (1986-, 59.26%) Kizza Besigye (91.77%) No 
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Uzbekistan 1991 Islam Karimov (1991-, 87.1%) Muhammad Salih (100%) No 
2000 Islam Karimov (1991-, 95.7%) Abdulhafiz Jalolov (100%) No 
2007 Islam Karimov (1991-, 90.76%) Asliddin Rustamov (35.38%) No 
Venezuela 2006 Hugo Chávez (1999-, 62.84%) Manuel Rosales (95.79%) No 
Yemen 1999 Ali Abdullah Saleh (1990-2012, 96.2%) Najeeb Qahtan Al-Sha'abi (100%) 
Note: the main opposition candidate, 
Ali Saleh Obad of the Yemeni Socialist 
Party, failed to gain enough support in 
the parliament, boycotting the election 
Yes 
2006 Ali Abdullah Saleh (1990-2012, 77.17%) 
Note: resigned in mass demonstrations 
Faisal Bin Shamlan (95.56%) No 
Zambia 1996 Frederick Chiluba (1991-2002, 72.59%) Dean Mungomba (46.50%) 
Note: the main opposition party, the 
United National Independence Party, 
together with five other allied parties, 
following changes to the constitution, 
boycotted the election 
Yes 
2001 Levy Mwanawasa (2002-2008, 29.15%) Anderson Mazoka (38.39%) No 
2006 Levy Mwanawasa (2002-2008, 42.98%) 
Note: died in office, return to democracy in 
2008 
Michael Sata (51.51%) No 
Zimbabwe 1990 Robert Mugabe (1987-, 83.05%) Edgar Tekere (100%) No 
1996 Robert Mugabe (1987-, 92.76%) Abel Muzorewa (66.27%) 
Note: all candidates withdrew their 
candidacies shortly before the election 
due to threats of violence, though their 
names remained on the ballot 
Yes 
2002 Robert Mugabe (1987-, 56.2%) Morgan Tsvangirai (95.80%) Yes 
2008 Robert Mugabe (1987-, 43.2%) Morgan Tsvangirai (84.34%) No 
Note: this study measured opposition unity as the total number of votes of the top presidential candidate divided by 
that of other candidates of the opposition bloc using data of each election from the Psephos – Adam Carr’s Election 
Archive, Election Data Handbooks by Dieter Nohlen and Wikipedia Election Lists by Country. For robustness, I 
excluded elections that the major opposition had boycotted using data from National Elections across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA) because it is unknown if these opposition elites are willing to come together and propose 
common candidates for the specific goal of winning an election. Cases, shaded in gray, are excluded because of too 
short duration of an autocrat (deposed in the same year when winning the elections). 
98 
 
 
A Dictator’s Gift 
Dominant Party Regimes and Health Expenditures 
Yan, Huang-Ting, Lin, Yu-Chun 
Huang-Ting Yan* 
Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester 
CO4 3SQ, UK 
hy16127@essex.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0)79 6052 0007 
 
Yu-Chun Lin† 
Department of Chinese Medicine, China Medical University Hospital, No. 2, 
Yude Road, North District, Taichung City, Taiwan 40447 
yclinjoyce@gmail.com 
Tel: +886 (0)972 072 387 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
*
 Corresponding author 
†
 Co-author 
99 
 
ABSTRACT 
Background 
A country’s health expenditure significantly improves its population health 
status. This study aims to examine the determinants of health expenditure in 
dictatorships. 
Methods 
We designed a mixed methods research approach. First, we used panel data 
from 1995 to 2014 covering 99 countries (n=1,488). Fixed effects regression 
models were fitted to determine how different types of authoritarianism relate 
to health expenditure. Second, we chose Ivory Coast to apply the synthetic 
control methods for a case study. We constructed a synthetic Ivory Coast, 
combining other dominant party regimes to resemble the values of health 
expenditure predictors for Ivory Coast prior to a regime change from a 
dominant party system to personalist dictatorships in 2000. 
Results 
We found that dominant party autocracies, compared to non-dominant party 
regimes, increased health expenditure (% of GDP) (1.36 percentage point 
increase, CI = 0.59–2.12). The marginal effect, however, decreased when an 
autocrat in this type of regime held elections (0.86 percentage point decrease, 
CI = 0.20–1.52). Furthermore, we found the difference in health expenditure 
between the actual Ivory Coast and its synthetic version starts to grow 
following the regime change in 2000 (in 2000, actual: 6.00%, synthetic: 
6.04%; in 2001, actual: 4.85%, synthetic: 5.99%), suggesting a pronounced 
negative effect of the government transition on Ivory Coast health 
expenditure. 
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Conclusion 
The findings suggest that different forms of dictatorship are associated with 
varying levels of health expenditure. Where dictatorships rely on popular 
support, as is the case with dominant party dictatorships, health expenditure 
is generally greater. 
Keywords dictator, dominant party regimes, election, health expenditure 
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INTRODUCTION 
A country’s health expenditure significantly improves its population health 
status, including life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rates, and other 
health outcome indicators (Alisa et al. 2014; Novignon et al. 2012; Nixon and 
Ulmann 2006). Although existing research confirms the significance of 
economic and social factors as determinants of health spending (Baltagi et al. 
2017; Hitiris and Posnett 1992; Zweifel et al. 1999), there is lack of 
comparative works on how governance types influence health expenditure 
and cross-national analyses of authoritarian regimes. This study examines 
the determinants of health expenditure in dictatorships. 
A dictatorship occurs when the chief executive is chosen in a 
regularised selection process within the political elite and, once in office, the 
autocrat exercises power with few institutional constraints. Drawing on 
scholarship on authoritarian regimes (Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2018), this 
paper will use the terms authoritarian regime, dictatorship, non-democratic 
regime and autocracy interchangeably, unless otherwise indicated. 
We incorporate two factors – legitimation strategies and perceived 
threat – in explaining variations in health spending. First, the authoritarian 
incumbent must develop legitimation strategies to justify his/her right to rule, 
such as rules, tradition or custom, regime performance, and charisma 
(Weber 1958). If a ruling regime is largely tied to popular sovereignty – that is, 
its government is created and sustained by a large group of people – rulers 
tend to increase health spending. By contrast, if the leadership derives 
support from a narrower group, rulers are less inclined to improve population 
health but rather to benefit only that group. Second, the authoritarian 
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incumbent faces threats from regime outsiders wanting to replace existing 
institutions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Higher levels of perceived threat, 
especially when outsiders sense regime change is possible and decide to 
challenge the government, cause rulers to transfer spending from health to 
managing the opposition. 
Regime types matter. Dominant party rule, defined as policy control, 
leadership selection, and the security apparatus in the hands of a ruling party, 
is not based on support from a specific social group but on a monist vision of 
popular sovereignty (Kailitz 2013). In this concept, a single party reflects the 
common interest of the ruled and electoral competition of political alternatives 
is unnecessary. Because the party is the main channel of societal interest 
intermediation, the dictator needs to tie a large group of people to the regime 
elite, making politics more representative of different social groups. A 
personalist dictatorship, however, relies on charismatic leadership or 
extractive institution through which rents could be distributed to followers, 
thus legitimising its rule based on a narrower group centred on a dictator 
(Hyden 2013). Military regimes and monarchies represent institutions with 
specific foundations, and their priority is to guard the common interest of 
soldiers or the royal family. An example is the creation of military jurisdiction 
to guard military members’ interest under Franco’s rule (Ríos-Figueroa and 
Aguilar 2018). Different social groups are, thus, less likely to be recruited as 
the foundation of monarchies and military regimes. In conclusion, dictators in 
dominant party regimes, compared to other forms of autocracies, pay closer 
attention to the population health status on which the legitimate rule is based 
and tend to increase health expenditure. 
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Multiparty elections, however, decrease this marginal effect in 
dominant party regimes. A multiparty election is more likely to lead to 
democracy due to the emergence of an electoral alliance to challenge and 
defeat the incumbent (Donno 2013; Howard and Roessler 2006). This is 
because multiparty elections offer opposition forces a channel to express 
policy positions, develop the party organisations, foster their supporters, and 
unite different social forces, raising leaders’ risk of electoral defeat. Previous 
research has also shown that multiparty elections provide key opposition 
forces with legislative representation through autonomous political parties, 
which are more likely to generate policy outcomes that cater to their 
preferences (Magaloni 2006). This co-opts opposition groups and enables 
the purchase of social peace. However, the legalisation of multiparty 
elections may make it less effective to co-opt the opposition. In fact, 
multiparty elections increase the risk that a leader will be ousted if the dictator 
allows candidates or parties from outside the regime to compete and, 
accordingly, gain more seats in legislatures. This is because they see the 
possibility to overthrow an autocrat and thus reject unity with the regime. In 
this context, some authoritarian regimes hold tightly controlled elections to 
obtain intended results. 
Autocrats can use a variety of ways to defeat the opposition in 
elections. Through threats of or actual physical abuse and assassination, 
intimidation, limitation of political rights, or electoral frauds, authoritarian 
leaders ensure continued dominance (Levitsky and Way 2010; Magaloni 
2010). However, such methods require money (Pepinsky 2007), and this is 
why economic recessions discourage such a regime from spending more in 
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buying votes and retaining patronage networks, providing a motive for elites 
to defect (Magaloni 2006; Reuter and Gandhi 2011). Thus, dictators in 
dominant party regimes holding multiparty elections tend to transfer 
government spending on healthcare to reduce opposition threats. 
METHODS 
The unit of analysis was ‘dictatorships.’ We used the Polity IV Project as the 
main source of dictatorship measures. The Polity IV data series scales 
regimes from -10 to +10 and we identified dictatorships as those with scores 
lower than 6 (<6), screening all countries between 1995 and 2014. Selection 
bias was mitigated by selecting the Polity scale rather than using Geddes, 
Wright, and Frantz’s (2014, 317-318, GWF) dataset to determine the 
universe of autocracies. GWF’s classification scheme includes minimal 
conditions for suffrage and party competition for coding democratic 
country-years. However, the level of party competition may be influenced by 
the strength of opposition, which then determines the dictator’s willingness to 
transfer health spending in order to manage the opposition. That is, a regime 
was defined as a dictatorship given the creation an unequal playing field, 
which can be achieved through factors such as budgetary transfers or 
targeted spending designed to influence election outcomes despite robust 
competition. In this way, their classification scheme for measuring a 
dictatorship included an assessment of whether the country exhibited higher 
levels of health expenditures, thus blurring the predicted relationship. By 
contrast, the Polity IV data distinguish between democracies and autocracies 
based on institutional characteristics rather than the dynamics of party 
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competition, which do not suffer from this problem. Further, the sample was 
chosen from the period’s dataset because it includes nearly all data on the 
variables of interest, covariates and robustness checks. 
Health expenditure was defined as the total country spending on 
health as a proportion of GDP. This study measured health expenditure using 
World Bank data. Dominant party regimes were defined as governments in 
which ‘control over policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus is 
in the hands of a ruling party (Geddes et al. 2014).’ A dummy variable was 
created where 1 = dominant party dictatorships and 0 = otherwise. 
Furthermore, we follow Brownlee’s operationalisation of Levitsky and Way’s 
typology of dictatorships based on the existence of multiparty elections using 
data from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Brownlee 2009; 
Levitsky and Way 2002). The DPI contains a 7-point measure of legislative 
indices of electoral competitiveness (LIEC). A dictatorship that holds 
multiparty elections was coded 1 if a regime has a score greater than 4 or, in 
terms of Levitsky and Way’s typology, is an electoral authoritarian regime, 
where 5 = multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats, 6 = multiple 
parties won seats but the largest party won more than 75% of the seats, and 
7 = largest party held less than 75% (Brownlee 2009). Control variables that 
influence health expenditure were then added, including economic 
development, economic growth, prevalence of HIV, and magnitudes of armed 
conflict. A summary of the variables, operationalisation of indicators, and data 
sources is shown in Supplementary Table 1. 
We designed a mixed methods research approach. First, we used 
panel data from 1995 to 2014 covering 99 countries, a sample of 1,488 
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pooled time series, and cross section observations. Fixed effects regression 
models were used based on the results of the Hausman test. We used 
cluster-adjusted standard error where estimated variance of the parameters 
increases when the observations are in the same cluster, which accounts for 
within-cluster correlation. This was because regression model errors in 
different time periods for a given country may be correlated, and failure to 
control for within-cluster error correlation can lead to very misleadingly small 
standard errors (Cameron and Miller 2015). Further, to deal with reverse 
causality and allow some time for the effect of regime change on health 
expenditure to materialise, we lagged the two independent variables by one 
period. For robustness tests, this study changed the threshold for the 
determinant of dictatorships as those with Polity IV scores lower than 1 (<1). 
It, thus, excluded regimes with scores ranging from 5 to 1 because scholars 
cannot come to an agreement that they are dictatorships (Geddes et al. 
2014). Furthermore, we compared the effects of dominant party regimes only 
with those of personalist dictatorships, which were defined as regimes in 
which ‘control over policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus is 
in the hands of a narrower group centred on an individual dictator (Geddes et 
al. 2014). A better approach could have been to disaggregate the broad 
category of non-party regimes as data are available for this, but fewer cases 
of military regimes and monarchies produced large parameter estimates and 
standard errors. The study, therefore, focused on comparing the two types of 
dictatorships. The study also used GWF’s (2014) dataset to identify the 
universe of autocracies as an alternative to Polity IV data. Finally, some 
highlight there is some sort of inertia in government spending. It would be 
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useful to show that the results are robust to including a dependent variable 
lagged by one year in the empirical estimates. 
The types of dictatorships can be influenced by unobserved factors 
simultaneously determining levels of health expenditure. To address this 
concern, we used the instrumental variable two stage least squares analysis. 
A good instrumental variable (IV) should have a theoretical interpretation that 
it was expected to influence the endogenous variable but was unrelated to 
the outcome. Thus, we used one exogenous variable, autocratic 
constitutional design, to instrument regime types. The reason for this choice 
is autocratic parliamentary regimes, compared to presidential or 
semi-presidential dictatorships, were more likely to evolve into dominant 
party regimes (Yan 2020). However, current research cannot provide clear 
arguments and evidence on the effect of autocratic constitutional design on 
the values of health expenditure. We, thus, introduced a dummy variable 
coded 1 for parliamentarism and 0 for others. 
Second, we applied synthetic control methods for causal inference in 
comparative case studies, constructing a synthetic Ivory Coast by combining 
other dominant party regimes resembling the values of health expenditure 
predictors for Ivory Coast prior to a regime change from a dominant party 
system to personalist dictatorships in 2000. We chose Ivory Coast because it 
was the only country experiencing such types of regime change. Further, we 
selected comparison countries and their weighting based on a weighted 
average of the available countries that can minimise the mean square error of 
the synthetic control estimator (Abadie 2010; 2015). Supplementary Table 5 
shows the weight of each country in the synthetic Ivory Coast. 
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Supplementary Table 4 compares the characteristics of Ivory Coast prior to 
the regime change to those of the synthetic version, suggesting the synthetic 
Ivory Coast is very similar to the actual one in terms of pre-2000 per capita 
GDP, magnitudes of armed conflict, and one-year lag of health expenditure. 
For robustness tests, we built up a synthetic Ivory Coast as a combination of 
all personalist dictatorships with weights chosen so that the resulting 
synthetic version reproduced the values of the predictors of health 
expenditure in Ivory Coast prior to the regime change in 2000. In addition, to 
ensure the results are indeed indicative of the negative effects of change into 
a personalist dictatorship and not driven by other unobservable factors, we 
conducted sensitivity analyses in which the treatment of interest is 
reassigned in the data to year 1999 from 2000. 
RESULTS 
Figure 1 presents the relationship between regime types and health 
expenditure in the period 1995–2014, showing that dominant party 
autocracies, compared to non-dominant party regimes, increased health 
expenditure (% of GDP) (left panel: 1.36 percentage point increase, CI = 
0.59–2.12). Our theoretical expectations were confirmed when an alternative 
threshold that distinguishes autocracies with democracies was chosen 
(middle panel: 1.88 percentage point increase, CI = 1.28–2.48), or only 
personalist dictatorships were compared with dominant party autocracies 
(right panel: 1.54 percentage point increase, CI = 0.63–2.45). 
Figure 2 verifies the positive effects of dominant party autocracies on 
the values of health expenditure when GWF’s (2014) definition of democracy 
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and dictatorship was used (left panel: 1.11 percentage point increase, p<0.1), 
the dependent variable lagged by one year was included in the empirical 
estimates (middle panel: 0.82 percentage point increase, p<0.1), or an 
instrumental variable was used (right panel: 1.66 percentage point increase, 
p<0.1). 
 
Figures 1. Dominant Party Autocracies Increase Health Expenditure, 
1995–2014 
Note: linear prediction (left, middle, right): non-dominant party regimes (4.468
***
, 4.267
***
, 
4.474
***
) and dominant party regimes (5.823
***
, 6.148
***
, 6.013
***
); 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 
p < 0.01. All results were based on panel data analysis with country and time fixed effects. 
Results illustrated in left, middle, and right panel correspond to model 1, 2 and 3 of 
Supplementary Table 2. Source: the author. 
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Figures 2. Dominant Party Autocracies Increase Health Expenditure, 
1995–2014 
Note: linear prediction (left, middle, right): non-dominant party regimes (4.560
***
, 4.588
***
, 
4.387
***
) and dominant party regimes (5.668
***
, 5.408
***
, 6.043
***
); 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 
p < 0.01. The result in left panel was based on panel data analysis with country and time 
fixed effects. The result in middle panel was based on one-step system GMM estimation for 
dynamic panel data models. The result in right panel was based on panel data analysis with 
instrumental variable and country and time fixed effects. Results illustrated in left, middle, 
and right panel correspond to model 4, 5 and 6 of Supplementary Table 2. Source: the 
author. 
Figure 3 presents the relationship between regime types, the 
existence of multiparty elections, and health expenditure in the period 
1995–2014, showing that multiparty elections reduce the marginal effect of 
party autocracies on health expenditure. For example, the value of health 
expenditure was approximately 6.69% of GDP in dominant party 
dictatorships without multiparty elections, but it dropped to 5.83% with 
multiparty elections (left panel: 0.86 percentage point decrease, CI = 
0.20–1.52). Using a robustness test, Figure 3 also verifies our expectation 
that the marginal effect decreased when an autocrat in this type of regime 
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determined to hold multiparty elections (middle panel: 1.07 percentage point 
decrease, CI = 0.54–1.59; right panel: 0.92 percentage point decrease, CI = 
0.17–1.67). Further, Figure 4 verifies the conditional effect when using GWF’s 
(2014) dataset to identify the universe of autocracies (left panel: 0.85 
percentage point decrease, CI = 0.19–1.52) or including a lagged dependent 
variable in the empirical estimates (right panel: 0.34 percentage point 
decrease, p<0.1). 
 
Figure 3. Multiparty Elections Reduce the Marginal Effect of Party 
Autocracies on Health Expenditure, 1995–2014 
Note: linear prediction (left, middle, right): dominant party regimes without elections (6.693
***
, 
7.173
***
, 6.867
***
) and dominant party regimes with elections (5.829
***
, 6.108
***
, 5.947
***
); 
*
 p < 
0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. All results were based on panel data analysis with country 
and time fixed effects. Results illustrated in left, middle, and right panel correspond to model 
1, 2 and 3 of Supplementary Table 3. Source: the author. 
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Figure 4. Multiparty Elections Reduce the Marginal Effect of Party 
Autocracies on Health Expenditure, 1995–2014 
Note: linear prediction (left, right): dominant party regimes without elections (6.529
***
, 5.762
***
) 
and dominant party regimes with elections (5.676
***
, 5.419
***
); 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p 
< 0.01. The result in left panel was based on panel data analysis with country and time fixed 
effects. The result in right panel was based on one-step system GMM estimation for dynamic 
panel data models. Results illustrated in left and right panel correspond to model 4 and 5 of 
Supplementary Table 3. Source: the author. 
Figure 5 demonstrates that the synthetic Ivory Coast almost exactly 
reproduced health expenditure for the actual Ivory Coast during the 
pre-treatment period from 1997 to 1999. The difference in health expenditure 
between the actual Ivory Coast and its synthetic version, however, started to 
grow following the regime change in 2000, suggesting a pronounced 
negative effect of the government transition on Ivory Coast health 
expenditure. Similarly, the two lines diverged substantially before 2000 when 
a synthetic Ivory Coast combining all personalist dictatorships was compared. 
From 2001 onward, the difference between the two series declined, thus 
verifying our theoretical expectations. 
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Figure 5. Trends in Health Expenditure: Ivory Coast vs. Synthetic Ivory Coast, 
1997–2003 
Note: health expenditure from 1997 to 2003 (upper panel): actual Ivory Coast (7.066, 7.298, 
6.522, 6.001, 4.846, 4.467, 4.652) and synthetic Ivory Coast (7.025, 6.965, 6.802, 6.044, 
5.994, 6.313, 6.330); health expenditure from 1997 to 2003 (lower panel): synthetic Ivory 
Coast (4.699, 4.784, 4.772, 4.795, 4.820, 4.954, 5.107). Source: the author. 
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Using sensitivity analyses, Figure 6 shows that the health expenditure 
trajectories of Ivory Coast and its synthetic version did not diverge 
considerably in 2000 but did in 2001, reflecting the regime change in 2000 as 
the determinant of health expenditure in dictatorships. 
 
Figure 6. Placebo Regime Change-Trends in Health Expenditure: Ivory 
Coast vs. Synthetic Ivory Coast, 1997–2003 
Note: health expenditure from 1997 to 2003: actual Ivory Coast (7.066, 7.298, 6.522, 6.001, 
4.846, 4.467, 4.652) and synthetic Ivory Coast (6.879, 6.845, 6.671, 5.932, 5.877, 6.218, 
6.313). Country weights in the synthetic Ivory Coast: Zimbabwe (0.812), Tunisia (0.044), 
Zambia (0.039), Singapore (0.032), Laos (0.020), Malaysia (0.019), Mozambique (0.015), 
Tanzania (0.011) and Vietnam (0.008). Predictor means: log (GDP per capita): real (8.033) 
and synthetic (8.033); Armed conflict: real (0) and synthetic (0); Lagged health expenditure: 
real (6.903) and synthetic (6.902). Source: the author. 
DISCUSSION 
The findings suggest that dominant party dictatorships in which multiparty 
elections are banned, compared to other forms of dictatorships, are 
associated with a higher level of health expenditure. A dictator needs to pay 
close attention to the population health status in a dominant party regime in 
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which legitimation strategies and governance are configured to tie a large 
group of people to the elite, thus increasing health expenditure. Multiparty 
elections, however, decrease this marginal effect, as more government 
expenditures go into discouraging the opposition’s use of elections to replace 
existing institutions (see supplementary data analysis). 
We confirmed that dominant party regimes were associated with 
higher health expenditures, which is consistent with the finding dominant 
party regimes contain more public goods provisions. For example, a greater 
number of non-government environmental organisations are likely to be 
found in dominant party regimes than in other autocracies; this is because 
dominant party regimes must rely on popular support, and thus promote 
something similar to a civil society (Böhmelt 2014). Dominant party regimes 
are also more likely to reach into society in order to create a political base, 
and will therefore extensively allocate subsides and transfers that are linked 
with lower income inequality (Hanson 2013). 
The presence of elections decreases health expenditures. Our 
findings were similar to those of other studies suggesting that the presence of 
elections and incumbent elites in electoral autocracies have greater 
incentives to co-opt broader segments from within society (Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2007). That is, multiparty elections increase the number of 
potential challengers; this creates higher levels of political competition, which 
then increases the dictator’s fears about turnover and the willingness to 
transfer particular goods (e.g., perks, privileges, and direct monetary rewards) 
to specific individuals or groups, or even buy popular support. These 
conditions can lead to a transfer of healthcare expenditures in order to 
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influence election outcomes. 
We, however, failed to consider two aspects: the effects of subtypes of 
non-dominant party regimes on the values of health expenditure and the 
marginal effect of multiparty elections on such types of regimes. First, military 
dictators justify their position as guardians of national interest, saving the 
nation from economic setback or social anomie (Cheibub et al. 2010). They 
borrow their legitimacy from better governance and, thus, need to care about 
population health, compared to monarchies in which rulers base their 
legitimacy on a God-given, natural or at least established historical right to 
rule (Kailitz 2013). Second, as Figure 2 shows, multiparty elections reduce 
the marginal effect of party autocracies on health expenditure but seemingly 
have a reverse effect on health expenditure in other forms of autocracies. A 
possible explanation is multiparty elections can enlarge the social basis and 
secure legitimacy in such types of regimes in which leaders previously relied 
on support from specific groups (e.g. junta), thus encouraging more spending 
on healthcare. In conclusion, future studies should focus on the two 
dimensions. 
The literature on social spending and the provision of public goods 
generally shows that health and education expenditures follow a similar logic 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Kauffman and Segura-Ubriego 2001). It 
would be useful to investigate how dominant party regimes affect education 
expenditures as a test of robustness. First, limited data value is stored for the 
variable between 1995 and 2014. Second, education expenditures may have 
adverse effects on authoritarian durability. Previous research has shown that 
increases in education favour democratisation because education fosters 
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political tolerance, which involves the practical application of democratic 
principles to disfavoured groups (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007), the 
provision of civic skills and promotion of political participation (Glaeser et al. 
2007), and fairer income distribution (De Gregorio and Lee 2002). It is 
therefore doubtful that dictators in dominant party regimes are more likely to 
increase education expenditures when compared to other autocratic leaders. 
Future research can be conducted to test theoretical expectations when more 
complete data are available. 
The study investigates the influence of different forms of dictatorships 
through the use of two separate methods, thus speaking to several central 
studies in health economics and comparative politics. First, elections, parties, 
or legislatures help the dictator make a credible commitment to share power 
with ruling elites (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2008; Wright 2008), 
thus making it more likely for the dictator to transfer government expenditure 
from discouraging a rebellion to healthcare to buy off popular support. 
Instead of this power-sharing logic, we incorporate the legitimation dimension 
into the explanation of the variation in health spending. Second, this study 
argues for legitimation strategies under which more voices in policymaking 
are involved to exert a positive influence on the dictator’s willingness to 
increase health expenditure, contributing to existing studies on the roles of 
regime legitimation patterns (Stier 2015). 
Some limitations of this study should be discussed. One limitation is 
that countries were observed over a relatively short period of time, leading 
only Ivory Coast to experience an exit from dominant party regimes. World 
Bank data – the most comprehensive data set available on global health 
118 
 
expenditure – however, allows us to analyse at the given period of time. 
Another limitation is there are no data for examining the level of health 
spending that reflects the extent to which authoritarian leaders care about 
population health. Thus, alternative explanations are likely: for example, a 
dictator increases health spending when left-wing parties are in government 
or the impact of populist radical right parties on policy is low (Bellido et al. 
2019; Falkenbach and Greer 2018). In dictatorships, however, parties 
frequently are not ideologically disciplined organizations, but rather groupings 
of business oligarchs or candidates based on the support of family and 
friends who compete to gain personal benefits (Gandhi and Reuter 2013). 
Finally, despite using robustness tests, we acknowledge that researchers 
examining the same questions might have made different decisions about the 
data to use, the thresholds, the assumptions, the analytical approach, all of 
which may have substantially influenced the results. 
In sum, at least two policy implications follow. First, efforts to guide the 
autocrat to increase health expenditure by creating dominant party regimes 
might be more effective if the use of such strategies is conditional on the 
existence of multiparty elections. Second, scholars of health economics in 
non-democratic regimes could pay close attention to a constitutional design 
that facilitates the emergence of dominant party regimes (Yan 2019). 
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Supplementary Data Analysis 
This research presents evidence on why multiparty elections reduce the 
marginal effect of dominant party regimes on health expenditure. First, we 
demonstrate that in the face of electoral competition, the dictator intends to 
manage the opposition, for example, through control over the media, thus 
ensuring authoritarian dominance. Second, such methods require money, 
and we, thus, display a negative correlation between health expenditure and 
media control. In other words, a dictator in dominant party regimes holding 
elections tends to transfer government spending on healthcare to alleviate 
opposition threats. Finally, we expect that leaders of party autocracies cut 
back on other types of expenditures as well to manage the opposition. This is 
because electoral competition increases their willingness to transfer 
expenditures from legitimising dictatorial rule, such as improving public health, 
maintaining national security or indoctrinating ideological goals, to cope with 
the imminent threat. Thus, we reveal that multiparty elections reduce the 
marginal effect of party autocracies on other types of expenditures. 
Multiparty elections help the regime incumbents identify opposition 
strongholds (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), and provide key opposition 
forces with legislative representation of autonomous political parties that 
make more likely generating of policy outcomes that cater to their 
preferences (Magaloni 2006). It, thus, may reduce their risk of violent removal 
from office by the opposition (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). Further, 
elections aid incumbents in maintaining their ties with ruling elites by 
distributing spoils and power positions with certain regularity, thus deterring 
rebels among members of the ruling coalition (Magaloni 2008). Finally, 
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multiparty elections help the regime incumbents establish democratic 
legitimation, reducing international conditionality, defined as the linking of 
concrete punishments to improvements in the quality of democracy (Schedler 
2006). Multiparty elections, however, offer opposition forces a channel to 
express policy positions, develop the party organisations, foster their 
supporters, and unite different social forces, raising leaders’ risk of electoral 
defeat. 
Confronting opposition threats in multiparty elections, the dictator 
intends to manage the opposition. Media control is closely associated with a 
dictator’s survival. In multiparty elections, the media facilitates power 
struggles that emerge between the government and the opposition by 
shaping public discourse, providing a collaborative forum for opposition 
voices (Ojo 2007), which empowers inefficient collective action against 
dictators and promotes democratisation. The media can also educate the 
public (Corrigall-Brown and Wilkes 2014; Kenski and Stroud 2006; Kittilson 
and Dalton 2011) and deepen the concept of political liberties and 
participation rights of citizens in society (Swigger 2013; Sajuria 2013), which 
helps the opposition mobilise people to vote against “authoritarian” 
incumbents. Leaders in dictatorships that hold multiparty elections, thus, 
often actively seek to suppress the independent media. 
Media control is defined as the degree to which a country allows the 
free flow of news and information. This research measured media control 
using the freedom of the press index of Freedom House, the most 
comprehensive data set available on global media freedom. The index 
assessed the degree of print, broadcast, and the Internet freedom in every 
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country, analysing the events of each calendar year. The index is scaled to a 
range of 0–100: A score of “100” is least free, indicating an autocrat’s 
sweeping control over the media, while “0” is most free. We follow Brownlee’s 
operationalisation of Levitsky and Way’s typology of dictatorships based on 
the existence of electoral institutions using a 7-point measure of legislative 
indices of electoral competitiveness (LIEC) (Brownlee 2009; Levitsky and 
Way 2002). A dictatorship that holds multiparty elections is coded 1 if a 
regime has a score greater than 4. A list of control variables influencing 
media control was added, including constitutional design, economic 
development and economic growth. This study tested the hypotheses using 
panel data regression. 
Figure 1 presents the relationship between regime types, the 
existence of multiparty elections and media control in the period of 
1995–2014, showing that multiparty elections increase the marginal effect of 
party autocracies on media control (left panel: 5.64, CI = 1.77–9.51). For 
example, while the score of media control was approximately 70.71 in 
dominant party autocracies without elections, it rose to 76.35 with elections. 
Figure 1 also verifies that the marginal effect increased when an autocrat in 
this type of regime determined to hold elections using robustness testing 
(middle panel: 4.98, CI = 1.09–8.86; right panel: 5.26, CI = 1.72–8.81). 
Media control requires money. For example, in Peru, the Fujimori 
government gained de facto control over all of the country’s privately owned 
television stations through bribery (Levitsky and Way 2002). The regime 
incumbents often funded the broadcast or print media owned by the state for 
increasing the probability of winning elections. For example, in Kazakhstan, 
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the major state-funded TV stations Khabar and Kazakhstan granted the 
ruling party preferential coverage quantitatively and qualitatively in elections 
(Yan 2017). 
 
Figure 1. Multiparty Elections Increase the Marginal Effect of Party 
Autocracies on Media Control, 1995–2014 
Note: linear prediction (left, middle, right): dominant party regimes without elections (70.71
***
, 
72.43
***
, 74.67
***
) and dominant party regimes with elections (76.35
***
, 77.41
***
, 79.93
***
); 
*
 p < 
0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. All results were based on panel data analysis with country 
and time fixed effects. Left panel: this study defined dictatorships as those with Polity IV 
scores lower than 6; middle panel: this study changed the threshold for the determinant of 
dictatorships as those with Polity IV scores lower than 1; right panel: this study compared the 
effects of dominant party regimes only with those of personalist dictatorships. Source: the 
author. 
We expect that leaders of party autocracies transfer expenditures from 
legitimising dictatorial rule to manage the opposition. A dictator in dominant 
party regimes pays closer attention to the public health status on which the 
legitimate rule is based and increases the health expenditure. The strategic 
action, however, cannot be envisaged in multiparty elections under which the 
dictator is likely to be ousted through electoral defeat and, thus, must fully 
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concentrate on the opposition. In this way, a dictator in dominant party 
regimes holding elections tends to transfer government spending on 
healthcare to increase media control. 
Figure 2 reveals a negative correlation between health expenditure 
and media control in the period of 1995–2014. A 10 percentage point 
decrease in health expenditure (e.g. moving down from 15% to 5%) resulted 
in an increase in the score of media control by 6.82 (left panel, CI = 
2.35–11.30) or 6.45 (right panel, CI = 1.70–11.19) respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Negative Relations Between Health Expenditure and Media Control, 
1995–2014 
Note: regression coefficient: left panel: –0.682
***
, 95% CI = [–1.130, –0.235]; right 
panel: –0.645
***
, 95% CI = [–1.119, –0.170]; 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. All results 
were based on panel data analysis with country and time fixed effects. Left panel: this study 
defined dictatorships as those with Polity IV scores lower than 6. Right panel: this study 
changed the threshold for the determinant of dictatorships as those with Polity IV scores 
lower than 1. Source: the author. 
To support our arguments, we checked the relationship between 
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health expenditure and judicial control, one of the measures to manage the 
opposition. An independent judiciary has monitoring and coordination 
functions (Carrubba 2005; Weingast 1997), helping the opposition annul 
controversial election results under which the ruling party won through 
massive fraud and violence. Compliant judges or prosecutors, by contrast, 
investigate politically sensitive actors and issues and bring those cases to 
court for a trial or threaten to do so to discourage the opposition from 
competing with the incumbent (Ríos-Figueroa and Aguilar 2018). Thus, a 
dictator in dominant party regimes holding elections tends to transfer 
government spending on healthcare to increase judicial control. 
This research used Latent Judicial Independence scores constructed 
with the graded item response theory model as the level of judicial 
independence (0: least independent; 1: most independent), which captures 
the extent to which a court depends on a government and its trends between 
1995 and 2012 (Linzer and Staton 2015). The index was rescaled into a 
range of 0–1, with higher values representing a greater level of an autocrat’s 
manipulation of the judiciary. Likewise, a list of control variables influencing 
judicial control was added, including constitutional design, economic 
development and economic growth. This study tested the hypotheses using 
panel data regression. 
Figure 3 shows a negative correlation between health expenditure and 
judicial control in the period of 1995–2012. A 10 percentage point decrease in 
health expenditure (e.g. moving down from 15% to 5%) resulted in an 
increase in the level of manipulation of the judiciary by 0.040 (left panel, CI = 
0.006–0.074) or 0.032 (right panel, CI = 0.003–0.062). 
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Figure 3. Negative Relations Between Health Expenditure and Judicial 
Control, 1995–2012 
Note: regression coefficient: left panel: –0.0040
**
, 95% CI = [–0.0074, –0.0006]; right 
panel: –0.0032
**
, 95% CI = [–0.0062, –0.0003]; 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. All 
results were based on panel data analysis with country and time fixed effects. Left panel: this 
study defined dictatorships as those with Polity IV scores lower than 6. Right panel: this 
study changed the threshold for the determinant of dictatorships as those with Polity IV 
scores lower than 1. Source: the author. 
To support our arguments, we also checked whether in multiparty 
elections leaders of party autocracies cut back on other types of expenditures 
originally used for legitimising dictatorial rule. We choose military expenditure 
as the object of analysis because it is closely associated with national 
security, which helps the autocrats establish legitimacy through the security 
of a nation state. 
Military expenditure was defined as all current and capital 
expenditures on the armed forces as a proportion of GDP. This research 
measured military expenditure using World Bank data. Likewise, a list of 
control variables influencing military expenditure was added, including 
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economic development, economic growth, prevalence of HIV, and 
magnitudes of armed conflict. This study tested the hypotheses using panel 
data regression. 
Figure 4 presents the relationship between regime types, the 
existence of multiparty elections and military expenditure in the period of 
1995–2014, showing that multiparty elections reduce the marginal effect of 
party autocracies on military expenditure. For example, while the proportion 
of military expenditure was approximately 3.33% of GDP in dominant party 
dictatorships without elections, it dropped to 2.20% with elections (left panel: 
1.13 percentage point decrease, CI = 0.38–1.88). Figure 4 also verifies that 
the marginal effect increased when an autocrat in this type of regime 
determined to hold elections using a test of robustness (middle panel: 1.32 
percentage point decrease, CI = 0.48–2.15; right panel: 1.21 percentage 
point decrease, CI = 0.60–1.82). 
There is no statistically significant difference in government spending 
on the armed forces between the dominant party regimes and their 
counterparts. Thus, unlike health expenditure, regime types are not the 
determinants of military expenditure in dictatorships. It is rational because 
dictators, irrespective of their governance types, are motivated to protect their 
countries from foreign intervention, thus stabilising their rule. Our results 
imply legitimation strategies in explaining variations in health spending but 
not in military expenditure. 
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Figure 4. Multiparty Elections Reduce the Marginal Effect of Party 
Autocracies on Military Expenditure, 1995–2014 
Note: linear prediction (left, middle, right): dominant party regimes without elections (3.33
***
, 
3.65
***
, 2.88
***
) and dominant party regimes with elections (2.20
***
, 2.33
***
, 1.66
***
); 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 
p < 0.05, and 
***
 p < 0.01. All results were based on panel data analysis with country and time 
fixed effects. Left panel: this study defined dictatorships as those with Polity IV scores lower 
than 6; middle panel: this study changed the threshold for the determinant of dictatorships as 
those with Polity IV scores lower than 1; right panel: this study compared the effects of 
dominant party regimes only with those of personalist dictatorships. Source: the author. 
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Supplementary Tables 1. The Summary of Variables, Operationalization of 
Indicators, Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Operationalizaiton of indicators Data Sources 
Health expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
The total country spending on 
health as a proportion of GDP 
Continuous variables 
The World Bank:  
http://data.worldbank.org. 
Dominant party 
regime 
Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) Autocratic Regime Data 
http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/.  
Multiparty elections Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) Database of Political Institutions 
GDP per capita Log GDP, per capita (US dollars) 
Continuous variables 
The World Bank:  
http://data.worldbank.org. 
GDP per capita 
growth 
Percentage of GDP growth (%) 
Continuous variables 
Prevalence of HIV 
(% of population 
ages 15–49) 
The percentage of people ages 
15–49 who are infected with HIV 
Continuous variables 
Magnitudes of 
armed conflict 
The systematic and sustained use 
of lethal violence by organized 
groups that result in at least 500 
directly-related deaths over the 
course of the episode 
Ordinal variables 
Major Episodes of Political Violence, 
1946–2017 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.h
tm. 
Personal 
dictatorships 
Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) Autocratic Regime Data 
http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/.  
Military expenditure 
(% of GDP)* 
All current and capital expenditures 
on the armed forces as a proportion 
of GDP 
Continuous variables 
The World Bank:  
http://data.worldbank.org. 
Media control* The degree to which a country 
allows the free flow of news and 
information 
Continuous variables (0–100, from 
most free to least free) 
Freedom House: 
https://freedomhouse.org. 
Judicial control* The extent to which a court 
depends on a government 
Continuous variables (0–1, from 
lower to higher level of control) 
The replication data from Linzer DA, 
Staton J. A global measure of judicial 
independence, 1948–2012. J Law 
Courts 2015; 3: 223–56. 
Parliamentarism* Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) Database of Political Institutions 
(Continued). 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Health expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
1431 4.900 1.828 1.446 13.633 
Dominant party regime 1485 0.179 0.384 0 1 
Multiparty elections 1488 0.708 0.455 0 1 
GDP per capita 1388 11403.74 20431.42 247.437 129349.9 
Log(GDP per capita) 1388 8.421 1.272 5.511 11.770 
GDP per capita growth 1399 2.853 7.651 -62.225 140.501 
Prevalence of HIV (% of 
population ages 15–49) 
1468 2.264 4.528 0 30 
Magnitudes of armed 
conflict 
1488 0.798 1.678 0 7 
Personal dictatorships 1485 0.322 0.467 0 1 
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Military expenditure (% of 
GDP)* 
1171 2.978 3.039 0.001 34.376 
Media control* 1483 69.070 15.841 18 100 
Judicial control* 1333 0.757 0.139 0.073 0.983 
Parliamentarism* 1474 0.226 0.418 0 1 
Note: *Data will be used in the supplementary information. Source: the author. 
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Supplementary Tables 2. Dominant Party Autocracies Increase Health 
Expenditure, 1995–2014 
 Model (1) 
Polity<6 
Model (2) 
Polity<1 
Model (3) 
Only pers. 
Model (4) 
GWF 
Model (5) 
LDV 
Model (6) 
IV 
Lag. dominant party 
regime 
1.355
***
 1.881
***
 1.539
***
 1.107
*
 0.820
*
 1.656
*
 
 (0.384) (0.301) (0.453) (0.597) (0.452) (0.874) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.395 -0.168 -0.879 -0.466 -0.577
***
 -0.455
***
 
 (0.392) (0.428) (0.514) (0.387) (0.218) (0.158) 
GDP growth -0.001 -0.006 0.007 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
Prevalence of HIV -0.075 -0.245 0.012 -0.031 -0.024 -0.044 
 (0.110) (0.153) (0.124) (0.108) (0.042) (0.037) 
Armed conflict -0.106 -0.105 -0.079 -0.120
*
 -0.006 -0.071
**
 
 (0.070) (0.082) (0.078) (0.070) (0.027) (0.031) 
Health expendituret-1     0.514
***
  
     (0.046)  
Constant 7.580
**
 5.905
*
 10.803
***
 8.178
**
 7.451
***
 7.888
***
 
 (3.183) (3.518) (3.888) (3.142) (1.945) (1.263) 
No. of subjects 1019 836 668 1085 1016 1067 
No. of groups 73 66 48 77 73 73 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster on countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.7574 0.7634 0.6652 0.7579 - - 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - 
Note: standard error in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
Independent variables are lagged by one year. Model 1: Hausman test: Prob. >chi2 
= 0.000, and a joint test of year dummies: Prob. > F = 0.000; model 2: Hausman test: 
Prob. >chi2 = 0.000, and a joint test of year dummies: Prob. > F = 0.000; model 3: 
Hausman test: Prob. >chi2 = 0.037, and a joint test of year dummies: Prob. > F = 
0.000; model 4: Hausman test: Prob. >chi2 = 0.001, and a joint test of year dummies: 
Prob. > F = 0.000; model 5: Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: Prob. > 
z = 0.000, Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: Prob. > z = 0.565, Sargan 
test: Prob. >chi2 = 0.000; model 6: First stage regression coefficient of autocratic 
constitutional design: 0.291***, CI = 0.262–0.321. Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 367.948. The 10% relative bias of the 2SLS 
estimator we are willing to tolerate is 16.38. Model 1: this study defined dictatorships 
as those with Polity IV scores lower than 6; model 2: this study changed the 
threshold for the determinant of dictatorships as those with Polity IV scores lower 
than 1; model 3: this study compared the effects of dominant party regimes only with 
those of personalist dictatorships; model 4: this study employed Geddes, Wright, 
and Frantz’s dataset to identify the universe of autocracies; model 5: this study 
included the dependent variable lagged by one year in the empirical estimates; 
model 6: this study used autocratic constitutional design to instrument regime types. 
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Supplementary Tables 3. Multiparty Elections Reduce the Marginal Effect of 
Party Autocracies on Health Expenditure, 1995–2014 
 Model (1) 
Polity<6 
Model (2) 
Polity<1 
Model (3) 
Only pers. 
Model (4) 
GWF 
Model (5) 
LDV 
Lag. dominant party 
regime 
2.479
***
 3.194
***
 2.615
***
 2.220
***
 1.265
**
 
 (0.529) (0.411) (0.591) (0.701) (0.515) 
Lag. multiparty elections 0.282 0.327 0.164 0.278 0.090 
 (0.276) (0.290) (0.301) (0.272) (0.101) 
Lag. dom. party* Lag. 
elections 
-1.145
***
 -1.392
***
 -1.084
**
 -1.131
***
 -0.433
*
 
 (0.403) (0.335) (0.432) (0.404) (0.252) 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.372 -0.144 -0.829 -0.444 -0.602 
 (0.390) (0.427) (0.511) (0.385) (0.218) 
GDP growth -0.001 -0.006 0.007 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) 
Prevalence of HIV -0.066 -0.217 0.019 -0.023 -0.019 
 (0.107) (0.148) (0.121) (0.105) (0.042) 
Armed conflict -0.102 -0.102 -0.074 -0.115
*
 -0.009 
 (0.066) (0.077) (0.076) (0.066) (0.027) 
Health expendituret-1     0.499
***
 
     (0.047) 
Constant 7.142
**
 5.416 10.171
**
 7.744
**
 7.563
***
 
 (3.159) (3.503) (3.866) (3.114) (1.947) 
No. of subjects 1019 836 668 1085 1016 
No. of groups 73 66 48 77 73 
Years dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster on countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.7616 0.7697 0.6719 0.7618 - 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 
Note: standard error in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
Independent variables are lagged by one year. Model 1: Hausman test: Prob. >chi2 
= 0.000, and a joint test of year dummies: Prob. > F = 0.000; model 2: Hausman test: 
Prob. >chi2 = 0.000, and a joint test of year dummies: Prob. > F = 0.000; model 3: 
Hausman test: Prob. >chi2 = 0.000, and a joint test of year dummies: Prob. > F = 
0.000; model 4: Hausman test: Prob. >chi2 = 0.002, and a joint test of year dummies: 
Prob. > F = 0.000; model 5: Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: Prob. > 
z = 0.000, Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: Prob. > z = 0.651, Sargan 
test: Prob. >chi2 = 0.000. Model 1: this study defined dictatorships as those with 
Polity IV scores lower than 6; model 2: this study changed the threshold for the 
determinant of dictatorships as those with Polity IV scores lower than 1; model 3: 
this study compared the effects of dominant party regimes only with those of 
personalist dictatorships; model 4: this study employed Geddes, Wright, and 
Frantz’s dataset to identify the universe of autocracies; model 5: this study included 
the dependent variable lagged by one year in the empirical estimates. 
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Supplementary Tables 4. Health Expenditure Predictor Means 
 Ivory Coast (dominant party 
dictatorships) 
Ivory Coast (personalist 
dictatorships) 
 Real Synthetic Real Synthetic 
Log(GDP per capita) 8.033 8.033 8.033 8.025 
Armed conflict 0 0 0 0 
Lagged health 
expenditure 
7.035 7.036 - - 
Note: All variables were averaged for the 1997–2003 period. 
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Supplementary Tables 5. Country Weights in the Synthetic Ivory Coast 
Ivory Coast (dominant party dictatorships) Ivory Coast (personalist dictatorships) 
Country Weights Country Weights 
Angola 0 Armenia 0.061 
Cambodia 0 Azerbaijan 0 
China 0 Belarus 0.178 
Ethiopia 0 Burkina Faso 0.076 
Laos 0.006 Cameroon 0.026 
Malaysia 0.012 Chad 0.027 
Mozambique 0.004 Congo Kinshasa 0 
Singapore 0 Gambia 0.016 
Tanzania 0.003 Georgia 0 
Tunisia 0.121 Guinea 0.045 
Vietnam 0.008 Kazakhstan 0.070 
Zambia 0.010 Kyrgyzstan 0.057 
Zimbabwe 0.836 Libya 0.093 
  Mauritania 0.059 
  Russia 0 
  Sudan 0 
  Tajikistan 0 
  Togo 0.240 
  Uganda 0 
  Yemen 0.051 
Note: we chose countries where dominant party (left panel) or personalist 
dictatorships (right panel) exist from 1997 to 2003. For example, we excluded Kenya 
(1997–2002), Senegal (1997–2000) and Mexico (1997–2000) from the donor pool 
(left panel). 
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ABSTRACT 
This study examines why regime survival rates vary across young 
democracies. While scholars have identified a host of causal factors, 
those explanations ignore the influence of antecedent authoritarian 
rule on these factors. This study argues that there is a relationship 
between the type of authoritarian regime and the survival of 
subsequent democracies. Old regime elites inherit valuable 
resources from former dominant party regimes that may increase the 
likelihood of authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) performing well 
under democracy. This, in turn, for one thing, reduces the 
fragmentation of the new ruling parties, which inoculates young 
democracies against political instability that could lead to regime 
collapse. For another, it can effectively check the government’s 
power, thus preventing a new ruling party from crossing the line from 
democracy to authoritarianism. This study considers the hypothesis 
that dominant party regimes have a positive impact on the 
performance of ASPs under democracy, thus contributing to the 
longevity of succeeding democracies, and tests that hypothesis by 
combining quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
Keywords: authoritarian successor parties, dominant party regimes, party 
politics, democratic survival 
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INTRODUCTIONS 
Why are the survival rates of nascent democracies different? Scholars 
attribute the variation to a host of causal factors, including constitutional 
designs (Cheibub 2007; Elgie 2011 etc.), legal institutions (Gibler and 
Randazzo 2011; Reenock et al. 2013 etc.), party system (Kuenzi and 
Lambright 2005; Wang 2014 etc.), economic development (Gasiorowski 1995; 
Przeworski and Limongi 1997 etc.), inequality (Haggard and Kaufman 2012; 
Houle 2009 etc.), foreign aids (Dietrich and Wright 2015; Kono and Montinola 
2009 etc.), natural resources (Ross 2001; Smith 2004 etc.), social diversity 
(Blimes 2006; Wegenast and Basedau 2014 etc.), and international influence 
(Leeson and Dean 2009; Pevehouse 2002 etc.), as well as their causal 
mechanisms in the democratic period. However, these explanatory factors 
may be shaped by antecedent authoritarian rule. Further, though many studies 
have explored the lasting effects of preceding authoritarian regimes on party 
politics (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Frantz and Geddes 2016; 
Grzymala-Busse 2006; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011; Kitschelt 1995; Riedl 2014), 
civil society (Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Neundorf et al. 2020; Pop-Eleches 
and Tucker 2011; Shirah 2014) and transitional justice (Pinto 2006) in new 
democracies, we know little about the effect of antecedent authoritarian rule 
on the survival of post-authoritarian regimes. To fill the gap, this study 
combines two dimensions of research and explores how preceding 
dictatorships influence the survival of subsequent democracies. 
Authoritarian rule plays a role in the survival of subsequent 
democracies. One main reason is that many nascent democracies emerge 
from authoritarian regimes that shaped the institutions, party politics, and 
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social structure of their country, which, in turn, influenced autocratic survival. It 
is thus reasonable to infer that the political dynamics in dictatorships influence 
the longevity of ensuing democracies. The other is that new democracies face 
a greater risk of reversal into authoritarian regimes in the few years 
immediately after democratisation (Svolik 2008: 158). Thus, a good foundation 
laid by antecedent dictatorships helps new democracies ensure their survival 
in the early years of democratic consolidation. 
Except for a study on the effects of competitive and noncompetitive 
authoritarianism on democratic survival (Shirah 2014), comparative research 
on the types of authoritarian regimes and their relationship with the durability 
of the subsequent democratic regime is scant. It is important to fill this gap in 
the literature because institutional legacy is based not on the existence of 
competitive electoral experience in dictatorships but the extent to which power 
is shared within the ruling bloc. 
This study chooses a binary classification of dictatorships—dominant 
and non-dominant party regimes—to distinguish the extent of power-sharing 
within the ruling bloc, arguing that dominant party regimes lead to 
longer-lasting democracies compared to their non-dominant counterparts. In a 
dominant party regime, a power-sharing ruling party prompts the elites to 
create positive resources to sustain the party and ensure its survival. After 
democratisation, such parties become the authoritarian successor parties 
(ASPs), defined as former ruling parties or parties newly created by high-level 
authoritarian incumbents in preceding ruling parties in response to democratic 
transitions (Loxton 2015: 158-159). ASPs often inherit valuable resources from 
their predecessors, including a party brand, an institutionalised mechanism, a 
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territorial organisation, and sources of party finance and cohesion. Thus, 
ASPs from dominant party regimes achieve great success in 
post-authoritarian politics. The strong performance of an ASP may encourage 
cooperation among the opposition—if it performs strongly and wins in the first 
democratic elections—or reduce fragmentation of the new ruling parties—if it 
emerges as a strong contender in the first or subsequent democratic 
elections—which will decrease the likelihood of political instability that could 
lead to extra-institutional forces-driven regime change. Further, ASPs can 
effectively check the government’s power, thus reducing the new ruling parties’ 
potential to become autocratic. In sum, this study argues that dominant party 
regimes have a positive impact on the performance of ASPs and, thus, 
contribute to the longevity of succeeding democracies. 
The study combines quantitative methods with qualitative analysis. We 
confirm the argument using data gathered between 1945 and 2010 from 109 
democracies and employing mediation analysis with the survival data. Further, 
we demonstrate the internal causal mechanism through process-tracing 
methods in the case of Taiwan, combining different types of mechanistic 
evidence. 
Moreover, our research has several implications for the study of 
post-authoritarian party politics. Existing literature highlights the importance of 
dictatorial strategy towards party politics (Frantz and Geddes 2016; Hicken 
and Kuhonta 2011) and political transition (Grzymala-Busse 2006; Kitschelt 
1995; Riedl 2014) in explaining the post-authoritarian party system. These 
seminal works, however, fail to consider how the abundance or scarcity of 
inherited resources determines the performance of ASPs, which, in turn, affect 
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how the new ruling parties react. This study contributes to the existing 
literature on the dynamics of ASPs in democracies (Grzymala-Busse 2002; 
Ishiyama and Quinn 2006; Langston 2006). ASPs performing well in 
post-authoritarian politics are often ones that have inherited positive resources 
(Loxton 2015: 160-164). This study argues that elites of dominant party 
regimes are likely to have created these resources. 
POST-AUTHORITARIAN PARTY POLITICS 
Scholars have associated post-authoritarian party politics with the following: (1) 
how preceding dictators shape party politics, and how these party 
configurations are inherited by subsequent democracies (Frantz and Geddes 
2016; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011), and (2) how the dictators dominate or 
develop distinct strategies for political transition (Grzymala-Busse 2006; 
Kitschelt 1995; Riedl 2014). 
In an empirical analysis of party system institutionalisation in Asian 
countries, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011: 584) confirm that party system 
institutionalisation is more likely when the ruling party was highly 
institutionalised under the previous authoritarian regime. For example, the 
lowest level of electoral volatility was observed in post-1969 Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Taiwan, where the organisational structure of the respective 
ruling parties—the Alliance Party, People’s Action Party, and 
Kuomintang—was adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent. Instead of 
focusing on how the dictators institutionalise their parties, Frantz and Geddes 
(2016) analysed the effect of dictatorial strategies towards pre-existing parties 
on party system institutionalisation in Latin American democracies. They 
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argue that if a dictator determines to repress or ally with a traditional party, the 
party either goes underground or becomes the official ruling party and, thus, at 
least maintains its linkages to loyal voters until their return to democracy. 
Conversely, new parties that a dictator creates to divide the opposition will 
lead to the realignment of voter loyalty, adding instability to the future party 
system under democracy. 
While these research studies highlight the significance of authoritarian 
party dynamics for post-autocratic party systems, the role of ruling parties is 
also important in the transition to democracy. Frantz and Geddes (2016: 9) 
argue that ‘when authoritarian governments do create new ruling 
parties…they create incentives for those with a vocation for politics to expend 
their energy, either in the regime-sponsored party or in the tame opposition’. If 
a new ruling party totally controls the transitional politics, those planning on 
establishing other parties will be discouraged from doing so. This is because 
the ruling party will impose a higher barrier of entry into politics for other 
parties and, thus, decrease their probability of political survival. In sum, the 
stability of a party system in succeeding democracies depends not only on 
party politics of antecedent dictatorships but also on party competition in the 
transition phase. 
Post-authoritarian party politics is closely related to how dictators and 
their ruling parties react to political transition. When communist leaders set up 
patronage networks to prevent intra-elite contestations and co-opt the 
opposition, they would likely maintain their hegemonic status in democratic 
transitions and create institutions to their advantages. Consequently, party 
competition centres on personalistic power, which contributes to a fragmented 
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party system in post-communist regimes (Kitschelt 1995). By contrast, robust 
party competition is more likely when communist parties initially exit from the 
power centre during the transition period but resurge through the 
transformation of organisations, ideologies, and policy outlines 
(Grzymala-Busse 2006). In African democracies, where local elites are 
incorporated into a regime, the dictator has more bargaining power than the 
opposition during the transition period and, accordingly, imposes rules to limit 
electoral competition. Conversely, when local elites are substituted with newly 
created nomenklatura, they defect and choose to align with the opposition 
during the transition. Consequently, the opposition wins and pushes open 
participation (Riedl 2014). 
While these seminal works highlight the importance of preceding 
dictatorial rule in explaining party politics during the transition period, which, in 
turn, influences the party system of subsequent democracies, two points merit 
further discussion. First, no comparative study other than Grzymala-Busse’s 
(2007) has examined the interplay of ASPs and their opponents. When a 
dictator seeks to co-opt local elites, dominating transitional politics and limiting 
electoral competition, the high barrier to entry during the transition period 
causes the opposition to cooperate, which leads to higher party system 
institutionalisation (Riedl 2014). This argument, however, fails to explain why 
these ‘anti-incumbent alliances’ do not lose the incentive to remain united 
even after winning the battle. Further, the party system in a democratic country 
does not always become unstable if the ruler in preceding autocracies tends to 
create the new party (Frantz and Geddes 2016). This is because a dominant 
ASP may lead a divided opposition to realign, thus reducing the likelihood of 
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an unstable party system. 
Second, these seminal works introduce the concept of the hegemonic 
status of a dictator during democratic transitions into the study of the 
determinants of post-authoritarian party politics. The origin of their dominant 
status, however, remains unclear. Further, it is possible for ASPs to still play a 
significant role after democratisation, despite not controlling the transition 
process. It is the case when the authoritarian incumbents lose an election and 
allow the winner of the election to assume office and, thus, cannot design the 
rules of the new democratic game to their advantage. However, they can still 
return to power when possessing and inheriting substantial antecedent 
political strengths and resources. In Mexico, for instance, the old regime’s 
clientelistic structures and business community allies, and the government’s 
mediocre economic performance explain the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party’s return to presidency in 2012 (Flores-Macías 2013: 135-137). Therefore, 
this study argues that valuable resources that old regime elites inherit 
determine the performance of the ASPs, which affects the post-authoritarian 
party system. 
DOMINANT AND NON-DOMINANT PARTY REGIMES 
This study chose a binary classification of dictatorships, namely, dominant and 
non-dominant party regimes. Geddes et al. (2014: 318) categorise autocracies 
based on ‘whether control over policy, leadership selection, and the security 
apparatus is in the hands of a ruling party (dominant-party dictatorships), a 
royal family (monarchies), the military (rule by the military institution), or a 
narrower group centred on an individual dictator (personalist dictatorships)’. 
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This classification is mainly based on the extent to which decision-making 
power is distributed within the ruling bloc, which in turn determines their 
influence once democratisation is complete. 
In dominant party dictatorships, ruling party elites prevent the dictator 
from changing the status quo to his advantage because the party is a 
collective decision-making platform. A personalist leader may establish a 
ruling party for a credible commitment with elites. He and his narrow coalition, 
however, still enjoy substantial discretion (Reuter and Remington 2009) or can 
determine a potential successor (Brownlee 2007a: 610-612). As the number of 
the ruling elites whose consent is required to change the status quo decreases, 
policy stability also decreases (Tsebelis 2002: 25). In other words, the status 
quo is more likely to be changed in a personalist regime, which marginalises 
the authoritarian party.1 
The situation is different in military dictatorships or monarchy. In all 
probability, a collective decision-making platform is identified in these regimes 
if an authoritarian institution is created to play such a role. However, because 
of the common interest within a junta or royal family (Chin 2015; Nassif 2017), 
their incentives and goals align with each other.2 Policy stability decreases 
when the homogeneity of players who are required to agree to change the 
status quo decreases (Tsebelis 2002: 30). Therefore, elites who have a place 
                                                     
1
 In fact, these parties as ‘parties of power’ are created for the sole purpose of supporting the 
dictators. For instance, Nazarbayev established Otan or Nur Otan for amassing leaders’ 
popularity and channeling mass consensus through elections (Del Sordi 2011). 
Personalist rule often predates these ruling parties, and designates a successor by 
hereditary succession (Brownlee 2007a: 610-612). 
2
 For example, in regime change coups, soldiers from disenfranchised socio-economic 
classes or ethnic groups often hold common interests to radically change current political 
institutions. In leadership reshuffling coups, soldiers often guard conservative policy 
stances and fight against incompetent military leaders (Chin 2015: 5-6). For the royal 
family, how to ensure despotism or hereditary succession is the foremost and common 
interest. 
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in decision-making but are not soldiers or royal members are incapable of 
maintaining the status quo. Under a dominant party regime, conversely, elites 
with different backgrounds, ideologies, and policy expectations are likely to be 
recruited into the ruling party and, consequently, hold decision-making power. 
In this way, policy stability increases with the heterogeneity of players. 
Dominant party regimes provide the incumbent with positive resources 
and, thus, are more endurable than other types of dictatorships (Magaloni 
2008). One such resource is a source of party cohesion. Where 
decision-making power is shared by the dictator and the ruling party (Magaloni 
and Kricheli 2010: 127), instead of being concentrated in one of them (e.g., a 
royal family, the junta, or the dictator), the dictator can resolve commitment 
problems by loyally distributing positions, spoils, and privileges among the 
ruling elites (Magaloni 2008: 723). Further, they can mitigate intra-elite 
conflicts by offering the forum of collective agenda setting (Brownlee 2007b) or 
coordinate suitable elites to run for office in specific electoral districts (Reuter 
and Remington 2009: 506). Therefore, elites are less likely to consider 
defecting to opposition parties. 
Another resource is party organisation and finance. In dominant party 
regimes, a power-sharing ruling party prompts elites to create positive 
resources by either diverting public funds for partisan use (Greene 2007) or 
developing strong organisational power (Svolik 2012) to sustain the party and 
ensure its survival. First, the ruling party is a power-sharing platform; therefore, 
no single actor determines everything. Thus, party elites are not anxious about 
their benefits being withdrawn by the dictator or party assets being used for 
personal gain. Instead, they are willing to invest in the party and develop a 
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robust source of party finance. Second, the dictator neither arbitrarily appoints 
his offspring as the successor nor has the final words on personnel 
administration. Instead, institutionalised mechanisms for the recruitment and 
advancement of elites are created, enabling them to work for the party or the 
State. Moreover, once promoted to the top of the party leadership or political 
office, they could get involved in policy-making and leadership succession 
decisions. Thus, a comprehensive territorial organisation is necessary for 
recruiting party members. These power-sharing designs exploit members’ 
opportunism and career aspirations to create a stake in the perpetuation of the 
regime (Svolik 2012: 163). 
Another resource is a party brand. A dominant party regime 
successfully attracts investments because the party establishes formal rules 
on intra-party transparency in terms of access to information, which constrains 
the actions of the dictator and breaks down the barriers to collective action by 
party elites (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011). Consequently, it fosters high 
economic growth. Further, as the dictator of dominant party regimes cannot 
derive support from a narrow group, he needs to tie a large group of people to 
the regime elite, making politics more representative of different social groups. 
Therefore, the dictator needs to attend closely to the population health status 
and increase health expenditure (Yan and Lin 2019). In conclusion, they can 
establish strong brands by promoting economic development and providing 
public goods. 
While dominant party regimes and authoritarian stability are strongly 
linked, this does not necessarily mean that regimes do not become 
democracies. For example, the opposition can topple current authoritarian 
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regimes through successful electoral strategies. Bunce and Wolchik (2010: 47) 
concluded that the successful defeat of autocrats primarily hinged on the 
extent to which the opposition and their allies used novel and sophisticated 
strategies (e.g., collaboration with youth movements) to maximise their chance 
of winning elections. Further, authoritarian incumbents are likely to choose 
democratisation when regimes possess substantial political strengths and 
resource advantages (Slater and Wong 2013). In other words, ruling parties 
tend to concede when they are confident that democratic politics will secure 
their continued dominance, or can at least be ensured that their party will be 
preserved from an electoral standpoint. Once they are democratised, these 
enduring regimes can have positive impacts on democratic survival, as old 
regime elites may inherit valuable resources that can facilitate the strong 
performance of ASPs. 
ASPs AND DEMOCRATIC SURVIVAL 
ASPs achieving significant success in post-authoritarian politics often 
inherit positive resources, including a party brand, an institutionalised 
mechanism, a territorial organisation, and sources of party finance and 
cohesion, from their past autocratic rule (Loxton 2015: 160-164). A strong 
record on economic development, infrastructure, or national defence justifies 
the party’s continued leadership, while a robust source of party finance and 
territorial infrastructure facilitate election campaigning and mobilisation. 
Institutionalised recruitment or advancement mechanisms constitute a solid 
foundation for fulfilling the promise to promote opposition elites joining the 
organisation. 
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ASPs from dominant party regimes often perform well due to these 
valuable resources. For example, the decision of the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP) to maintain organisational continuity with its predecessor, the Bulgarian 
Communist Party (BKP), and inherit the BKP’s enormous property, along with 
its established institutionalised mechanism, nationwide grassroots 
organisation, and source of party finance, allowed it to remain the largest party 
in terms of membership and the richest party even after its consecutive 
defeats in 1997 and 2001. Further, this helped it to eventually return to power 
in 2005 (Spirova 2008: 485–486). In Cape Verde, despite suffering resounding 
defeats, leaders and members of the African Party for the Independence of 
Cape Verde (PAICV), based on their history of violent struggle, remained 
united. Furthermore, the PAICV ran on its record as the champion of 
independence and solid performance in socioeconomic matters and operated 
as a constructive opposition (Meyns 2002: 159-161). 
In non-dominant party regimes, however, the official party offers only 
limited power-sharing function. These parties, as a political vehicle of 
authoritarian rulers, serve to increase the leaders’ popularity and garner mass 
approval during elections.3 Further, these parties are built to transform 
citizens into true believers through mass indoctrination, making it more likely 
for the society to be ideologically monolithic.4 Despite the prominent role in 
mobilising voters, these parties lack an institutionalised mechanism to ensure 
power-sharing between elites, while the tilting of the power balance towards 
                                                     
3
 Communal Councils, or para-partisan organisations that subsequently developed into board 
bases of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, rendered assistance to Hugo Chávez in 
distributing resources for local infrastructure, helping him win the allegiance of the 
masses (Handlin 2016: 1248-1249). 
4
 For instance, the Workers’ Party of Korea inculcated in North Koreans the Juche Ideology of 
Kim Il-sung, that is, everything must be reliant on the masses, for the purpose of 
mobilising ideological unity and maintaining the hegemonic rule through ideological 
leadership (Choi 2017: 787). 
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the dictator reduces elites’ incentive to fund their party. After losing power, old 
regime elites hardly depend on immature organisations or 
less-institutionalised party financing to be voted back into office. In the 
Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos created Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), a 
clientelistic party with weak organisational power, and used it for the 
systematic exploitation of State resources to fulfill the needs of Marcos and 
other self-serving politicians, instead of strengthening the party (Quimpo 2009: 
340). After democratisation, KBL fared poorly in all legislative elections and 
gradually became marginalised. 
A positive effect of ASPs on democratic survival is the effective check 
they place on the government’s power. As ASPs are still veto players, there is 
no room for new ruling parties to be divided. For instance, after its defeat in the 
1990 Nicaraguan elections, the long-ruling party Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN), apart from conducting an organisational reformation, 
mobilised its grass-root organisations to protest against the new government. 
To prevent FSLN from returning to power, Arnoldo Alemán brought together 
divergent liberal forces to establish the Constitutionalist Liberal Party and 
coalesced with three other parties to form the Liberal Alliance (Puig 2010: 
89-92). As a strong contender in the first and subsequent democratic elections, 
FSLN prevented the fragmentation of the new ruling coalition, thereby 
avoiding political instability and a consequent regime collapse. The other 
effect of powerful ASPs is that they facilitate the emergence of the main 
opposition party. This significantly reduces the odds of fragmentation. For 
example, following the overwhelming victory of the National Salvation Front 
(FSN), the successor to the Romanian Communist Party, over a host of poorly 
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organised opposition parties in the first democratic election, the Christian 
Democratic National Peasants’ Party (PNT-CD) decided to form a consistent 
alliance of centre-right parties with the main objective of opposing FSN 
(Pop-Eleches 2008). FSN (later FDSN/PDSR) and PNT-CD were the two 
primary political forces in Romania in the 1990s. 
In Thailand, by contrast, poor performance of ASPs has contributed to 
overall political instability. High fragmentation constitutes a challenge to the 
governability of democratic regimes, as many ineffective and short-lived 
multi-party coalition cabinets within Thailand have shown. Instability gave Thai 
military leaders the opportunity to launch coups. For example, Chatichai's 
multi-party coalition government (1988-1991) was ridden with corruption and 
factional conflict, which the military used as a pretext for its intervention in 
1991 (Bhuchongkul 1992). 
ASPs also reduce the potential of new ruling parties to change formal 
rules that lead to autocratisation by limiting competition in subsequent 
elections. The success of ASPs assures the electorates that if they are 
unsatisfied with the performance of the government, they have a clear 
alternative. In this scenario, ASPs find it easier to mobilise public support when 
they criticise the government’s policies, condemn its economic or democratic 
failure, or propose bills to curtail the government’s power, while the 
incumbents find it difficult to alter the electoral outcome through extensive 
vote-buying, by imposing a ban on other parties, or by beating, jailing, or killing 
opposition leaders or supporters. 
Conversely, the failure of ASPs often encourages the new ruling parties 
to cross the line from democracy to authoritarianism. This is because actors 
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who are in an advantageous position tend to fashion a new constitutional order 
to cripple their opponents and secure continued rule, which paves the way for 
gradual autocratisation in post-transition politics. For example, in Pakistan, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed office after his party won an absolute 
parliamentary majority. Due to the lack of ASPs that effectively checked the 
government’s power, Bhutto easily amended the Constitution and law 
concerning the use of emergency powers and preventive detention, under 
which the major opposition party was dissolved and its leaders were arrested 
(Wheeler 1976: 113). Similarly, in Zambia, the political weakness of the ASP, 
the UNIP, enabled the new president Frederick Chiluba and his party MMD to 
pass a constitutional amendment that prevented the most important opposition 
candidate from running for presidency (Baylies and Szeftel 1997). 
In sum, compared to non-dominant party regimes, a power-sharing 
ruling party of dominant party regimes provides the incumbent with more 
valuable resources, including party finance, territorial organisation, and party 
brand. After democratisation, ASPs inheriting positive resources from 
dominant party regimes continue to challenge the ‘new’ ruling parties or 
coalitions, thus acting as the strongest check on the government’s power and 
decreasing the likelihood of collapse. Thus, the study made the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Dominant party regimes have a positive impact on the longevity of 
succeeding democracies. 
H1.1: Dominant party regimes lead to a strong performance of ASPs 
and, thus, have a positive impact on the longevity of succeeding democracies. 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
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First, the terms were defined. The unit of analysis was ‘nascent 
democracy-year’.5 Democracies were defined as regimes where the 
executive achieved power through a direct competitive election, in which at 
least 10% of the total population was eligible to vote, all major parties were 
permitted to compete, and neither fraud nor violence determined the election 
outcome, or through an indirect election by a body at least 60% of which was 
elected in direct competitive elections (Geddes et al. 2014: 317). A nascent 
democracy was a country that was ruled by a dictator for some years after 
1945, but subsequently transitioned to a democratic political regime.6 A 
democratic regime was considered to have ended under the following 
conditions: (1) if an executive achieved power through undemocratic means, 
(2) if the government achieved power through democratic means but 
subsequently changed the formal or informal rules, or (3) if competitive 
elections were held to choose the government but one or more parties for 
which substantial numbers of citizens would be expected to vote were banned 
(Geddes et al. 2014: 317-318). Our data therefore covered 109 democracies, 
including 1,443 pooled time series and cross section observations between 
1945 and 2010 using data from the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (GWF) 
Autocratic Regimes dataset (see Appendix A). 
The dependent variable was the failure or survival time of a democratic 
regime in years. The independent variables were the type of preceding 
authoritarian regime, with this research creating a dummy variable where 1 = 
                                                     
5
 Svolik (2008: 164) finds that any country that has been democratic for 52 or more years as 
of 2001 is estimated to have consolidated with at least 90% probability. In other words, it 
is nearly impossible for them to embrace autocratic rule again. Consequently, 
consolidated democracies, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K., transformed 
from the imperial rule, were excluded from the analysis to avoid biased estimation. 
6
 Based on the definition, the study excluded countries that experienced autocratic rule in the 
period of interwar or WWII, but were restored to democracy after 1945, such as Germany, 
Italy, and Japan. 
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dominant party regimes and 0 = non-dominant party regimes using data from 
the GWF dataset.7 A dominant party regime was defined as a regime in which 
‘control over policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus is in the 
hands of a ruling party’ (Geddes et al. 2014: 318). The mediator was the 
performance of ASPs. A dummy variable was created to indicate if ASPs 
performed well in a new democracy, with 1= ASPs that had a majority of seats 
in the legislature or whose party members were appointed as the prime 
minister or won the presidential elections, and 0 = otherwise. Appendix B 
contains the list of ASPs with superior performance. 
A list of control variables influencing the duration of new democracies 
was added. First, scholars associate the variation in the longevity of 
democracies with their constitutional design (Cheibub 2007; Elgie 2011 etc.), 
and, thus, three types of constitutional systems, namely presidentialism, 
semi-presidentialism, and parliamentarism, were included. Second, we used 
annual economic development and growth to study the effects of economic 
conditions on the duration of a democratic regime (Svolik 2008; Gasiorowski 
1995; Przeworski and Limongi 1997 etc.). The two covariates based on 
Maddison Project’s data were annual GDP per capita and GDP growth. Third, 
oil revenues provide a government with enough money for patronage and 
internal security, thus making it less likely for a country relying heavily on 
natural resources to be democratic (Ross, 2001; Smith, 2004 etc.). This study 
considered this effect by using a continuous variable for natural resource 
                                                     
7
 For countries moving back and forth between autocracies and democracies, the coding of 
preceding authoritarian regime lies between the two democracies. If a democracy 
experienced two or more consecutive but distinct cases of authoritarian rule, the recent 
one was recorded. The alternative method was to use a new category to distinguish those 
democracies from different authoritarian regimes in a row. However, it posed no effects on 
the coding results because democracies undergoing transitions from dominant party 
regimes did not go through other types of autocracies. 
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income as a percentage of the GDP. Fourth, democracies are less likely to 
survive in divided societies (Blimes 2006; Wegenast and Basedau 2014 etc.). 
Measures of ethnic and religious fractionalisation were thus added to the 
analysis. Fifth, British colonial rule is thought to have promoted 
post-independence democracy, and a dummy variable was included for former 
British colonies (La Porta et. al. 1998). Further, it has been suggested that the 
particular timing to accomplish democratisation and prior experiences with 
democracy affect democratic survival. This analysis thus controlled for the 
year that the country became democratic and the number of democratic 
transitions. Finally, transitional similarity in post-Soviet countries shows that 
democratic survival may have been influenced by the lasting effects of 
antecedent USSR rule rather than institutional characteristics within dominant 
party regimes. Therefore, a dummy variable was included to indicate whether 
a country was governed by the USSR dictatorship during the Cold War.8 The 
summary of variables, operationalisation of indicators, and data source are 
shown in Appendix E. 
To confirm our theoretical expectations, this research used the Cox PH 
model with time-variant covariates.9 Further, a mediation model sought to 
explain the mechanism that links the type of former authoritarian regime to the 
                                                     
8
 It includes 15 sovereign States that emerged and re-emerged from the USSR following its 
breakup in 1991, and the closest allies of the Soviet Union, sometimes called the Eastern 
Bloc, including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. 
Yugoslavia and Albania are not included because they ceased being allied to the Soviet 
Union in 1948 and 1966, respectively. 
9
 Based on PH assumptions, the hazard ratio is constant over time. To check if PH 
assumptions were violated, this study used Harrel and Lee’s test. When PH assumptions 
are not met, this analysis should introduce time-dependent covariates, that is, the 
extended Cox model. This study considers this effect by multiplying by time or some 
function of time, like the natural log form of time or Heaviside function, the choice of which 
is judged by graphical approaches. 
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duration of a democratic regime.10 Following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) steps 
for mediation, a mediation effect was found to exist when (1) the type of 
authoritarian regime and ASP performance both affect democratic survival; (2) 
the type of authoritarian regime is associated with ASP performance; (3) the 
effect of the authoritarian regime type on democratic survival disappears (or at 
least weakens) when ASP performance is included in the regression. 
We should control an alternative pathway that links the type of regime 
and economic development to succeeding democratic survival. Scholars 
argue that dominant party regimes create formal rules that constrain the power 
of dictators and foster higher economic growth and investment (Gehlbach and 
Keefer 2011; Wright 2008). Consequently, the more economically developed a 
country is at the outset of democratic development, the more likely its regime 
is to survive. Thus, the analysis includes annual GDP per capita to test the 
validity of the proposed causal mechanisms. 
Regarding a test for robustness, we first investigated how the type of 
the preceding authoritarian regime influences the survival of a democratic 
regime in the initial 19 years, as democracies face a greater risk of reversal 
into authoritarian regimes in the few years immediately after democratisation 
(Svolik 2008: 158) (see Supplementary Figure 1).11 Second, this study 
considered the longer regime, rather than the most recent one, as the 
antecedent authoritarian rule if a democracy had experienced consecutive but 
distinct authoritarian regimes.12 Third, a military elites-led transition places a 
                                                     
10
 Although the Cox PH model combined with non-rare outcomes of events cannot offer a 
measure of mediation effects, at least the product method of mediation analysis provides 
a valid test of whether the mediation effect exists or not (VanderWeele 2011). 
11
 The hazard of democratic collapse remains constant after t=19, despite an upward 
movement in the cumulative hazard function close to t=47. 
12
 Seven democracies were changed in records from antecedent non-dominant to dominant 
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new democracy at a high risk of failure. A possible reason is that the military 
can justify its ouster of an illegitimate regime and establishment of a 
supposedly legitimate democratic government, thus making it more likely to 
use ‘saving the country in a time of crisis’ as a pretext to seize power (Marinov 
and Goemans 2014: 803; Thyne and Powell 2016: 196). Therefore, a dummy 
variable was included to indicate whether the antecedent regime was military. 
Fourth, previous studies found that communist regimes differed from most 
other kinds of authoritarian regimes by not merely being interested in ruling 
over citizens, but also trying to indoctrinate their ideologies to convert citizens 
into ‘true believers’ in the regime, which influenced citizens’ attitudes towards 
the democratic system (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). Instead of post-Soviet 
States, the study controlled for countries that were governed by a single 
communist party guided by Marxism–Leninism to capture their common 
effects on democratic development.13 Fifth, a prolonged experience with 
democratic rule should have a strong and positive influence on democratic 
survival; for example, this may be seen through economic growth (Gerring et 
al. 2005) or enhanced human development (Gerring et al. 2012). The risk of 
democratic breakdowns may also increase with an increasing number of past 
regime collapses (Morrison 2009; Przeworski et al. 2000). Rather than using 
the year that the country became democratic and number of democratic 
transitions, this study controlled for both the number of years of democracy 
since 1945 and the number of all past regime changes. Sixth, based on the 
existing literature and findings discussed in the first and second chapters, we 
                                                                                                                                                       
party regimes: Azerbaijan (1993-1993), Bolivia (1983- ), Georgia (2005- ), Lesotho 
(1994- ), Serbia (2001- ), Sierra Leone (1997-1997), and Turkey (1962-1980) while 
Nicaragua (1991- ) was changed in records vice versa. 
13
 It included post-Soviet States, Albania, former member States of Yugoslavia, Benin, the 
Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, and Mongolia. 
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should control an alternative pathway that links the type of regime and judicial 
independence or health expenditures to succeeding democratic survival.14 
Finally, the analysis used the vote and seat share of ASPs as an alternative 
measure of the performance of ASPs. 
A glance at the figure reveals the impact of the type of antecedent 
authoritarian regime on the survival curve of democratic regimes (see 
Supplementary Figure 2). Dominant party regimes lead to longer lasting 
democracies than their non-dominant counterparts. Further, the positive 
impact of dominant party regimes on succeeding democratic survival was 
confirmed even if the analysis divided non-dominant regimes into personal, 
military or hybrid regimes, based on the log-rank test to compare their pattern 
of survival times. However, the survival curves of democratic regimes that 
were preceded by personalist dictatorships, military regimes, and hybrid 
regimes were not significantly different. Thus, the analysis treats 
non-dominant regimes as a whole category. 
Table 1 presents how the threat of collapse of the succeeding 
democratic regime varied according to the type of authoritarian rule and other 
variables. Models 1-3 are Cox PH models with time-invariant covariates. 
Dominant party regimes lowered the risk of subsequent democracies being 
toppled by 75% (Model 1), 75% (Model 2) and 77% (Model 3). As for the effect 
of control variables, the risk abruptly increased 3.8-fold (Model 2) or 5-fold 
(Model 3) if a new democracy adopted semi-presidentialism instead of 
                                                     
14
 Data from the World Bank constitutes the most comprehensive dataset available on global 
health expenditures, and thus allows us to analyse information from between 1995 and 
2010. An insufficient sample size may prevent findings from being extrapolated while 
increasing the risk that observations are simply the results of chance (Faber and Fonseca 
2014). As such, this study controlled the pathway from the type of regime to succeeding 
democratic survival via judicial independence. 
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presidentialism as its constitutional design. Further, recent entry into 
democracy reduced the risk of regime collapse. Thus, a more democratic 
international context in recent decades has made democracies more immune 
to authoritarian reversal. 
Models 4-5 are extended Cox models used to correct variables from 
Models 2 to 3, in which PH assumptions were not met. Using rank plots, this 
study captured the effect of parliamentarism and ethnic fragmentation on the 
risk of regime change by multiplying by natural log of time ln (t) in Model 4, 
while adding ethnic fragmentation × ln (t) in Model 5, as shown in Table 1. All 
models demonstrate that antecedent dominant party rule lowered the risk of 
abrupt regime collapse in new democracies (Model 4: -73%; Model 5: -77%). 
All time-variant models were preferred to time-invariant models by the 
likelihood ratio test. Table 1 confirms our expectation when using the Cox PH 
model with time-variant and -invariant covariates (Model 6: -64%; Model 7: 
-70%). 
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Table 1 Survival analysis on the hazard of democratic regimes collapse, 1945–2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
 Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR 
Dominant party regimes -1.398
***
 0.248
***
 -1.397
**
 0.247
**
 -1.466
**
 0.231
**
 -1.319
**
 0.267
**
 -1.462
**
 0.232
**
 -1.033
*
 0.356
*
 -1.190
*
 0.304
*
 
 (0.525) (0.130) (0.616) (0.152) (0.637) (0.147) (0.621) (0.166) (0.635) (0.147) (0.571) (0.239) (0.680) (0.207) 
Parliamentarism   0.201 1.222 -0.030 0.971 -1.190 0.304 -0.048 0.953 0.343 1.409 0.134 1.143 
   (0.413) (0.505) (0.456) (0.442) (0.827) (0.252) (0.457) (0.436) (0.424) (0.597) (0.473) (0.541) 
Parliamentarism × ln (t)       0.983** 2.673**       
       (0.444) (1.188)       
Semi-presidentialism   1.339
***
 3.817
***
 1.606
***
 4.982
***
 1.486
***
 4.421
***
 1.613
***
 5.018
***
 1.189
**
 3.285
**
 1.389
**
 4.012
**
 
   (0.489) (1.866) (0.544) (2.713) (0.506) (2.236) (0.537) (2.694) (0.512) (1.681) (0.546) (2.193) 
Ethnic fractionalization   0.860 2.363 -0.016 0.984 -1.099 0.333 -2.040
*
 0.130
*
 0.155 1.168 -0.087 0.917 
   (0.711) (1.681) (0.815) (0.802) (1.099) (0.366) (1.187) (0.154) (0.720) (0.841) (0.810) (0.742) 
Ethnic frac. × ln (t)       1.745** 5.728** 1.583** 4.868**     
       (0.729) (4.175) (0.711) (3.461)     
Religious 
fractionalization 
  0.241 1.273 0.015 1.015 -0.321 0.726 -0.164 0.849 -0.309 0.734 -0.013 0.987 
   (0.917) (1.167) (0.986) (1.000) (0.921) (0.668) (0.992) (0.842) (0.927) (0.680) (1.032) (1.018) 
Former British colony   1.000
**
 2.719
**
 0.729 2.073 1.355
**
 3.877
**
 0.846
*
 2.331
*
 0.755 2.127 0.616 1.851 
   (0.497) (1.351) (0.501) (1.038) (0.529) (2.050) (0.506) (1.180) (0.505) (1.075) (0.517) (0.957) 
No. democratic transition   -0.110 0.896 -0.074 0.928 -0.107 0.898 -0.039 0.962 0.009 1.009 -0.003 0.997 
   (0.189) (0.170) (0.208) (0.193) (0.190) (0.171) (0.211) (0.203) (0.201) (0.203) (0.218) (0.217) 
Years of entry   -0.050
***
 0.951
***
 -0.057
***
 0.944
***
 -0.054
***
 0.949
***
 -0.059
***
 0.943
***
 -0.049
***
 0.952
***
 -0.053
***
 0.948
***
 
   (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Post-soviet states   -0.058 0.944   0.019 1.019   0.076 1.079   
   (0.720) (0.680)   (0.726) (0.740)   (0.868) (0.936)   
Log GDP pc           -0.729
***
 0.482
***
 -0.467
*
 0.627
*
 
           (0.238) (0.115) (0.276) (0.173) 
Growth           -5.810
**
 0.003
**
 -6.144
**
 0.002
**
 
           (2.599) (0.008) (2.608) (0.006) 
Oil           0.536 1.709 0.325 1.384 
           (0.516) (0.882) (0.538) (0.745) 
No. of Subjects 109 109 109 109 109 108 108 
No. of Observations 1443 1443 1443 1443 1443 1441 1441 
Region Dummy No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
LR chi
2
 10.30 36.01 49.91 46.75 55.05 50.54 56.80 
Prob> chi
2
 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -192.95359 -180.09671 -173.14573 -174.72814 -170.57783 -168.09354 -164.96347 
Note: standard error in parentheses in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. Likelihood ratio test: Compared with model 2, model 4 (chi
2
(2) = 10.74, Pr>chi
2
 = 0.0047), compared 
with model 3, model 5 (chi
2
(1) = 5.14, Pr>chi
2
 = 0.0234). A list of region dummies: Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America and Post-soviet states. The study used region dummies instead of unit 
fixed effects, that is, nascent democracies, because the type of preceding authoritarian regime was a time-invariant covariate. With fixed effects models, the study does not estimate the 
effects of variables whose values do not change across time. By contrast, a list of region dummies was included to control for unobserved characteristics at the regional level that may bias 
the predictors and outcomes. For example, researchers have argued that the culture of stressing monism rather than pluralism explain democratic breakdown in Latin America (Lipset 
2004). 
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Table 2. Mediation analysis with survival model, 1945–2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR 
Dominant party regimes -1.404
**
 0.246
**
     -0.937 0.392 -1.033
*
 0.356
*
 -0.727 0.484 
 (0.631) (0.155)     (0.670) (0.263) (0.571) (0.239) (0.686) (0.331) 
ASP with better 
performance 
  -1.975
***
 0.139
***
   -1.825
***
 0.161
***
   -1.831
***
 0.160
***
 
   (0.555) (0.077)   (0.562) (0.091)   (0.569) (0.091) 
Log GDP pc     -0.827
***
 0.437
***
   -0.729
***
 0.482
***
 -0.722
***
 0.486
***
 
     (0.232) (0.102)   (0.238) (0.115) (0.240) (0.116) 
Growth -6.863
**
 0.001
**
 -6.051
**
 0.002
**
 -5.678
**
 0.003
**
 -6.279
**
 0.002
**
 -5.810
**
 0.003
**
 -4.944
**
 0.007
**
 
 (2.669) (0.003) (2.425) (0.006) (2.499) (0.009) (2.518) (0.005) (2.599) (0.008) (2.502) (0.018) 
Oil 0.134 1.144 -0.095 0.910 0.607 1.835 -0.166 0.847 0.536 1.709 0.324 1.383 
 (0.484) (0.553) (0.481) (0.438) (0.523) (0.959) (0.483) (0.409) (0.516) (0.882) (0.514) (0.711) 
Parliamentarism 0.256 1.292 0.003 1.003 0.315 1.370 0.017 1.018 0.343 1.409 0.039 1.040 
 (0.418) (0.540) (0.420) (0.421) (0.428) (0.586) (0.423) (0.430) (0.424) (0.597) (0.431) (0.448) 
Semi-presidentialism 1.284
***
 3.612
***
 1.252
***
 3.498
***
 1.051
**
 2.861
**
 1.259
***
 3.523
***
 1.189
**
 3.285
**
 1.244
**
 3.469
**
 
 (0.489) (1.765) (0.474) (1.660) (0.496) (1.419) (0.474) (1.671) (0.512) (1.681) (0.502) (1.743) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.684 1.982 0.868 2.382 0.193 1.213 0.909 2.482 0.155 1.168 0.407 1.503 
 (0.728) (1.442) (0.744) (1.772) (0.742) (0.900) (0.728) (1.806) (0.720) (0.841) (0.712) (1.070) 
Religious fractionalization -0.142 0.868 0.257 1.293 -0.264 0.768 0.126 1.134 -0.309 0.734 -0.031 0.970 
 (0.955) (0.829) (0.941) (1.217) (0.939) (0.721) (0.926) (1.051) (0.927) (0.680) (0.883) (0.856) 
Former British colony 1.101
**
 3.008
**
 0.874
*
 2.397
*
 0.659 1.933 0.924
*
 2.520
*
 0.755 2.127 0.719 2.053 
 (0.506) (1.522) (0.519) (1.244) (0.495) (0.957) (0.515) (1.297) (0.505) (1.075) (0.499) (1.024) 
No. democratic transition -0.121 0.886 -0.175 0.839 0.086 1.090 -0.237 0.789 0.009 1.009 -0.089 0.915 
 (0.191) (0.169) (0.197) (0.165) (0.198) (0.216) (0.201) (0.159) (0.201) (0.203) (0.214) (0.196) 
Years of entry -0.047
***
 0.955
***
 -0.054
***
 0.947
***
 -0.050
***
 0.951
***
 -0.052
***
 0.949
***
 -0.049
***
 0.952
***
 -0.059
***
 0.943
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
Post-soviet states -0.438 0.645 -0.711 0.491 -0.440 0.644 -0.118 0.889 0.076 1.079 0.578 1.782 
 (0.788) (0.509) (0.755) (0.371) (0.790) (0.508) (0.856) (0.761) (0.868) (0.936) (0.933) (1.663) 
No. of Subjects 108 108 108 108 108 108 
No. of Observations 1441 1441 1441 1441 1441 1441 
LR chi
2
 40.51 53.17 47.82 55.43 50.54 65.17 
Prob> chi
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -173.10972 -166.77674 -169.45578 -165.64668 -168.09354 -160.78048 
Note: standard error in parentheses in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Mediation analysis, as shown in Table 2, revealed that antecedent 
dominant party regimes reduced the risk of democratic failure by 75%, 
compared to non-dominant party regimes (Model 1). In addition, good 
performance of ASPs was associated with a decreased risk of regime collapse 
(Model 2, -86%), and dominant party regimes were likely to promote ASPs that 
could achieve considerable success in post-authoritarian politics (see 
Supplementary Figure 3). When the explanatory variable and the mediator 
were included, only indirect effects were found to be statistically significant, 
thus confirming that dominant party regimes lead to a strong performance of 
ASPs and, thus, have a positive impact on the longevity of succeeding 
democracies. Table 2 also confirms the proposed causal mechanism 
controlling the pathway that links dominant party regimes and higher levels of 
GDP per capita to reduced risk of democratic collapse. Further, our theoretical 
expectations were confirmed when this study examined succeeding 
democratic survival in the initial 19 years after democratisation (see 
Supplementary Table 1), changed the criterion to record antecedent 
authoritarian rule (see Supplementary Table 2), included former military 
regimes as an additional control (see Supplementary Table 3), controlled for all 
post-communist countries (see Supplementary Table 4), controlled for both the 
number of years of democracy since 1945 and the number of all past regime 
changes rather than using the year that the country became democratic and 
number of democratic transitions (see Supplementary Table 5), controlled an 
alternative pathway that links the type of regime and judicial independence to 
succeeding democratic survival (see Supplementary Table 6), and used an 
alternative measure of the performance of ASPs (see Supplementary Table 7). 
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In sum, dominant party regimes enable better performance of ASPs, thus 
making it difficult for the subsequent democratic regimes to slide back into 
authoritarian rule. 
CAUSAL MECHANISM: A CASE STUDY 
We chose Taiwan as the subject of our case study in light of its long-lasting 
dominant party rule for nearly 50 years. Longer periods of dictatorships, in all 
probability, shape political structure, which would, in turn, influence 
post-authoritarian politics. Moreover, it is an appropriate case for excluding 
reverse causality, for example, elites facing a well-organised opposition will 
likely create an official party to counter any threats, making it likely for 
dominant party regimes to emerge (Smith 2005: 430). It thus increases the 
likelihood of having effective checks and balances on the government’s power 
after democratic transitions. However, Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party in 
Taiwan between 1950 and 1999, had retreated to Taiwan after 1949 following 
its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party during the civil war. As a result, the 
origin of dominant party rule was not caused by any situation in Taiwan before 
1949. 
This study explores the cause-effect link that connects the cause and 
outcome using the process-tracing methods. Of the four variants of 
process-tracing, we used theory-testing process-tracing, which starts with 
conceptualising a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism based on 
proposed theories and empirical research. Precisely put, each of the 
constituent parts of the mechanism needs to be theorised and subsequently 
operationalised. We collected and assessed the available empirical record to 
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determine whether there is mechanistic evidence suggesting that the 
mechanism worked as theorised (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 8-9). Figure 1 
presents the causal mechanism that links the KMT regime to democratic 
survival. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Theory testing process-tracing: How KMT affects subsequent 
democratic survival 
Part I: KMT elites created positive resources to sustain the party and ensure its survival 
Evidence I: KMT elites jointly controlled seven holding companies, which owned shares in over 60 
enterprises (trace) 
Evidence II: KMT elites holding government posts at all levels transferred and donated public 
properties to KMT and its affiliated units (trace) 
Evidence III: KMT set up branch offices in every township and urban district to recruit party 
members (trace, pattern) 
Evidence IV: KMT established institutionalised mechanisms for the recruitment and advancement 
of elites (trace, pattern) 
Evidence V: KMT provided local faction leaders personal benefits in exchange for their support to 
ensure the continued dominance of KMT (trace) 
 
Part II: After democratisation, KMT still had resource advantage over its major opponent, the DPP 
Evidence I: KMT had much more party members than DPP (pattern) 
Evidence II: KMT had much more party assets than DPP (pattern) 
Evidence III: KMT had much more local branch offices than DPP (pattern) 
Part III: KMT performed well and, thus, was a veto player. 
Evidence I: KMT and its pan-blue coalition held the majority of seats in parliament (pattern) 
Evidence II: KMT’s strength at the grassroots level in terms of the number of city (or county) 
councilors, speakers and town mayors (pattern) 
Part IV: KMT can effectively check the DPP 
government’s power 
Evidence I: A lower percentage of bills 
came up for consultative discussion 
and eventually passed in a divided 
DPP government than in a unified KMT 
government (pattern) 
Evidence II: Interviews of elites (account) 
Part IV: DPP in power remained coherent 
Evidence I: Compared to KMT, DPP had a 
lower number of un-nominated 
aspirants in presidential and municipal 
elections (pattern) 
Evidence II: DPP suffered party split to a 
slight extent (pattern) 
Evidence III: Interviews of elites (account) 
OUTCOME (Y): Democratic survival 
Observation: Taiwan is still a democratic country based on the indicators of GWF and Polity IV 
(trace) 
 
CONDITION(X): KMT was a power-sharing party 
Evidence I: The central standing committee was the core decision-making authority (trace) 
Evidence II: The national congress elected a potential successor of the party chairman (trace) 
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Before 2000: Dominant party rule of KMT 
KMT was certainly a power-sharing party. Similar to communist parties 
adopting the principle of democratic centralism, KMT established ‘democratic 
centralisation of authority’ as its organisational principle. Former permanent 
party chairman Chiang Kai-shek had said: ‘In accordance with this principle, 
the decision-making process is democratic as party members can freely 
express their opinions, discuss, and vote, while implementation is centralised 
whereby members must abide by the joint resolution to ensure party unity’ (先
總統蔣公思想言論總集，1951). Under the principle, the national congress of 
KMT elected central committee members who, in turn, elected central 
standing committee members. The central standing committee was 
responsible for discussing and implementing party affairs during the 
intersessional period of the national congress and central committee’s plenary 
session (中央委員會組織大綱，1952). It was thus the core decision-making 
authority of KMT, and the party leader was not in complete control of 
policy-making (第二次全國代表大會第一次修正中國國民黨黨綱，1926). As for 
leadership selection, the national congress elected a potential successor (臨時
全國代表大會第三次修正中國國民黨黨綱，1938),15 a mechanism that reduced 
the likelihood of rulers designating their successors. 
As KMT was a power-sharing party, party elites created positive 
resources to sustain the party and ensure its survival. First, party elites holding 
government posts at all levels, through appropriation, transferred Japanese 
properties that had been taken over by Chinese Nationalist government, 
                                                     
15
 From 2001, the leader of the KMT has been elected by all registered and due-paying party 
members. 
170 
 
specifically 494 enterprises, including oil, steel, and machinery companies (臺
灣省接收委員會日產處理委員會結束總報告，1947), to the Taiwan Province 
Branch of KMT (中國國民黨轉帳撥用國有特種房屋及其基地之調查意見報告，
2001) when Japan was defeated and ended its colonial rule in Taiwan. 
Between 1958 and 1988, local elites donated to KMT and its affiliated units a 
total of 86 parcels of land and 37 buildings that they owned (中國國民黨轉帳撥
用國有特種房屋及其基地之調查意見報告，2001). Further, under the 
party-State governance system, KMT issued a special licence to party-owned 
businesses, thus accumulating huge party assets. For example, KMT elites 
jointly controlled seven holding companies, which owned shares in over 60 
enterprises and reinvested in more than 300 enterprises, with total assets 
worth 600 billion NT dollars (中國國民黨七大控股公司綜合文件，1994). 
KMT elites developed strong organisational power to enlarge and 
consolidate their popular base of support. First, KMT set up branch offices in 
every township and urban district to recruit party members, with a total of 
145,600 in 1952, up from 72,400 in 1949 and rising to 2.61 million under 
Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule between 1978 and 1988 (李松林，1996). Second, 
KMT in 1969 promoted a robust retirement system for government and party 
members to replace old-age cadres from mainland China with a new 
generation of local elites. After Chiang Ching-kuo became the party chairman, 
KMT, through civil service examinations and elections, started recruiting local 
elites to serve as cabinet ministers and central standing committee members 
of the party, thus legitimising its rule (江南，1993；李松林，1993). The 
percentage of Taiwanese members in the central standing committee rose 
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from 22.73% in 1978 to 51.61% in 1988 (劉維開，1994), while the percentage 
of Taiwanese ministers increased from 4% in 1958 to 8% in 1963, 28% in 
1972, 38% in 1978, and 41% in 1984 (王春祝，彭懷真，1986). Finally, KMT 
provided local faction leaders subsidies in agriculture, while also offering them 
the opportunity to serve in public office and organise farmers’ and fishermen’s 
associations with political leanings in exchange for their support to ensure the 
continued dominance of KMT (陳明通，1995). 
After 2000: KMT’s loss of power 
Because KMT elites had created valuable resources to sustain the 
party, even after democratisation in 2000, KMT still had an advantage over its 
major opponent, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), in terms of the number 
of party members, party assets, and territorial organisation. KMT’s 
membership was around 1 million in 2005, four to five times greater than 
DPP’s in 2006 (see Supplementary Figure 6). Further, it still owned hundreds 
of real estate properties and business enterprises. According to annual 
financial reports of political parties, KMT had 100 times as many assets as 
DPP between 2005 and 2008 (see Supplementary Figure 7), not to mention 
illegal party assets. Finally, KMT maintained an immense organisational 
network across six special municipalities or 16 counties or cities, with one 
branch office per two to three townships and urban districts, for example, 13 
offices for 38 urban districts of Kaohsiung City (中國國民黨官方網站，2019), 
compared to DPP, which had just one branch office at the municipal level, i.e., 
one for 38 urban districts of Kaohsiung City (民主進步黨官方網站，2019). 
 KMT performed well due to the valuable resources that it had inherited 
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and, thus, was a veto player. Despite losing power, KMT and its pan-blue 
coalition held the majority of seats in parliament. For example, the coalition 
won 51.1% and 50.7% of the seats, compared to DPP and its pan-green 
coalition with 44.4% and 44.9% seats in the 2001 and 2004 legislative 
elections, respectively (中央選舉委員會選舉資料庫，2019). What was even 
more striking was the gap in strength at the grassroots level. KMT had at least 
five times as many town mayors and two times as many city or county 
councillors as DPP between 2000 and 2008 when KMT was the opposition 
party. Further, KMT held more than 70% of the city or county council speaker 
positions, while DPP members did not occupy a single speaker position 
between 2000 and 2008 (see Supplementary Figure 8). ‘KMT’s success at the 
local level can be attributed to its immense organisation and enormous 
property’, said Chen Chu, DPP’s Secretary-General to the President, in her 
biography (林倖妃，2017). For instance, campaign expenditures incurred by 
KMT on parliamentary candidates in the 2008 election totalled about 142 
million NT dollars, compared to DPP’s 38 million NT dollars (內政部民政司政黨
及政治團體財務申報，2008). An empirical analysis found the positive effect of 
the campaign spending on the 2008 election results in Taiwan (王鼎銘，范恩
邦，2010). 
Because KMT is still a veto player, there is no room for the new ruling 
party, DPP, to be divided. First, even though DPP has seen a growing number 
of factions and consequent realignment within the party, and one of the 
factions, the World United Formosans for Independence, formed the Taiwan 
Independence Party (TIP) in 1997 as it was disappointed by DPP’s gradual 
moderation of its support of Taiwan independence, DPP faces no further split 
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(see Supplementary Figure 9). By contrast, KMT suffered two major and one 
minor splits. The first major split came when the New Kuomintang Alliance 
formed the New Party (NP) in 1993 over KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui’s 
ideological move away from Chinese reunification, while the other was led by 
Soong Chu-yu, the former Governor of Taiwan Province, who, after his 
personal clash with Lee, took away several prominent KMT members to set up 
the People First Party (PFP) in 2000. The third split occurred when 
Minkuotang was established by former KMT MP Hsu Hsin-ying in 2015. 
Although DPP also suffered a party split, TIP posed a relatively insignificant 
threat to DPP, compared to that posed by NP and PFP to KMT. For example, 
in the first legislative and city and county councilor elections held after the 
three parties were formed, TIP gained 1.41% (1998), 0.00% (1998), and 
0.87% (1998) seats in the pan-green coalition, significantly less than NP’s seat 
share of 19.81% (1995), 23.21% (1994), and 1.88% (1998), and PFP’s share 
of 40.00% (2001), 28.85% (2002), and 11.29% (2002) in the pan-blue coalition 
(see Supplementary Figure 10). In addition, NP and PFP played the role of 
spoiler in the presidential and municipal elections while TIP did not (see 
Supplementary Figure 11). 
Second, interviews of elites offer evidence of a coherent DPP. ‘In the 
face of KMT’s resource advantage, we must unite and cooperate….All 
candidates for public office and party high-level posts are negotiated and 
determined by all major factions, ensuring that no factions are dissatisfied and 
preventing a split that would benefit KMT’, elite D from DPP said. Similarly, 
elite A from DPP said: ‘I don’t like New Tide. They always control party power 
and the negotiations. However, KMT is an abnormal party with huge ill-gotten 
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assets….It poses unfair competition, so the best way to defeat KMT is to 
cooperate with New Tide’. Elite C from DPP also said ‘I am familiar with KMT, a 
party closely allied with local factions….As an opposition party, it still 
dominates at the local level. For us, the strategy is to let all factions co-govern 
and remain coherent. If we present DPP as a powerful alternative, factional 
candidates who do not get KMT approval will turn coat’. 
Third, compared to KMT, DPP has a lower number of un-nominated 
aspirants in presidential and municipal elections. For example, candidates that 
participated in elections without KMT approval amounted to 39, in contrast 
with DPP, which identified 15 during 12 municipal elections between 1993 and 
2018 (see Supplementary Figure 12). 
A coherent DPP decreases the likelihood of a political instability-led 
democratic collapse according to interviews of elites. ‘Remaining coherent is 
important, certainly important, for DPP….If DPP in power was divided, KMT 
would be likely to use the political instability as a pretext for military 
intervention’, elite F from DPP said. Similarly, elite E from DPP said ‘KMT 
always wants to barter away the sovereignty of Taiwan to China. A divided 
DPP offers the opportunity for both sides to unify on the pretext of instability’. 
Elite B from DPP linked a divided DPP to authoritarian nostalgia, saying ‘a 
coherent DPP government shows people that we can secure democracy and 
liberty that will increase the benefits for the masses….It reduces public 
disorder and prevents the general public from embracing the authoritarian rule 
again’. 
Further, as KMT is still a veto player, it can effectively check the DPP 
government’s power. A comparative analysis of the percentage of bills passed 
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offers the necessary evidence: a lower percentage of bills came up for 
consultative discussion and eventually passed in a divided DPP government 
(12.96%, 2000-2008) than in a unified KMT government (22.19%, 2008-2016) 
(立法院議事及發言系統，2019). When asked about this issue, Elite G said ‘as 
a former MP, our caucus boycotted many DPP government proposed bills, 
such as proposals for military purchases from the US, which deviated from the 
script’. Elite I of KMT said ‘we tried our best to prevent the DPP government 
from passing bills that would restrict party competition….DPP wanted to 
confiscate our party assets. It was undemocratic’. Elite H spoke about how 
KMT undermined potential unofficial changes that would have benefited DPP. 
He said ‘DPP was eager to indoctrinate teenagers through curriculum 
modifications that KMT would barter away the sovereignty of Taiwan to 
China.... I suspected that DPP wanted to remain in power forever. At that time 
we KMT MPs successfully blocked its attempt’. 
As a result, Taiwan is still a democratic country. Based on the GWF 
indicators, KMT or DPP came to power through competitive elections where all 
parties could participate and all citizens aged more than 20 would be expected 
to vote. In terms of the indicators of Polity IV, Taiwan is a full democracy where 
political participation is open and unrestricted, executive recruitment is elective, 
and constraints on the chief executive are substantial. 
CONCLUSION 
This study associates legacies of dominant party regimes with the survival of 
subsequent democracies. We argue that dominant party regimes, compared 
to their non-dominant counterparts, exert a greater positive impact on 
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democratic survival after democratisation. This is because valuable resources 
that old regime elites inherit from dominant party regimes make it more likely 
for ASPs to perform well under democracy. Thus, for one thing, they reduce 
fragmentation of the new ruling parties, which inoculates subsequent 
democracies against political instability that could lead to regime change 
through extra-institutional forces. For another, they can effectively check the 
government’s power, thus preventing a new ruling party from crossing the line 
from democracy to authoritarianism. Quantitative analysis and a case study of 
Taiwan confirm the arguments. In conclusion, dominant party regimes leave 
good legacies that pave the way for democratic consolidation. 
Our findings are similar to Grzymala-Busse’s (2007) arguments that 
state that what matters for good democratic outcomes is the robustness of 
party competition, which depends on the strength of successor parties 
(plausible competitors) and their capacity to adapt to democratic politics (clear 
competitors). However, we further argue that a strong performance by ASPs 
contributes to the longevity of a democratic regime because of the decreased 
risk of political instability associated with extra-institutional forces-led regime 
change and a lower likelihood of autocratisation. The case study and a causal 
specific hazard model (see Supplementary Figure 5) certainly found that both 
risks were reduced when ASPs perform well. 
Our findings speak to other studies suggesting that inclusionary 
regimes which rely on broad public support ensure wider populational 
redistributions of political and socioeconomic benefits, thus fostering stronger 
antidemocratic attitudes among citizens (Neundorf et al. 2020). These findings 
have important implications for party competition in new democracies. An 
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inclusionary regime may result in the strong performance of ASPs, which is 
based on support from citizens with authoritarian nostalgia and antidemocratic 
sentiments, thus reducing the fragmentation of new ruling parties. For 
example, voters in Eastern Europe equally dislike all opposing parties, and do 
not additionally penalise authoritarian successor parties (Dinas and 
Northmore-Ball 2020). Future research can investigate the link between voter 
attitudes toward democracy and the political base as well as the performance 
of ASPs when more comprehensive data are available. 
However, there are three aspects that we failed to consider, namely the 
effects of sub-types of non-dominant party regimes, a more sophisticated 
causal pathway, and the supposedly declining effects of authoritarian legacies 
over time. First, we found that the survival curves of democratic regimes with 
preceding authoritarian rule as personalist dictatorships, military regimes, and 
hybrid regimes were not significantly different. However, their links to the 
modes of democratic breakdown may be different. A democracy that 
originated from a military regime fails to incorporate the military into the 
democratic system, thus making it more likely for ensuing democracies to 
suffer coups. By contrast, a change from personalist rule to a democracy often 
results in a power void that enables insiders to fashion a new constitutional 
order to cripple their opponents. Second, we should consider a more 
sophisticated causal relationship. There are other causal pathways that link 
dominant party regimes to democratic consolidation. For example, dominant 
party regimes are likely to accept electoral defeat. A peaceful power transfer to 
the new incumbent due to electoral defeat represents the former ruler’s 
willingness to maintain inclusive competition that ensures an opportunity to 
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return to power, thus ensuring that neither side will come to power through 
undemocratic means (Yan 2019). It indicates how the type of regime is linked 
to the mode of transition, which, in turn, affects the survival of post-transitional 
regimes. 
The current literature shows the declining effects of authoritarian 
legacies over time. For example, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2011) found a 
declining effect for communist-era legacies on the level of trust in 
post-communist institutions. There were two main reasons for this. First, older 
generations, which lived under communism for longer periods, were gradually 
dying off. Second, more recent democratic experiences gradually overshadow 
older memories. To test whether the legacies of authoritarian regimes weaken 
over time, this study included the following interaction term: ‘preceding 
dominant party regimes × time’, in which time was measured as the number of 
years since democratic transition. However, there is no evidence that the 
impact of authoritarian legacies on succeeding democratic survival increases 
or decreases over time (HR: 0.93, 95% CI: 0.72-1.20). Findings suggest that, 
despite temporarily shaping the political attitudes of citizens, antecedent 
authoritarian rule may reorganise a country’s political, economic, and social 
system, thus exerting a lasting effect on the survival of nascent democracies. 
This study has some limitations. One limitation is that the country 
observations were for the period between 1945 and 2010. However, GWF 
data—the most comprehensive data set available on the types of authoritarian 
regimes—allows us to make temporal analysis. To expand the data to 2020 is 
necessary, but we must ensure there is not some systematic error in the 
coding of the data after 2011. Another limitation is that this study used only 
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Taiwan as a case study to confirm the causal mechanism. The advantage to 
using Taiwan as a case study is for excluding reverse causality—the origin of 
dominant party rule can be influenced by unobserved factors simultaneously 
determining the survival of subsequent democracies. Despite providing a 
nuanced, empirically-rich, holistic account of phenomena, a single case study 
lacks external validity and provides little basis for generalization of results to 
the wider population. In the future, the qualitative analysis should be extended 
to other cases of former dominant party regimes, such as Bulgaria, Cape 
Verde, and Mexico, which have widely varying political, economic, and social 
conditions, but never reversed to authoritarian rule after democratisation. Most 
Different Systems Design could be applied to compare these cases for 
providing the strongest basis for generalisation and eliminating other potential 
causes (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Another limitation is the 
operationalisation of the performance of ASPs. Even if ASPs do not hold a 
majority of seats in the legislature or win the presidential elections, they could 
still have the governing or blackmail potential, thus performing well. For one 
thing, no data exists for examining it. For another, it is doubtful whether ASPs, 
as minor governing or opposition coalition partners, can reduce the potential of 
new ruling parties to become a dominant power. The study thus used more 
strict criteria to determine ASP performance. 
At least two policy implications follow. First, efforts to guide autocrats to 
push for democratisation might be more conducive to the survival of 
democracy if the use of such strategies is conditional on the existence of ASPs 
that perform well. Second, scholars of transitions and democratic 
consolidation should pay closer attention to institutional or non-institutional 
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factors that raise the likelihood of dominant party regimes forming and then 
transforming into a democracy. 
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Supplementary Table 
Table S1. Mediation analysis with survival model, 1945–2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR 
Dominant party regimes -1.421
**
 0.241
**
   -0.734 0.480 
 (0.632) (0.153)   (0.687) (0.330) 
ASP with better 
performance 
  -1.830
***
 0.160
***
 -1.768
***
 0.171
***
 
   (0.568) (0.091) (0.572) (0.098) 
Log GDP pc   -0.778
***
 0.459
***
 -0.738
***
 0.478
***
 
   (0.241) (0.111) (0.241) (0.115) 
Growth -7.332
***
 0.001
***
 -5.052
**
 0.006
**
 -5.216
**
 0.005
**
 
 (2.670) (0.002) (2.420) (0.015) (2.506) (0.014) 
Oil 0.133 1.142 0.406 1.502 0.333 1.395 
 (0.484) (0.553) (0.512) (0.769) (0.515) (0.718) 
Parliamentarism 0.263 1.301 0.008 1.008 0.050 1.052 
 (0.418) (0.544) (0.433) (0.436) (0.432) (0.454) 
Semi-presidentialism 1.295
***
 3.651
***
 1.224
**
 3.400
**
 1.240
**
 3.455
**
 
 (0.490) (1.788) (0.505) (1.717) (0.504) (1.742) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.622 1.862 0.346 1.414 0.398 1.489 
 (0.730) (1.359) (0.723) (1.023) (0.716) (1.067) 
Religious fractionalization -0.098 0.906 0.073 1.076 -0.028 0.972 
 (0.957) (0.867) (0.885) (0.952) (0.884) (0.860) 
Former British colony 1.106
**
 3.023
**
 0.683 1.979 0.713 2.040 
 (0.506) (1.530) (0.500) (0.990) (0.499) (1.018) 
No. democratic transition -0.137 0.872 -0.037 0.964 -0.091 0.913 
 (0.193) (0.168) (0.209) (0.202) (0.215) (0.196) 
Years of entry -0.047
***
 0.954
***
 -0.060
***
 0.942
***
 -0.059
***
 0.943
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Post-soviet states -0.503 0.605 0.100 1.105 0.551 1.736 
 (0.798) (0.483) (0.838) (0.926) (0.941) (1.634) 
No. of Subjects 108 108 108 
No. of Observations 1200 1200 1200 
LR chi
2
 41.68 64.27 65.55 
Prob> chi
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -171.42377 -160.12908 -159.49254 
Note: standard error in parentheses in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Table S2. Mediation analysis with survival model, 1945–2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR 
Dominant party regimes -0.884
*
 0.413
*
   -0.282 0.754 
 (0.507) (0.209)   (0.548) (0.413) 
ASP with better 
performance 
  -1.755
***
 0.173
***
 -1.721
***
 0.179
***
 
   (0.508) (0.088) (0.513) (0.092) 
Log GDP pc   -0.728
***
 0.483
***
 -0.715
***
 0.489
***
 
   (0.236) (0.114) (0.235) (0.115) 
Growth -6.864
***
 0.001
***
 -4.928
**
 0.007
**
 -4.995
**
 0.007
**
 
 (2.635) (0.003) (2.425) (0.018) (2.453) (0.017) 
Oil 0.244 1.276 0.444 1.559 0.445 1.561 
 (0.488) (0.623) (0.514) (0.801) (0.515) (0.804) 
Parliamentarism 0.332 1.393 0.110 1.116 0.160 1.173 
 (0.421) (0.586) (0.429) (0.479) (0.438) (0.513) 
Semi-presidentialism 1.207
**
 3.345
**
 1.151
**
 3.160
**
 1.157
**
 3.182
**
 
 (0.481) (1.609) (0.496) (1.566) (0.493) (1.570) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.711 2.035 0.416 1.517 0.393 1.482 
 (0.751) (1.528) (0.720) (1.091) (0.719) (1.065) 
Religious fractionalization -0.315 0.730 -0.174 0.840 -0.203 0.816 
 (0.987) (0.721) (0.900) (0.756) (0.904) (0.738) 
Former British colony 1.099
**
 3.002
**
 0.615 1.850 0.636 1.888 
 (0.494) (1.484) (0.493) (0.913) (0.489) (0.924) 
No. democratic transition -0.109 0.897 -0.039 0.962 -0.062 0.940 
 (0.194) (0.174) (0.210) (0.202) (0.214) (0.201) 
Years of entry -0.045
***
 0.956
***
 -0.056
***
 0.945
***
 -0.055
***
 0.946
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Post-soviet states -0.644 0.525 0.038 1.039 0.224 1.252 
 (0.780) (0.410) (0.817) (0.849) (0.898) (1.123) 
No. of Subjects 108 108 108 
No. of Observations 1441 1441 1441 
LR chi
2
 37.89 64.35 64.63 
Prob> chi
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -174.42034 -161.18864 -161.04969 
Note: standard error in parentheses in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Table S3. Mediation analysis with survival model, 1945–2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR 
Dominant party regimes -1.350
**
 0.259
**
   -0.684 0.505 
 (0.637) (0.165)   (0.693) (0.350) 
ASP with better 
performance 
  -1.853
***
 0.157
***
 -1.802
***
 0.165
***
 
   (0.572) (0.090) (0.574) (0.095) 
Log GDP pc   -0.771
***
 0.462
***
 -0.735
***
 0.480
***
 
   (0.240) (0.111) (0.240) (0.115) 
Growth -6.459
**
 0.002
**
 -4.584
*
 0.010
*
 -4.745
*
 0.009
*
 
 (2.702) (0.004) (2.430) (0.025) (2.508) (0.022) 
Oil 0.100 1.105 0.333 1.395 0.280 1.323 
 (0.488) (0.539) (0.516) (0.720) (0.516) (0.683) 
Parliamentarism 0.190 1.209 -0.078 0.925 -0.028 0.972 
 (0.425) (0.514) (0.444) (0.411) (0.444) (0.432) 
Semi-presidentialism 1.333
***
 3.792
***
 1.259
**
 3.522
**
 1.272
**
 3.569
**
 
 (0.489) (1.856) (0.504) (1.774) (0.503) (1.796) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.798 2.222 0.410 1.507 0.452 1.572 
 (0.740) (1.644) (0.726) (1.095) (0.719) (1.130) 
Religious fractionalization -0.178 0.837 -0.0004 1.000 -0.082 0.922 
 (0.955) (0.799) (0.886) (0.886) (0.884) (0.815) 
Former British colony 1.083
**
 2.954
**
 0.660 1.935 0.694 2.002 
 (0.511) (1.510) (0.504) (0.975) (0.503) (1.007) 
No. democratic transition -0.220 0.802 -0.121 0.886 -0.158 0.854 
 (0.219) (0.176) (0.235) (0.208) (0.237) (0.202) 
Years of entry -0.046
***
 0.955
***
 -0.059
***
 0.943
***
 -0.058
***
 0.943
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Post-soviet states -0.382 0.682 0.199 1.220 0.614 1.847 
 (0.785) (0.536) (0.830) (1.013) (0.933) (1.724) 
Military regimes 0.388 1.474 0.327 1.387 0.278 1.320 
 (0.390) (0.575) (0.400) (0.555) (0.399) (0.527) 
No. of Subjects 108 108 108 
No. of Observations 1441 1441 1441 
LR chi
2
 41.49 64.58 65.65 
Prob> chi
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -172.61751 -161.07448 -160.53896 
Note: standard error in parentheses in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Table S4. Mediation analysis with survival model, 1945–2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR 
Dominant party regimes -1.232
**
 0.292
**
   -0.581 0.559 
 (0.629) (0.184)   (0.625) (0.350) 
ASP with better 
performance 
  -1.873
***
 0.154
***
 -1.813
***
 0.163
***
 
   (0.575) (0.088) (0.575) (0.094) 
Log GDP pc   -0.745
***
 0.475
***
 -0.696
***
 0.499
***
 
   (0.237) (0.112) (0.238) (0.119) 
Growth -6.851
***
 0.001
***
 -4.953
**
 0.007
**
 -5.346
**
 0.005
**
 
 (2.563) (0.003) (2.333) (0.016) (2.462) (0.012) 
Oil 0.229 1.257 0.396 1.485 0.326 1.385 
 (0.493) (0.620) (0.512) (0.761) (0.517) (0.717) 
Parliamentarism 0.299 1.348 0.010 1.010 0.052 1.053 
 (0.421) (0.568) (0.433) (0.438) (0.432) (0.455) 
Semi-presidentialism 1.465
***
 4.329
***
 1.243
**
 3.465
**
 1.273
**
 3.572
**
 
 (0.502) (2.171) (0.501) (1.737) (0.497) (1.776) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.851 2.343 0.333 1.395 0.314 1.369 
 (0.720) (1.688) (0.706) (0.985) (0.697) (0.954) 
Religious fractionalization -0.046 0.955 0.092 1.097 0.011 1.012 
 (0.947) (0.904) (0.890) (0.976) (0.888) (0.898) 
Former British colony 0.980
*
 2.665
*
 0.685 1.983 0.723 2.062 
 (0.512) (1.365) (0.505) (1.002) (0.503) (1.038) 
No. democratic transition -0.189 0.828 -0.044 0.957 -0.090 0.914 
 (0.197) (0.163) (0.215) (0.206) (0.219) (0.200) 
Years of entry -0.045
***
 0.956
***
 -0.059
***
 0.943
***
 -0.058
***
 0.944
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Post-communist world -0.879 0.415 -0.015 0.985 0.137 1.146 
 (0.669) (0.278) (0.660) (0.650) (0.667) (0.764) 
No. of Subjects 108 108 108 
No. of Observations 1441 1441 1441 
LR chi
2
 41.98 63.89 64.84 
Prob> chi
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -172.37511 -161.41808 -160.9456 
Note: standard error in parentheses in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Table S5. Mediation analysis with survival model, 1945–2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR 
Dominant party regimes -1.569
**
 0.208
**
   -1.136
*
 0.321
*
 
 (0.615) (0.128)   (0.662) (0.213) 
ASP with better 
performance 
  -1.735
***
 0.176
***
 -1.627
***
 0.196
***
 
   (0.554) (0.098) (0.552) (0.108) 
Log GDP pc   -0.507
**
 0.602
**
 -0.449
**
 0.638
**
 
   (0.216) (0.130) (0.211) (0.135) 
Growth -7.718
***
 0.0004
***
 -5.638
**
 0.004
**
 -6.038
**
 0.002
**
 
 (2.709) (0.001) (2.502) (0.009) (2.626) (0.006) 
Oil 0.439 1.551 0.857 2.355 0.649 1.913 
 (0.483) (0.749) (0.528) (1.243) (0.538) (1.030) 
Parliamentarism 0.157 1.170 0.292 1.339 0.278 1.320 
 (0.397) (0.464) (0.410) (0.549) (0.411) (0.542) 
Semi-presidentialism 0.434 1.544 0.261 1.299 0.279 1.322 
 (0.422) (0.652) (0.410) (0.533) (0.411) (0.543) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.264 1.302 -0.170 0.844 0.014 1.014 
 (0.676) (0.880) (0.662) (0.559) (0.666) (0.675) 
Religious fractionalization -1.210 0.298 -0.876 0.417 -0.913 0.401 
 (0.847) (0.253) (0.832) (0.347) (0.825) (0.331) 
Former British colony 0.865
*
 2.375
*
 0.275 1.316 0.297 1.345 
 (0.460) (1.093) (0.459) (0.604) (0.455) (0.613) 
No. regime breakdown -0.049 0.953 -0.102 0.903 -0.150 0.861 
 (0.089) (0.084) (0.089) (0.080) (0.095) (0.082) 
The number of years as a 
democracy since 1945 
-0.065
**
 0.937
**
 -0.045 0.956 -0.049 0.952 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) 
Post-soviet states -0.812 0.444 -0.927 0.396 -0.328 0.721 
 (0.787) (0.349) (0.800) (0.317) (0.869) (0.626) 
No. of Subjects 108 108 108 
No. of Observations 1441 1441 1441 
LR chi
2
 31.20 45.52 48.98 
Prob> chi
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -177.76346 -170.60177 -168.87474 
Note: standard error in parentheses in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Table S6. Mediation analysis with survival model, 1945–2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR 
Dominant party regimes -1.404
**
 0.246
**
   -0.098 0.906 
 (0.631) (0.155)   (0.669) (0.606) 
ASP with better 
performance 
  -1.396
**
 0.247
**
 -1.389
**
 0.249
**
 
   (0.591) (0.146) (0.593) (0.148) 
Log GDP pc   -0.520
**
 0.595
**
 -0.517
**
 0.596
**
 
   (0.235) (0.140) (0.235) (0.140) 
Judicial independence   -4.789
***
 0.008
***
 -4.716
***
 0.009
***
 
   (1.424) (0.012) (1.502) (0.013) 
Growth -6.863
**
 0.001
**
 -5.014
*
 0.007
*
 -5.021
*
 0.007
*
 
 (2.669) (0.003) (2.616) (0.017) (2.627) (0.017) 
Oil 0.134 1.144 0.605 1.831 0.591 1.807 
 (0.484) (0.553) (0.523) (0.958) (0.531) (0.959) 
Parliamentarism 0.256 1.292 0.669 1.953 0.663 1.940 
 (0.418) (0.540) (0.481) (0.940) (0.482) (0.936) 
Semi-presidentialism 1.284
***
 3.612
***
 1.114
**
 3.047
**
 1.117
**
 3.056
**
 
 (0.489) (1.765) (0.525) (1.600) (0.525) (1.605) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.684 1.982 1.097 2.996 1.088 2.968 
 (0.728) (1.442) (0.805) (2.413) (0.805) (2.388) 
Religious fractionalization -0.142 0.868 -0.692 0.501 -0.685 0.504 
 (0.955) (0.829) (0.920) (0.461) (0.920) (0.464) 
Former British colony 1.101
**
 3.008
**
 0.808 2.244 0.810 2.249 
 (0.506) (1.522) (0.526) (1.181) (0.526) (1.182) 
No. democratic transition -0.121 0.886 0.022 1.022 0.014 1.014 
 (0.191) (0.169) (0.214) (0.218) (0.219) (0.223) 
Years of entry -0.047
***
 0.955
***
 -0.044
***
 0.957
***
 -0.044
***
 0.957
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Post-soviet states -0.438 0.645 0.547 1.729 0.584 1.793 
 (0.788) (0.509) (0.881) (1.523) (0.915) (1.641) 
No. of Subjects 108 108 108 
No. of Observations 1441 1441 1441 
LR chi
2
 40.51 75.97 75.99 
Prob> chi
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -173.10972 -155.3776 -155.36666 
Note: standard error in parentheses in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Table S7. Mediation analysis with survival model, 1945–2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
 Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR Coef. HR 
Dominant party regimes -1.404
**
 0.246
**
     -0.333 0.717 -0.665 0.514 
 (0.631) (0.155)     (0.795) (0.570) (0.718) (0.369) 
Vote share of ASP   -0.048
***
 0.953
***
   -0.046
***
 0.955
***
   
   (0.015) (0.014)   (0.016) (0.015)   
Seat share of ASP     -0.054
***
 0.947
***
   -0.051
***
 0.951
***
 
     (0.018) (0.017)   (0.018) (0.017) 
Log GDP pc   -0.782
***
 0.457
***
 -0.735
***
 0.480
***
 -0.763
***
 0.466
***
 -0.705
***
 0.494
***
 
   (0.228) (0.104) (0.231) (0.111) (0.233) (0.108) (0.233) (0.115) 
Growth -6.863
**
 0.001
**
 -5.101
**
 0.006
**
 -4.716
*
 0.009
*
 -5.166
**
 0.006
**
 -4.896
*
 0.007
*
 
 (2.669) (0.003) (2.531) (0.015) (2.525) (0.023) (2.556) (0.015) (2.595) (0.019) 
Oil 0.134 1.144 0.498 1.645 0.585 1.795 0.474 1.607 0.513 1.671 
 (0.484) (0.553) (0.515) (0.848) (0.525) (0.943) (0.517) (0.831) (0.527) (0.881) 
Parliamentarism 0.256 1.292 0.196 1.216 0.178 1.195 0.199 1.220 0.208 1.231 
 (0.418) (0.540) (0.445) (0.542) (0.451) (0.540) (0.444) (0.542) (0.451) (0.555) 
Semi-presidentialism 1.284
***
 3.612
***
 1.130
**
 3.094
**
 1.137
**
 3.117
**
 1.148
**
 3.151
**
 1.173
**
 3.231
**
 
 (0.489) (1.765) (0.496) (1.535) (0.499) (1.555) (0.498) (1.569) (0.498) (1.610) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.684 1.982 0.025 1.025 -0.141 0.868 0.031 1.032 -0.096 0.909 
 (0.728) (1.442) (0.703) (0.721) (0.718) (0.624) (0.699) (0.721) (0.712) (0.647) 
Religious 
fractionalization 
-0.142 0.868 -0.071 0.931 0.115 1.122 -0.084 0.919 0.032 1.033 
 (0.955) (0.829) (0.915) (0.852) (0.933) (1.047) (0.913) (0.840) (0.932) (0.962) 
Former British colony 1.101
**
 3.008
**
 0.601 1.825 0.635 1.886 0.619 1.857 0.654 1.923 
 (0.506) (1.522) (0.510) (0.931) (0.512) (0.965) (0.511) (0.949) (0.511) (0.982) 
No. democratic transition -0.121 0.886 -0.151 0.860 -0.200 0.819 -0.162 0.850 -0.238 0.788 
 (0.191) (0.169) (0.223) (0.192) (0.224) (0.184) (0.223) (0.190) (0.227) (0.179) 
Years of entry -0.047
***
 0.955
***
 -0.058
***
 0.944
***
 -0.052
***
 0.950
***
 -0.057
***
 0.944
***
 -0.052
***
 0.949
***
 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Post-soviet states -0.438 0.645 -0.427 0.653 -0.456 0.634 -0.203 0.816 -0.025 0.976 
 (0.788) (0.509) (0.811) (0.530) (0.820) (0.520) (0.972) (0.793) (0.944) (0.922) 
No. of Subjects 108 108 107 108 107 
No. of Observations 1441 1425 1409 1425 1409 
LR chi
2
 40.51 64.18 60.94 64.36 61.87 
Prob> chi
2
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -173.10972 -160.44593 -153.86477 -160.35555 -153.39869 
Note: standard error in parentheses in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.1, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
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Supplementary Figure 
 
Figure S1. The Nelson–Aalen estimate of the cumulative hazard function of 
democratic regimes, 1945–2010 
Note: Cumulative hazard function: t=1 (0.083), t=5 (0.343), t=10 (0.403), t=15 (0.518), 
t=19 (0.594), t=30 (0.594), t=40 (0.594), t=47 (0.927), t=60 (0.927). Source: the 
author. 
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Figure S2. Survival analysis of democratic regimes, 1945–2010 
Note: Incident rate: left panel: DPR (0.011), NDPR (0.039), and right panel: DPR 
(0.011), PR (0.027), MR (0.043), HR (0.048); mean survival time: left panel: DPR 
(15.04), NDPR (12.70), and right panel: DPR (15.04), PR (14.23), MR (12.74), HR 
(11.70); survival rate at year=10: left panel: DPR (0.840), NDPR (0.604), and right 
panel: DPR (0.840), PR (0.769), MR (0.528), HR (0.494); survival rate at year=20: left 
panel: DPR (0.840), NDPR (0.447), and right panel: DPR (0.840), PR (0.505), MR 
(0.412), HR (0.439); Log-rank test: left panel (chi2(1) = 8.68, Pr>chi2 = 0.0032), and 
right panel (chi2(3) = 10.53, Pr>chi2 = 0.0145). Log-rank test between DPR and PR: 
chi2(1) = 4.08, Pr>chi2 = 0.0435; Log-rank test between DPR and HR: chi2(1) = 7.81, 
Pr>chi2 = 0.0052; Log-rank test between DPR and MR: chi2(1) = 9.14, Pr>chi2 = 
0.0025; Log-rank test between PR and HR: chi2(1) = 1.40, Pr>chi2 = 0.2368. Log-rank 
test between PR and MR: chi2(1) = 0.88, Pr>chi2 = 0.3487. Log-rank test between HR 
and MR: chi2(1) = 0.00, Pr>chi2 = 0.9855. Source: the author. 
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Figures S3. Dominant party regimes increase the likelihood of better 
performance of ASPs, 1945–2010 
Note: the predicted probabilities (left, right): dominant party regimes (0.647***, 0.707***) 
and non-dominant party regimes (0.346***, 0.390***); * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 
0.01. All results were based on a binary logistic model with time-invariant and -variant 
covariates. Source: the author. 
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Figures S4. Dominant party regimes increase the vote and seat share of 
ASPs, 1945–2010 
Note: the liner prediction (upper-left, upper-right, lower-left, lower-right): dominant 
party regimes (25.687***, 25.708***, 28.504***, 27.692***) and non-dominant party 
regimes (10.786***, 12.415***, 12.130***, 14.046***); * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 
0.01. All results were based on a linear regression model with time-invariant and 
-variant covariates. Source: the author. 
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Figure S5. Cause specific survival analysis of democratic regimes, 
1945–2010 
Note:  
1. Existing research argues two modes of democratic breakdown. One group 
contains those cases where a democratic government is terminated by forces 
outside of the government while the other involves those cases where 
democratically elected leaders ended the democratic process themselves (Maeda 
2010). This study also distinguished the two distinct modes by which democracies 
reverse into nondemocracies. One was coups or organised armed conflict. A 
military coup was defined as ouster by the military of the regime in power. An 
organised armed conflict referred to insurgency, revolution, or civil war leading up 
to the ouster. The other was autocratisation that marked when an executive 
changes democratic rules such that competition in subsequent elections was 
limited. 
2. Left panel: democratic failure due to autocratisation; right panel: democratic 
collapse because of military coup and armed conflict. Log-rank test: left panel 
(chi2(1) = 5.71, Pr>chi2 = 0.0168), and right panel (chi2(3) = 11.93, Pr>chi2 = 
0.0006). Cause specific hazard model: left panel: -2.027* (HR: 0.132), right panel: 
-1.361** (HR: 0.256), and a list of time-invariant and -variant covariates was 
included. 
Source: the author used data from the codebook of GWF dataset, which provides the 
narratives of the start and end events for each regime (1945–2010). Of 109 
democratic regimes, 32 were ousted as a direct result of military coup and armed 
conflict, whereas 14 experienced autocratisation. 63 still remained in power by the 
end of 2010. 
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Figures S6. The number of KMT and DPP members, 1998–2019 
Source: the report of KMT chairmanship elections in 2001, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2013, 
2015, 2016, 2017; the report of DPP chairmanship elections in 1998, 2000, 2006, 
2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2019. 
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Figures S7. The annual financial report of KMT and DPP assets and the ratio, 
2005–2018 
Source: the annual financial report of political parties and groups, Department of Civil 
Service, Ministry of the Interior, R.O.C. (Taiwan). 
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Figures S8. The party’s share of town mayors, city or county councillors, or 
speakers, 1998–2018 
Note: 1: town mayors, 2: city or county councillors, 3: city or county council speakers 
Source: Central Election Commission database. 
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Figures S9. The Evolution of Major Factions in DPP after 1988 
Note: factions shaded by the same colour cooperate with each other. Source: the 
author. 
The Formosa 
(1984 to 1999) 
New Tide 
(1983) 
The Justice Alliance 
(1991 to 2006) 
The Welfare Nation 
(1992 to 2006) 
World United Formosans for 
Independence (1988 to Taiwan) 
Taiwan Independence 
Party (1996 party split) 
New Era 
Legislative Office 
(1998 to 2001) 
New Future Think 
Tank (Su 2006) 
Association of 
Long Devotion to 
Taiwan (Hsieh 
2006) 
One Country on 
Each Side 
Alliance (2010) 
GoGoGo (Lu 
2010) 
Taiwan Normal 
Country Promotion 
Association (2010) 
Tsai’s Faction 
(2016) 
204 
 
 
Figures S10. The performance of NP, PFP, and TIP in pan-blue or pan-green 
coalition at the legislative, city and county councilor elections, 1998–2018 
Note: pan-blue coalition: KMT, NP, and PFP; pan-green coalition: DPP, TIP, and TSU. 
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) was officially founded by supporters of former 
President and KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui in 2001. Due to its supportive of 
Taiwanese independence, it was considered part of the pan-green coalition. 
Source: Central Election Commission database. 
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Figures S11. The effect of NP, PFP, and TIP on KMT or DPP at the municipal 
elections, 1993–2018 
Note: MK: Minkuotang. Left panel: the number of nominated candidates for each 
party; Right panel: the number of candidates losing but leading KMT or DPP to lose 
elections (spoilers) and candidates winning the elections (winners) 
Source: see Appendix D. 
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Figures S12. The number of KMT and DPP un-nominated aspirants at the 
municipal elections, 1993–2018 
Source: see Appendix C. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A 109 Democracies 
Regime Start End Regime failure 
Albania 1992 2010 0 
Argentina I 1947 1951 1 
Argentina II 1974 1976 1 
Argentina III 1984 2010 0 
Armenia 1992 1994 1 
Azerbaijan 1993 1993 1 
Bangladesh I 1991 2007 1 
Bangladesh II 2009 2010 0 
Benin 1992 2010 0 
Bolivia 1983 2010 0 
Brazil 1986 2010 0 
Bulgaria 1991 2010 0 
Burundi I 1994 1996 1 
Burundi II 2006 2010 0 
C.A. Republic 1994 2003 1 
Chile 1990 2010 0 
Colombia 1959 2010 0 
Congo-Brazzaville 1993 1997 1 
Costa Rica 1950 2010 0 
Croatia 1992 2010 0 
Czech Republic 1993 2010 0 
Dominican Republic I 1963 1963 1 
Dominican Republic II 1979 2010 0 
Ecuador I 1949 1963 1 
Ecuador II 1969 1970 1 
Ecuador III 1980 2010 0 
El Salvador 1995 2010 0 
Estonia 1992 2010 0 
Georgia 2005 2010 0 
Ghana I 1970 1972 1 
Ghana II 1980 1981 1 
Ghana III 2001 2010 0 
Greece 1975 2010 0 
Guatemala 1996 2010 0 
Guinea Bissau I 2001 2002 1 
Guinea Bissau II 2006 2010 0 
Haiti I 1947 1950 1 
Haiti II 1991 1991 1 
Haiti III 1995 1999 1 
Haiti IV 2007 2010 0 
Honduras I 1958 1963 1 
Honduras II 1972 1972 1 
Honduras III 1982 2010 0 
Hungary 1991 2010 0 
Indonesia 2000 2010 0 
Kenya 2003 2010 0 
Korea South I 1961 1961 1 
Korea South II 1988 2010 0 
Latvia 1992 2010 0 
Lesotho 1994 2010 0 
Liberia 2006 2010 0 
Lithuania 1992 2010 0 
Macedonia 1992 2010 0 
Madagascar 1994 2009 1 
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Malawi 1995 2010 0 
Mali 1993 2010 0 
Mauritania 2008 2008 1 
Mexico 2001 2010 0 
Moldova 1992 2010 0 
Mongolia 1994 2010 0 
Myanmar 1961 1962 1 
Nepal I 1992 2002 1 
Nepal II 2007 2010 0 
Nicaragua 1991 2010 0 
Niger I 1994 1996 1 
Niger II 2000 2010 0 
Nigeria I 1980 1983 1 
Nigeria II 2000 2010 0 
Pakistan I 1972 1975 1 
Pakistan II 1989 1999 1 
Pakistan III 2009 2010 0 
Panama I 1953 1953 1 
Panama II 1956 1968 1 
Panama III 1990 2010 0 
Paraguay 1994 2010 0 
Peru I 1957 1962 1 
Peru II 1964 1968 1 
Peru III 1981 1992 1 
Peru IV 2002 2010 0 
Philippines 1987 2010 0 
Poland 1990 2010 0 
Portugal 1977 2010 0 
Romania 1991 2010 0 
Russia 1992 1993 1 
Senegal 2001 2010 0 
Serbia 2001 2010 0 
Sierra Leone I 1997 1997 1 
Sierra Leone II 1999 2010 0 
Slovakia 1993 2010 0 
Slovenia 1992 2010 0 
South Africa 1995 2010 0 
Spain 1978 2010 0 
Sri Lanka 1995 2010 0 
Sudan I 1966 1969 1 
Sudan II 1987 1989 1 
Syria I 1948 1949 1 
Syria II 1955 1957 1 
Taiwan 2001 2010 0 
Thailand I 1976 1976 1 
Thailand II 1989 1991 1 
Thailand III 1993 2006 1 
Thailand IV 2008 2010 0 
Turkey I 1951 1957 1 
Turkey II 1962 1980 1 
Turkey III 1984 2010 0 
Ukraine 1992 2010 0 
Uruguay 1985 2010 0 
Venezuela 1959 2005 1 
Zambia 1992 1996 1 
Note: 1= regime fails and 0 = censored. 
Appendix B The List of ASPs with Better Performance 
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Regime Periods ASPs Performance 
Albania 1992-2010 Socialist Party of Albania (PS) The largest party in the parliament (1997-2005) 
Prime minister (1997-2005) 
Bangladesh 1991-2007 Bangladesh Awami League (AL)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (1996-2001) 
Prime minister (1996-2001) 
Bangladesh 1991-2007 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (1991-1996, 
2001-2006) 
Prime minister (1991-1996, 2001-2006) 
Bangladesh 2009-2010 Bangladesh Awami League (AL)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (2009-) 
Prime minister (2009-) 
Bolivia 1983-2010 Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (1985-1997, 
2002-2005) 
Won 1985, 1993 and 2002 presidential elections 
Bolivia 1983-2010 Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)
☆◎
 The largest party in the parliament (1997-2002) 
Won 1997 presidential election 
Brazil 1986-2010 Liberal Front Party (PFL)/ Democrats (DEM) The largest party in the parliament (1998-2002) 
Won 1985 presidential election (Vice-President José 
Sarney succeeded to the Presidency due to the death of 
President-elect Tancredo Neves) 
Bulgaria* 1991-2010 Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) The largest party in the parliament (1991-1997, 
2005-2009) 
Prime minister (1994-1997, 2005-2009) 
Won 2001 and 2006 presidential elections 
Chile 1990-2010 Independent Democratic Union (UDI) The largest party in the parliament (2001-)
1
 
Won 2009 presidential election 
Chile 1990-2010 National Renewal (RN) Won 2009 presidential election 
Colombia 1959-2010 Colombian Conservative Party (PCC)
☆
 From 1958-1974, 50% of the seats in both houses 
allocated to Conservative Party and Liberal Party, and the 
two main political parties agreed to rotate power, 
intercalating for a period of four presidential terms 
Won 1982 and 1998 presidential elections 
Costa Rica 1950-2010 National Liberation Party (PLN)
◎
 The largest party in the parliament (1953-1978, 
1982-1990, 1994-1998, 2006-) 
Won 1953, 1962, 1970, 1974, 1982, 1986, 1994, 2006 and 
2010 presidential elections 
Croatia* 1992-2010 Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) The largest party in the parliament (2000-2003) 
Prime minister (2000-2003) 
Won 2009/2010 presidential election
2
 
Dominican Rep. II 1979-2010 Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) The largest party in the parliament (1986-1990) 
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Won 1986, 1990 and 1994 presidential elections 
Ecuador I 1949-1963 Ecuadorian Conservative Party (PCE) The largest party in the parliament (1949-1954) 
Won 1956 presidential election
3
 
El Salvador 1995-2010 Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)
☆◎
 The largest party in the parliament (1995-2000, 
2006-2009) 
Won 1999 and 2004 presidential elections 
Ghana II 1980-1981 People’s National Party (PNP)
☆◎
 The largest party in the parliament (1979-1981) 
Won 1979 presidential election 
Ghana III 2001-2010 National Democratic Congress (NDC) The largest party in the parliament (2008-) 
Won 2008 presidential election 
Guatemala 1996-2010 Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG)
☆◎
 The largest party in the parliament (1999-2003) 
Won 1999 presidential election 
Guinea Bissau II* 2006-2010 African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape 
Verde (PAIGC)
☆
 
The largest party in the parliament (2006-) 
Prime minister (2006-) 
Won 2009 presidential election 
Honduras II 1972-1972 National Party of Honduras (PNH)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (1971-1972) 
Won 1971 presidential election 
Honduras III 1982-2010 National Party of Honduras (PNH)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (1989-1993, 
2001-2005, 2009-) 
Won 1971 presidential election 
Hungary* 1991-2010 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) The largest party in the parliament (1994-1998, 
2006-2010) 
Prime minister (1994-1998, 2004-2009) 
Indonesia 2000-2010 Golkar The largest party in the parliament (2004-2009) 
Korea South II 1988-2010 Democratic Justice Party (DJP)/ Democratic Liberal 
Party (DLP)/ New Korea Party (NKP)/ Grand National 
Party (GNP) /Saenuri 
The largest party in the parliament (1988-2004, 2008-) 
Won 1992 and 2007 presidential elections 
Lithuania* 1992-2010 Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (LDDP)/ Social 
Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDB) 
The largest party in the parliament (1992-1996) 
Prime minister (1993-1996, 2001-2008) 
Won 1993 presidential election 
Macedonia* 1992-2010 Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) The largest party in the parliament (1992-1998, 
2002-2006) 
Prime minister (1992-1998, 2002-2006) 
Won 1994 and 2004 presidential elections 
Madagascar* 1994-2009 Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar (AREMA) The largest party in the parliament (1998-2002) 
Prime minister (1997-2002) 
Won 1996 presidential election 
Malawi 1995-2010 Malawi Congress Party (MCP) The largest party in the parliament (2004-2009) 
Mexico 2001-2010 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) The largest party in the parliament (2003-2006, 2009-) 
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Moldova
4
* 1992-2010 Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova 
(PCRM) 
The largest party in the parliament (1998-) 
Prime minister (2001-2009) 
Mongolia* 1994-2010 Mongolia People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) / 
Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) 
The largest party in the parliament (1994-1996, 2000-) 
Prime minister (1992-1996, 2000-2004, 2006-) 
Won 1997, 2001 and 2005 presidential elections 
Nepal I 1992-2002 Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) Prime minister (1997-1998) 
Nicaragua 1991-2010 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) The largest party in the parliament (1991-1996, 2006-)
5
 
Won 2006 presidential election 
Niger II* 2000-2010 National Movement for the Development of Society 
(MNSD)
☆
 
The largest party in the parliament (1999-) 
Prime minister (2000-) 
Won 1999 and 2004 presidential elections 
Panama II 1956-1968 National Patriotic Coalition (CPN) The largest party in the parliament (1956-1960) 
Won 1956 presidential election 
Panama II 1956-1968 Panameñista Party (PP)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (1968) 
Won 1968 presidential election 
Panama III 1990-2010 Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (1994-)
6
 
Won 1994 and 2004 presidential elections 
Panama III 1990-2010 Panameñista Party (PP)
☆
 Won 1989 and 1999 presidential elections 
Paraguay 1994-2010 Colorados The largest party in the parliament (1994-) 
Won 1998 and 2003 presidential elections 
Poland* 1990-2010 Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland 
(SdRP)/Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 
The largest party in the parliament (1993-1997, 
2001-2005) 
Prime minister (1995-1997, 2001-2005) 
Won 1995 and 2000 presidential elections
7
 
Romania* 1991-2010 National Salvation Front (FSN)/Democratic National 
Salvation Front (FDSN)/ Romanian Social Democratic 
Party (PDSR)/Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
The largest party in the parliament (1991-1996, 
2000-2008) 
Prime minister (1991-1996, 2000-2004) 
Won 1992 and 2000 presidential elections 
Serbia* 2001-2010 Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)
☆
 Prime Minister (2001-2001) 
Sierra Leone II 1999-2010 All People’s Congress (APC)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (2007-) 
Won 2007 presidential election 
Slovenia* 1992-2010 United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD)/ Social 
Democrats (SD) 
The largest party in the parliament (2008-) 
Prime minister (2008-) 
Spain 1978-2010 Union of the Democratic Center (UCD)/ People’s 
Alliance (AP)/ Peoples Party (PP)
◎
 
The largest party in the parliament (1978-1982, 
1996-2004) 
Prime minister (1978-1982, 1996-2004) 
Sri Lanka* 1995-2010 United National Party (UNP) The largest party in the parliament (2001-2004) 
Prime minister (2001-2004) 
Taiwan* 2001-2010 Kuomintang (KMT) The largest party in the parliament (2008-) 
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Prime minister (2008-) 
Won 2008 presidential election 
Thailand 1993-2006 New Aspiration Party (NAP)
☆◎
 The largest party in the parliament (1996-2001) 
Prime minister (1996-1997) 
Turkey II 1962-1980 Republican People’s Party (CHP)
☆
 The largest party in the parliament (1961-1965, 
1973-1980) 
Prime minister (1961-1965, 1974, 1977, 1978-1979) 
Turkey II 1962-1980 Justice Party (AP)
☆◎
 The largest party in the parliament (1965-1973) 
Prime minister (1965-1971, 1975-1977, 1977-1978, 
1979-1980) 
Turkey III*
(2008-)
 1984-2010 Motherland Party (ANAP)
◎
 The largest party in the parliament (1983-1991) 
Prime minister (1983-1991, 1996, 1997-1999) 
Turkey III*
(2008-)
 1984-2010 True Path Party (DYP)
☆◎
 The largest party in the parliament (1991-1995) 
Prime minister (1991-1995) 
Ukraine* 1992-2010 Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) The largest party in the parliament (1992-2002) 
Note: For presidential country, this study saw if ASPs successfully won at least one presidential election or if they became the largest 
party in the parliament. For parliamentary country, this paper checked if ASPs became the largest party in the parliament or their 
members were appointed as the prime minister. For semi-presidential country labeled as *, the study scrutinised if three condition were 
satisfied. 1: its alliance with National Renewal (RN) is not the largest parliamentary coalition in 2001 and 2005. 2: Two-run systems. 3: its 
alliance with Social Christian Party (PSC). 4: Moldova changed its constitutional design from semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism 
from 2000. 5: the largest parliamentary coalition is National Opposition Union (UNO) between 1991 and 1996. 6: its alliances, United 
People Alliance (1994-1999), New Nation Alliance (1999-2004) and New Fatherland (2004-2009), were the largest parliamentary 
coalitions. After 2009, its alliance, One Country for All, was not the largest parliamentary coalition although PRD was the largest party. 7: 
In 2000 presidential election, Aleksander Kwaśniewski ran as the independent but supported by SdRP. 
☆
: cases were not included 
because ASPs emerge not from the recent authoritarian regimes. 
◎
: ASPs were created in reaction to a transition to democracy, either 
by high-level authoritarian incumbents in anticipation of an imminent transition, or by former high-level incumbents shortly after a 
transition. Cases, shaded in gray, would be included if the rule to record antecedent authoritarian rule from the longer instead of the 
recent one was adopted.
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Appendix C DPP and KMT Candidates and Un-nominated Aspirants 
List of DPP Candidates and Un-nominated Aspirants 
1. Presidential Elections 
9th: no party rebels, DPP presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Peng 
Ming‑min and Frank Hsieh 
10th: party rebels, DPP presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Chen 
Shui-bian and Annette Lu, Others: Hsu Hsin-liang (chairperson of the DPP, 
Magistrate of Taoyuan) and Josephine Chu (Independent) 
11th: no party rebels, DPP presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Chen 
Shui-bian and Annette Lu (Incumbent) 
12th: no party rebels, DPP presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Frank 
Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang 
13th: no party rebels, DPP presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Tsai 
Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan 
14th: no party rebels, DPP presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Tsai 
Ing-wen and Chen Chien-jen (Independent) 
2. Municipal Elections 
a. Keelung City 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wang Tuoh 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lee Chin-yung 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lee Chin-yung (Incumbent) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wang Tuoh 
16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Yu-chang 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Yu-chang 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Yu-chang (Incumbent) 
b. New Taipei City (former Taipei County until 25 December 2010) 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: You Ching (Incumbent) 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Tseng-chang 
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14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Tseng-chang (Incumbent) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Luo Wen-jia 
1st: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Tsai Ing-wen 
2nd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yu Shyi-kun 
3rd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Tseng-chang 
c. Taipei City 
1st: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Shui-bian 
2nd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Shui-bian (Incumbent) 
3rd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lee Ying-yuan 
4th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Frank Hsieh 
5th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Tseng-chang 
6th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: n.a. (DPP agreed not to put 
forward a candidate for the election, and to support Ko Wen-je as 
representative of the Pan-Green Coalition) 
7th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Pasuya Yao 
d. Yilan County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yu Shyi-kun (Incumbent) 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liu Shou-cheng 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liu Shou-cheng (Incumbent) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Ding-nan 
16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Tsung-hsien 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Tsung-hsien (Incumbent) 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Ou-po 
e. Taoyuan City (former Taoyuan County until 25 December 2010) 
12th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chang Sheng Hsun, Others: Huang 
Yu-chiao (Incumbent Member of Taiwan Provincial Council) 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Annette Lu 
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14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Perng Shaw-jiin 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Cheng Pao-ching 
1st: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Cheng Wen-tsan 
2nd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Cheng Wen-tsan 
3rd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Cheng Wen-tsan (Incumbent) 
f. Hsinchu County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Fan Chen-tsung (Incumbent) 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Kuang-hua 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Kuang-hua (Incumbent) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Kuang-hua 
16th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Perng Shaw-jiin, Others: Tseng 
Chin-hsiang (chairperson of the DPP local branch, Hsinchu County) 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: n.a. (DPP agreed not to put 
forward a candidate for the election, and to support Cheng Yung-chin, 
former KMT Magistrate of Hsinchu County) 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Cheng Chao-fang 
g. Hsinchu City 
4th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wu Chiu-ku 
5th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Tsai Jen-chien 
6th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Tsai Jen-chien (Incumbent) 
7th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Cheng Kuei-yuan 
8th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liou Gin-show 
9th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Chih-chien, Others: Tsai Jen-chien 
(Mayor of Hsinchu City) 
10th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Chih-chien (Incumbent) 
h. Miaoli County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Fu Wen-cheng 
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13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Hsu Chin-jung 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wei Tsao-ping 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chiu Ping-kun 
16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yiong Cong-ziin 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wu Yi-chen 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: n.a. (DPP agreed not to put 
forward a candidate for the election, and to support Hsu Ting-chen, 
Toufen town mayor. Chu Tai-ping, the executive committee of the DPP 
local branch, Miaoli County, announced to participate in the election) 
i. Taichung County (merged with the original provincial Taichung City to form 
the special municipality on 25 December 2010) 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yang Chia-yu 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liao Yong-lai, Others: Chen 
Chin-lung (Incumbent Fengyuan City Mayor, Taichung County) 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liao Yong-lai (Incumbent) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chiu Tai-san 
j. Taichung City 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Edgar Lin 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chang Wen-ying 
14th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Michael Tsai, Others: Chang 
Wen-ying (Incumbent Taichung City Mayor) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Chia-Lung 
1st: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Jia-chyuan 
2nd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Chia-Lung 
3rd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Chia-Lung (Incumbent) 
k. Changhua County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chou Ching-yu (Incumbent) 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wong Chin-chu 
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14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wong Chin-chu 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wong Chin-chu (Incumbent) 
16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wong Chin-chu 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wei Ming-ku 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Wei Ming-ku (Incumbent) 
l. Nantou County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Hsu Jung-shu 
13th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Tsung-nan, Others: Peng 
Pai-hsien (Incumbent Member of Parliament) 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Tsung-nan 
15th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Tsai Huang-liang, Others: Lin 
Tsung-nan (Incumbent Magistrate of Nantou County) 
16th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lee Wen-chung, Others: Chang 
Chun-hung (Member of Parliament) 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lee Wen-chung 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Hung Guo-haw 
m. Yunlin County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Hung Yueh-chiao 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liao Ta-lin 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lin Shu-shan 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Chih-fen 
16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Chih-fen (Incumbent) 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lee Chin-yung 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lee Chin-yung (Incumbent) 
n. Chiayi County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: He Chia-jung (DPP support. 
Huang Hui-huang, the doctor, announced to participate in the election) 
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13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: He Chia-jung 
14th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Ming-wen, Others: Li 
Ming-hsien 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Ming-wen (Incumbent) 
16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chang Hua-kuan 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chang Hua-kuan (Incumbent) 
18th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Weng Chang-liang, Others: Wu 
Fang-ming (Incumbent Vice-Magistrate of Chiayi County) 
o. Chiayi City 
4th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: n.a. (DPP did not put forward a 
candidate for the election) 
5th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Tsai Hung-chang 
6th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Huang Cheng-nan 
7th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Li-chen 
8th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Twu Shiing-jer 
9th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Twu Shiing-jer 
10th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Twu Shiing-jer (Incumbent) 
p. Tainan County (merged with the original provincial Tainan City to form the 
special municipality on 25 December 2010) 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Tang-shan 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Tang-shan (Incumbent) 
14th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Huan-chih, Others: Wei 
Yao-chien (Member of Parliament) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Huan-chih (Incumbent) 
q. Tainan City 
12th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Tsai Chieh-hsiung, Others: Kuo 
Pei-hung 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chang Tsan-hung 
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14th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Hsu Tain-tsair, Others: Chang 
Tsan-hung (Incumbent Tainan City Mayor), Lin I-huang (Incumbent 
Member of Tainan City Council) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Hsu Tain-tsair (Incumbent) 
1st: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lai Ching‑te 
2nd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lai Ching‑te (Incumbent) 
3rd: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Huang Wei-cher, Others: Su 
Huan-chih (Magistrate of Tainan County, Member of Parliament) 
r. Kaohsiung County (merged with the original Kaohsiung City to form the 
special municipality on 25 December 2010) 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yu Cheng-hsien 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yu Cheng-hsien (Incumbent) 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yang Chiu-hsing 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yang Chiu-hsing (Incumbent) 
s. Kaohsiung City 
1st: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chang Chun-hsiung 
2nd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Frank Hsieh 
3rd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Frank Hsieh (Incumbent) 
4th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Chu 
1st: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Chu (Incumbent), Others: Yang 
Chiu-hsing (Magistrate of Kaohsiung County) 
2nd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Chu (Incumbent) 
3rd: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Chi-mai 
t. Pintung County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Tseng-chang (Incumbent) 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Jia-chyuan 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Su Jia-chyuan (Incumbent) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Tsao Chi-hung 
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16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Tsao Chi-hung (Incumbent) 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Pan Men-an 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Pan Men-an (Incumbent) 
u. Taitung County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: n.a. (DPP did not put forward a 
candidate for the election but to support Chen I-nan) 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Huang Chao-hui 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lai Kun-cheng 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: n.a. (DPP did not put forward a 
candidate for the election but to support Liu Chao-hao, incumbent 
Vice-Magistrate of Taitung County) 
16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liu Chao-hao 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liu Chao-hao 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liu Chao-hao 
v. Hualien County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Yung-hsing 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yu Ying-lung 
14th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Yu Ying-lung 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Lu Po-chi 
16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: n.a. (DPP did not put forward a 
candidate for the election but to support Chang Chih-ming, incumbent 
Vice-Magistrate of Hualien County) 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: n.a. (DPP did not put forward a 
candidate for the election) 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Liu Hsiao-mei 
w. Penghu County 
12th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Kao Chih-peng 
13th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Hsu Pi-lung 
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14th: party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Kuang-fu, Others: Hsu Li-yin 
(Incumbent Mogong City Mayor, Penghu County) 
15th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Kuang-fu 
16th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Tsai Chien-hsing 
17th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Kuang-fu 
18th: no party rebels, DPP mayor candidate: Chen Kuang-fu (Incumbent) 
Note: Aspirants without party approvals 
1. Hsu Hsin-liang (許信良): lose the 10th presidential election (Independent, 
the percentage of votes: 0.63%), lose the 6th legislative election (Taipei City 
Constituency 2, Independent, the percentage of votes: 2.22%), return to 
DPP, lose the 13th DPP presidential primary election (the percentage of 
votes: 12.21%), lose the 14th DPP chairperson election (the percentage of 
votes: 2.49%) 
2. Huang Yu-chiao (黃玉嬌): lose the 12th Taoyuan County election 
(Independent, the percentage of votes: 2.67%), lose the 4th legislative 
election (Independent, the percentage of votes: 0.28%), never return to 
DPP 
3. Tseng Chin-Hsiang (曾錦祥): lose the 16th Hsinchu County election 
(Independent, the percentage of votes: 0.75%), never return to DPP 
4. Tsai Jen-chien (蔡仁堅): lose the 9th Hsinchu City election (Independent, 
the percentage of votes: 20.28%) 
5. Chen Chin-lung (陳欽隆): lose the 13th Taichung County election 
(Independent, the percentage of votes: 1.82%), lose the 4th legislative 
election (新國家連線, the percentage of votes: 0.30%) 
6. Chang Wen-ying (張溫鷹): lose the 14th Taichung City election 
(Independent, the percentage of votes: 15.58%), Deputy minister of the 
interior in 2005, Advisor to the President Chen from 2006 to 2007, return to 
DPP in 2008, however, terminate her political career 
7. Peng Pai-hsien (彭百顯): win the 13th Nantou County election (Independent, 
the percentage of votes: 31.61%), lose the 14th Nantou County election 
(Independent, the percentage of votes: 15.71%), never return to DPP 
8. Lin Tsung-nan (林宗男): lose the 15th Nantou County election (Independent, 
the percentage of votes: 22.08%), never return to DPP, died in 2010 
9. Chang Chun-hung (張俊宏): lose the 16th Nantou County election 
(Independent, the percentage of votes: 1.14%) 
10. Li Ming-hsien (李明憲): lose the 14th Chiayi County election (Independent, 
the percentage of votes: 4.36%) 
11. Wu Fang-ming (吳芳銘): lose the 18th Chiayi County election (Independent, 
the percentage of votes: 17.89%), never return to DPP 
12. Wei Yao-chien (魏耀乾): lose the 14th Tainan County election (Independent, 
the percentage of votes: 4.04%), never return to DPP, lose the 7th 
legislative election (Wei was placed on the Home Party list but not elected), 
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lose the 7th Lienchang County election (Independent, the percentage of 
votes: 4.54%) 
13. Kuo Pei-hung (郭倍宏): lose the 12th Tainan City election (Independent, the 
percentage of votes: 7.43%), never return to DPP, establish Formosa 
Alliance in 2019 
14. Chang Tsan-hung (張燦鍙): lose the 14th Tainan City election (Independent, 
the percentage of votes: 2.90%), never return to DPP 
15. Lin I-huang (林易煌): lose the 14th Tainan City election (Independent, the 
percentage of votes: 1.86%), join the KMT and as a candidate of 9th 
legislative election but defeated (Tainan City Constituency 5, KMT, the 
percentage of votes: 24.28%) 
16. Su Huan-chih (蘇煥智): lose the 3rd Tainan City election (Independent, the 
percentage of votes: 4.11%), never return to DPP, establish Taiwan 
Renewal Party in 2019 
17. Yang Chiu-hsing (楊秋興): lose the 1st Kaohsiung City election 
(Independent, the percentage of votes: 26.68%), join the KMT and as a 
candidate of 2nd Kaohsiung City election but defeated (KMT, the 
percentage of votes: 30.89%), never return to DPP 
18. Hsu Li-yin (許麗音): lose the 14th Penghu County election (Independent, 
the percentage of votes: 8.42%), lose the 15th Penghu County Council 
election (Independent, the percentage of votes: 3.45%), temporarily return 
to DPP and then withdraw, lose the 18th Penghu County Council election 
(Independent, the percentage of votes: 2.47%), the 19th Penghu County 
Council election (Independent, the percentage of votes: 1.86%) 
List of KMT Candidates and Un-nominated Aspirants 
1. Presidential Elections 
9th: party rebels, KMT presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Lee 
Teng-hui and Lien Chan, Others: Lin Yang-kang (林洋港) (President of the 
Judicial Yuan) and Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) (Premier), Chen Li-an (陳履安) 
(President of the Control Yuan) and Wang Ching-feng (Independent, 
Committee of the Control Yuan) 
10th: party rebels, KMT presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Lien Chan 
and Siew Wan-chang, Others: Soong Chu-yu (宋楚瑜) (Governor of 
Taiwan Province) and Chang Chau-hsiung (Independent) 
11th: no party rebels, KMT presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Lien 
Chan and Soong Chu-yu (PFP, KMT aligned with PFP to propose 
common candidates) 
12th: no party rebels, KMT presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Ma 
Ying-jeou and Siew Wan-chang 
13th: no party rebels, KMT presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Ma 
Ying-jeou (Incumbent) and Wu Den-yih 
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14th: no party rebels, KMT presidential and vice-presidential candidate: Chu 
Li-luan and Wang Ju-hsuan (Independent) 
2. Municipal Elections 
a. Keelung City 
12th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Shui-mu (Incumbent) 
13th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Liu Wen-hsiung, Others: Hsu Tsai-li 
(許財利) (Incumbent Speaker of the Keelung City Council) 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Tsai-li 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Tsai-li (Incumbent) 
16th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chang Tong-rong 
17th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsieh Li-kung, Others: Huang 
Ching-tai (黃景泰) (Incumbent Speaker of the Keelung City Council) 
18th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsieh Li-kung 
b. New Taipei City (former Taipei County until 25 December 2010) 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Tsai Sheng-pang, Others: Chang 
Fu-tang (張馥堂) (Incumbent Member of National Assembly), Shih 
Chiung-wen (石瓊文) (Incumbent Member of National Assembly) 
13th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsieh Shen-shan, Others: Lin 
Chih-chia (林志嘉) (Incumbent Member of Parliament) 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: n.a. (KMT agreed not to put 
forward a candidate for the election, and to support Wang Chien-shien as 
representative of the Pan-Blue Coalition) 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chou Hsi-wei 
1st: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chu Li-luan 
2nd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chu Li-luan (Incumbent) 
3rd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hou You-yi 
c. Taipei City 
1st: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Ta-chou 
2nd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Ma Ying-jeou 
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3rd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Ma Ying-jeou (Incumbent) 
4th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hau Lung-pin 
5th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hau Lung-pin (Incumbent) 
6th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lien Sheng-wen 
7th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Ting Shou-chung 
d. Yilan County 
12th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chang Chun-tang 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Liao Feng-teh 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lu Kuo-hua 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lu Kuo-hua 
16th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lu Kuo-hua (Incumbent) 
17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chiou Shu-ti 
18th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Zi-miao, Others: Lin Hsin-hua (林
信華) (Vice-Magistrate of Yilan County) 
e. Taoyuan City (former Taoyuan County until 25 December 2010) 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Liu Pang-yu (Incumbent), Others: 
Huang Mu-tien (黃木添) (Incumbent Member of Taiwan Provincial 
Council) 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chen Ken-te 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chu Li-luan 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chu Li-luan (Incumbent) 
1st: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Chih-yang, Others: Wu Fu-tung 
(吳富彤) (later as a candidate of Hakka Party) 
2nd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Chih-yang (Incumbent) 
3rd: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chen Shei-saint, Others: Yang 
Li-huan (楊麗環) (Incumbent Member of Parliament) 
f. Hsinchu County 
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12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Cheng Yung-chin, Others: Chou 
Hsi-man (周細滿) (Incumbent Member of Taiwan Provincial Council) 
13th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Cheng Yung-chin, Others: Chiu 
Ching-chun (邱鏡淳) (Incumbent Member of Taiwan Provincial Council) 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Cheng Yung-chin 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Cheng Yung-chin (Incumbent) 
16th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chiu Ching-chun, Others: Chang 
Pi-chin (張碧琴) (Incumbent Speaker of the Hsinchu County Council) 
17th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chiu Ching-chun, Others: Cheng 
Yung-chin (鄭永金) (Magistrate of Hsinchu County) 
18th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Yang Wen-ke 
g. Hsinchu City 
4th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Tung Sheng-nan (Incumbent), Others: 
Jen Fu-yung (任富勇) (Mayor of Hsinchu City) 
5th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Chih-cheng 
6th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Junq-tzer 
7th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Junq-tzer (Incumbent) 
8th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Ming-tsai 
9th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Ming-tsai (Incumbent) 
10th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Ming-tsai 
h. Miaoli County 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chang Chiu-hua (Incumbent), 
Others: He Chih-hui (何智輝) (Incumbent Member of Parliament) 
13th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: He Chih-hui (Incumbent), Others: Fu 
Hsueh-peng (傅學鵬) (Incumbent Member of Taiwan Provincial Council) 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Hsiang-kun 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Liu Cheng-hung 
16th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Liu Cheng-hung (Incumbent) 
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17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Yao-chang 
18th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Yao-chang (Incumbent) 
i. Taichung County (merged with the original provincial Taichung City to form 
the special municipality on 25 December 2010) 
12th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Liao Liou-yi (Incumbent) 
13th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Shyu Jong-shyong* (徐中雄), Others: 
Kuo Jung-chen* (郭榮振) (Incumbent Member of Taiwan Provincial 
Council), Liu Chuan-chung (劉銓忠) (Incumbent Member of Taiwan 
Provincial Council) 
14th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Chung-sheng, Others: Lin 
Min-lin (林敏霖) (Incumbent Speaker of the Taichung County Council) 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Chung-sheng 
j. Taichung City 
12th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Po-jung (Incumbent) 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hung Chao-nan 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hu Chih-chiang 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hu Chih-chiang (Incumbent) 
1st: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hu Chih-chiang (Incumbent) 
2nd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hu Chih-chiang (Incumbent) 
3rd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lu Shiow-yen 
k. Changhua County 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Juan Kang-meng, Others: Hung 
Ying-hua (洪英花) (Member of the National Assembly) 
13th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Juan Kang-meng, Others: Chang 
Jung-chang (張榮昌) (Member of the Changhua County Council) 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Yeh Chin-fong 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Cho Po-yuan 
16th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Cho Po-yuan (Incumbent) 
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17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Tsang-min 
18th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wang Huei-mei 
l. Nantou County 
12th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Yuan-lang (Incumbent) 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Hui-yu 
14th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Ming-chen* (林明溱), Others: 
Chang Ming-hsiung* (張明雄) (Incumbent Member of Parliament) 
15th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lee Chao-ching, Others: Lin 
Ming-chen (林明溱) (Jiji town mayor) 
16th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lee Chao-ching (Incumbent), Others: 
Chen Cheng-sheng (陳振盛) (Member of Parliament) 
17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Ming-chen 
18th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Ming-chen (Incumbent) 
m. Yunlin County 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Liao Chuan-yu* (廖泉裕) 
(Incumbent), Others: Chen Shi-chang* (陳錫章) (Incumbent Member of 
Parliament) 
13th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Su Wen-hsiung, Others: Chang 
Jung-wei (張榮味) (Incumbent Speaker of the Yunlin County Council), Ou 
Ming-shien (歐明憲) (Member of National Assembly) 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chang Jung-wei 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Shu-po 
16th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Wei-chih 
17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chang Li-shan 
18th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chang Li-shan 
n. Chiayi County 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Li Ya-ching* (李雅景), Others: Chen 
Shih-yung* (陳適庸) (Incumbent Magistrate of Chiayi County) 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Li Ya-ching (Incumbent) 
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14th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wong Chung-chun, Others: Chen 
Sheng-san (陳勝三) (Incumbent Commissioner of Department of 
Education, Chiayi County) 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chen Ming-chen 
16th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wong Chung-chun 
17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wong Chung-chun 
18th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Yu-jen 
o. Chiayi City 
4th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chiang I-hsiung 
5th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chiang I-hsiung 
6th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chiang Ching-hsien, Others: 
Chang Jung-tsang (張榮藏) (Incumbent Member of the Chiayi City 
Council) 
7th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Min-hui 
8th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Min-hui (Incumbent), Others: 
Lin Sheng-fen (林聖芬) (Incumbent Member of the Chiayi City Council) 
9th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chen I-chen 
10th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Min-hui, Others: Hsiao 
Shu-li (蕭淑麗) (Incumbent Speaker of the Chiayi City Council) 
p. Tainan County (merged with the original provincial Tainan City to form the 
special municipality on 25 December 2010) 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Hsiu-meng, Others: Huang 
Ting-chuan (黃丁全) (Member of the National Assembly) 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hung Yu-chin 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Ching-ji 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Kuo Tien-tsai 
q. Tainan City 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Shih Chih-ming (Incumbent), Others: 
Lin Nan-sheng (林南生) (Incumbent Vice-Speaker of the Tainan City 
Council) 
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13th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chen Jung-cheng* (陳榮盛), Others: 
Lin Nan-sheng* (林南生) (Vice-Speaker of the Tainan City Council), Fang 
Chin-hai (方金海) (Incumbent Speaker of the Tainan City Council), Lin 
Shou-hung (林壽宏) (Incumbent Member of Taiwan Provincial Council) 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chen Jung-cheng 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chen Jung-cheng 
1st: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Kuo Tien-tsai 
2nd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Hsiu-shuang 
3rd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Kao Su-po 
r. Kaohsiung County (merged with the original Kaohsiung City to form the 
special municipality on 25 December 2010) 
12th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Pa-yeh 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Hung-tu 
14th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Kuang-hsun, Others: Huang 
Pa-yeh (黃八野) (Member of Kaohsiung County Council) 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lin Yi-shih 
s. Kaohsiung City 
1st: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Den-yih 
2nd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Den-yih (Incumbent) 
3rd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Chun-ying 
4th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Chun-ying 
1st: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Chao-shun 
2nd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Yang Chiu-hsing 
3rd: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Han Kuo-yu 
t. Pintung County 
12th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Tse-yuan 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Tseng Yung-chuan 
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14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wang Chin-shih 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wang Chin-shih 
16th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chou Tien-lun 
17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chien Tai-lang 
18th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Su Ching-chuan 
u. Taitung County 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chen Chien-nien, Others: Chen 
I-nan (陳益南) 
13th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chen Chien-nien (Incumbent), 
Others: Hsu Ching-yuan (徐慶元) (Incumbent Member of Taiwan 
Provincial Council) 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wu Chun-li 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: n.a. (KMT did not endorse but to 
support Wu Chun-li, incumbent Magistrate of Taitung County) 
16th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Chien-ting 
17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Huang Chien-ting (Incumbent) 
18th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Rao Ching-ling, Others: Kuang 
Li-chen (鄺麗貞) (Magistrate of Taitung County, Wu Chun-li was 
suspended after inauguration on charges of corruption. Kuang joined the 
KMT and won the Taitung magisterial by-election in April 2006) 
v. Hualien County 
12th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wang Ching-feng, Others: Lin 
Jung-hui, (林榮輝) (Incumbent Member of National Assembly) 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wang Ching-feng (Incumbent) 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Chang Fu-hsing 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsieh Shen-shan 
16th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Tu Li-hua, Others: Fu Kun-chi (傅崐
萁) (Incumbent Member of Parliament), Chang Chih-ming (張志明) 
(Incumbent Vice-Magistrate of Hualien County) 
17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Tsai Chi-ta 
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18th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Hsu Chen-wei 
w. Penghu County 
12th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Kuo Tien-yu 
13th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lai Feng-wei 
14th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lai Feng-wei (Incumbent) 
15th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wang Chien-fa 
16th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Wang Chien-fa (Incumbent) 
17th: no party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Su Kun-hsiung 
18th: party rebels, KMT mayor candidate: Lai Feng-wei, Others: Cheng 
Ching-fa (鄭清發) (chairperson of the KMT local branch, Penghu County) 
Appendix D Party Split from KMT and DPP and Their Performances 
From KMT 
New Party (1993-) 
Municipal Elections 
12th Taipei County: spoiler, Lee Sheng-feng (李勝峰) (the percentage of votes: 
16.32%), KMT lost the election 
4th Hsinchu City: not spoiler, Hsieh Chi-ta (謝啟大) (the percentage of votes: 
10.06%), KMT won the election 
1st Taipei City: spoiler, Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康) (the percentage of votes: 
30.17%), KMT lost the election 
1st Kaohsiung City: not spoiler, Tang A-ken (湯阿根) (the percentage of votes: 
3.45%), KMT won the election 
13th Taipei County: not spoiler, Yang Tai-shun (楊泰順) (the percentage of 
votes: 2.34%), KMT lost the election 
13th Miaoli County: not spoiler, Huang Ta-yeh (黃達業) (the percentage of 
votes: 5.66%), KMT lost the election 
13th Taichung City: not spoiler, Sung Ai-ke (宋艾克) (the percentage of votes: 
7.32%), KMT lost the election 
13th Nantou County: spoiler, Chen Cheng-sheng (陳振盛) (the percentage of 
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votes: 7.26%), KMT lost the election 
13th Tainan City: not spoiler, Kao Chia-chun (高家俊) (the percentage of votes: 
1.46%), KMT lost the election 
2nd Taipei City: not spoiler, Wang Chien-shien (王建煊) (the percentage of 
votes: 2.97%), KMT won the election 
2nd Kaohsiung City: spoiler, Wu Chien-kuo (吳建國) (the percentage of votes: 
0.81%), KMT lost the election, only 0.58% 
People First Party (2000-) 
Municipal Elections 
14th Changhua County: not spoiler, Cheng Hsiu-chu (鄭秀珠) (the percentage 
of votes: 6.37%), KMT lost the election 
14th Nantou County: spoiler, Chen Cheng-sheng (陳振盛) (the percentage of 
votes: 24.51%), KMT lost the election 
14th Taitung County: winner, Hsu Ching-yuan (徐慶元) (the percentage of 
votes: 44.30%), KMT lost the election 
14th Hualien County: not spoiler, Lai Cheng-hsiung (賴政雄) (the percentage of 
votes: 27.52%), KMT won the election 
15th Keelung City: not spoiler, Liu Wen-hsiung (劉文雄) (the percentage of 
votes: 25.89%), KMT won the election 
15th Miaoli County: not spoiler, Hsu Yao-chang (徐耀昌) (the percentage of 
votes: 17.07%), KMT won the election 
15th Taichung City: not spoiler, Shen Chih-hwei (沈智慧) (the percentage of 
votes: 2.23%), KMT won the election 
15th Hualien County: not spoiler, Fu Kun-Chi (傅崐萁) (the percentage of votes: 
24.59%), KMT won the election 
4th Taipei City: not spoiler, Soong Chu-yu (宋楚瑜) (the percentage of votes: 
4.14%), KMT won the election 
17th Hualien County: winner, Fu Kun-Chi (傅崐萁) (the percentage of votes: 
56.53%), KMT lost the election 
Taiwan Solidarity Union (2001-) 
*as a member of pan-green coalition 
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Minkuotang (2015-2019) 
Municipal Elections 
18th Hsinchu County: not spoiler, Hsu Hsin-ying (徐欣瑩) (the percentage of 
votes: 32.29%), KMT won the election 
From DPP 
Taiwan Independence Party (1996-) 
Municipal Elections 
13th Taichung County: not spoiler, Chien Wen-nan (錢文南) (the percentage of 
votes: 1.00%), DPP won the election 
13th Tainan City: not spoiler, Cheng Pang-chen (鄭邦鎮) (the percentage of 
votes: 1.83%), DPP won the election 
5th Chiayi City: not spoiler, Tsang Ting-sheng (臧汀生) (the percentage of votes: 
1.80%), DPP lost the election 
Taiwan Solidarity Union (2001-) 
Municipal Elections 
15th Keelung City: not spoiler, Chen Chien-ming (陳建銘) (the percentage of 
votes: 31.46%), DPP lost the election 
15th Tainan City: not spoiler, Chien Lin Hui-chun (錢林慧君) (the percentage of 
votes: 12.95%), DPP won the election 
4th Taipei City: not spoiler, Chou Yu-kou (周玉蔻) (the percentage of votes: 
0.26%), DPP lost the election 
4th Kaohsiung City: not spoiler, Lo Chih-ming (羅志明) (the percentage of votes: 
0.86%), DPP won the election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
234 
 
Appendix E The Summary of Variables, Operationalization of Indicators, 
Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Operationalizaiton of indicators Data Sources 
Dominant party 
regime 
Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) Autocratic Regime Data 
http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/ 
Regime duration Continuous variables Autocratic Regime Data 
ASP with better 
performance 
Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) ASPs: Loxton, J., 2015. 
Authoritarian successor parties. J. 
Democr. 26(3), 157-170. 
Better performance: Database of 
Political Institutions 
https://publications.iadb.org/en/da
tabase-political-institutions-2017-
dpi2017 
World Political Leaders 
1945-2015 
http://zarate.eu/countries.htm 
GDP per capita Log GDP, per capita (US dollars) 
Continuous variables 
New Maddison Project Database 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/m
addison-project/data.htm GDP per capita 
growth 
Percentage of GDP growth (%) 
Continuous variables 
Oil revenue Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) 1945-1999: Replication data for 
Fearon, J.D., Laitin, D.D., 2003. 
Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil 
war. Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 97(1), 
75–90 
2000-2010: The World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org 
Parliamentarism Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) Database of Political Institutions 
Presidentialism Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) Database of Political Institutions 
Semi-presidentialis
m 
Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) The Semi-presidential one 
http://www.semipresidentialism.c
om 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
      
  
   , where sij is the share of 
ethnic group i (i = 1...n) in country j 
Continuous variables (0-1) 
Fearon, J.D., 2003. Ethnic and 
cultural diversity by country. J. 
Econ. Growth 8(2), 195–222 
Religious 
fractionalization 
      
  
   , where sij is the share of 
religious group i (i = 1...n) in country 
j 
Continuous variables (0-1) 
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., 
Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., Wacziarg, 
R., 2003. Fractionalization. J. 
Econ. Growth 8(2), 155–194 
British colonies A country that had been ruled by the 
British Empire 
Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) 
Replication data for Fearon, J.D., 
Laitin, D.D., 2003. Ethnicity, 
insurgency, and civil war. Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 97(1), 75–90 
Number of 
democratic 
transitions 
Ordinal variables Autocratic Regime Data 
Years of entry Continuous variables Autocratic Regime Data 
Regions A list of region dummies (Africa, 
Asia, Europe, Latin America, 
Post-soviet states) 
- 
Military regimes Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) Autocratic Regime Data 
Former communist 
states 
A state that is previously 
administered and governed by a 
single communist party guided by 
Marxism–Leninism 
Dummy variables (0: No, 1: Yes) 
- 
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Vote share of ASP Continuous variables (0–100%) Main source 
Database of Political Institutions 
Global Elections Database 
http://www.globalelectionsdataba
se.com/index.php/index 
Other source 
Adam Carr’s Election Archive 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net 
Election Data Handbooks by 
Dieter Nohlen 
Wikipedia Election Lists by 
Country 
Seat share of ASP Continuous variables (0–100%) Main source 
Database of Political Institutions 
Global Elections Database 
Other source 
Adam Carr’s Election Archive 
Election Data Handbooks by 
Dieter Nohlen 
Wikipedia Election Lists by 
Country 
(Continued). 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dominant party regime 1443 0.261 0.439 0 1 
Regime duration 1443 22.854 13.725 1 61 
ASPs with better 
performance 
1443 0.428 0.495 0 1 
GDP per capita 1441 9294.741 7027.639 586 37253 
GDP per capita growth 1441 0.021 0.049 0 0 
Oil revenue 1443 0.065 0.247 0 1 
Parliamentarism 1443 0.245 0.430 0 1 
Presidentialism 1443 0.488 0.500 0 1 
Semi-presidentialism 1443 0.267 0.443 0 1 
Ethnic fractionalization 1443 0.433 0.226 0.0392 0.9084 
Religious fractionalization 1443 0.350 0.210 0 0.8603 
British colonies 1443 0.115 0.319 0 1 
Number of democratic 
transitions 
1443 0.674 0.868 0 4 
Years of entry 1443 1983.8 14.826 1947 2009 
Africa 1443 0.156 0.363 0 1 
Asia 1443 0.162 0.369 0 1 
Europe 1443 0.131 0.337 0 1 
Latin America 1443 0.396 0.489 0 1 
Post-soviet states 1443 0.155 0.362 0 1 
Military regimes 1443 0.274 0.446 0 1 
Former communist states 1443 0.254 0.436 0 1 
Vote share of ASP 1427 14.664 17.130 0 68.49 
Seat share of ASP 1411 16.389 20.405 0 95.12 
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Appendix F Data sources in Chinese of process-tracing methods 
1. Historical Archives 
先總統蔣公思想言論總集。1951。 
中央委員會組織大綱。1952。 
第二次全國代表大會第一次修正中國國民黨黨綱。1926。 
臨時全國代表大會第三次修正中國國民黨黨綱。1938。 
臺灣省接收委員會日產處理委員會結束總報告。1947。 
中國國民黨轉帳撥用國有特種房屋及其基地之調查意見報告。2001。 
中國國民黨七大控股公司綜合文件。1994。 
劉維開編輯。1994。《中國國民黨職名錄》。臺北：中國國民黨中央委員會黨
史委員會。 
2. Biography 
江南。1993。《蔣經國傳》。臺北：李敖出版社。 
李松林。1993。《蔣經國的臺灣時代》。臺北：風雲時代出版社。 
李松林。1996。《蔣經國晚年》。合肥：安徽人民出版社。 
林倖妃。2017。《花媽心內話：陳菊 4000 天》。臺北：天下雜誌出版社。 
3. Books and Journals 
王春祝，彭懷真。1986。《中華民國內閣名人錄》。臺北：洞察出版社。 
王鼎銘，范恩邦。2010，〈立委參選人競選支出的選舉效果：Jacobson 支出理
論在台灣新選制下的再驗〉，《台灣政治學刊》，14(2): 3-35。。 
陳明通。1995。《派系政治與臺灣政治變遷》。臺北：月旦評出版社。 
4. Official Websites 
中央選舉委員會選舉資料庫。2019。https://db.cec.gov.tw 
內政部民政司政黨及政治團體財務申報。2019。
https://www.moi.gov.tw/dca/03caucus.aspx 
中國國民黨官方網站。2019。http://www1.kmt.org.tw/list.aspx?mid=25 
民主進步黨官方網站。2019。https://www.dpp.org.tw/contact 
立法院議事及發言系統。2019。https://lis.ly.gov.tw/lylgmeet/timeout.html 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation addresses the question of which factors shape outcomes in 
autocratic regimes, and, in turn, what influences the survival of democratic 
regimes in light of their authoritarian legacies. I chose a binary classification of 
dictatorship—namely, contested and uncontested autocracies. In particular, 
contested autocracies are regimes where the leader’s power is constrained 
either by an organised opposition or a strong regime party; conversely, leaders 
in uncontested autocracies face fewer constraints from unorganised opposition 
groups and a weak regime party. Therefore, this dissertation presents the 
argument that regimes which are able to curtail the dictator’s powers, 
compared to uncontested autocracies, are associated with better institutional 
and socioeconomic outcomes during the authoritarian rule as well as a higher 
survival rate upon the transition to democracy. Specifically, regimes where the 
leader’s power is constrained either by an organised opposition or a strong 
regime party are more likely to have an independent judiciary and experience 
higher levels of health expenditure. Furthermore, a strong regime party that 
promotes authoritarian stability has a positive impact on the longevity of 
succeeding democracies. This dissertation offers a mixed-methods approach 
to confirm the three arguments. 
The three arguments reflect the core logic that preceding authoritarian 
regimes use to shape political institutions, party politics, and social structures 
of a country, thus determining the longevity of subsequent democracies. The 
first two papers of this dissertation provide evidence that regimes where the 
leader’s power is constrained either by an organised opposition or a strong 
regime party are more likely to have better institutional and socioeconomic 
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outcomes during the authoritarian rule. Scholars have demonstrated that 
regimes where a dictator shares power with the ruling group, allows limited 
pluralism and political competition or relies on the popular support as 
contested autocracies are less likely to control the judiciary (Epperly 2017). 
Moreover, they probably will not infringe upon the autonomy of legally 
independent central bankers (Bodea et al. 2019); reduce public goods 
provision (Rosenzweig 2015); expropriate land or other private property 
(Wilson and Wright 2017); discourage private investment (Gehlbach and 
Keefer 2011); filter the Internet (Hellmeier 2016); repress non-governmental 
organisations (Böhmelt 2014); impede several areas of human development 
as health, education, gender equality, and basic freedoms (Miller 2015); and 
experience peace failure following a negotiated settlement in the aftermath of 
civil war (Mason and Greig 2017). The findings thus add to the richness of 
existing scholarship on the import of the factors on autocratic governance that 
are likely to vary with autocratic regime type. 
The third paper provides evidence that the mechanisms which protect 
contested autocracies also lay the foundation for an institutional framework in 
which the subsequent democratic regimes are more likely to survive. Existing 
literature shows that autocracies with a strong regime party become more 
endurable by making power-sharing between the dictator and his ruling 
coalition possible (Magaloni 2008), considerably enhancing the unity of the 
elite (Kailitz and Stockemer 2017), or leading to a higher level of perceived 
trustworthiness, competence, and professionalism in the ruling party in the 
eyes of most voters (Oliver and Ostwald 2018). Furthermore, existing research 
has explored the lasting effects of autocratic ruling strategies on new 
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democracies in terms of party politics (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Frantz 
and Geddes 2016; Grzymala-Busse 2002, 2006, 2007; Hicken and Kuhonta 
2011; Kitschelt 1995; Miller 2019; Riedl 2014), civil society (Bernhard and 
Karakoç 2007; Libman and Kozlov 2017; Neundorf et al. 2020; Pop-Eleches 
and Tucker 2011; Shirah 2014), and transitional justice (Pinto 2006), all of 
which relate to democratic survival. However, few works—except for Miller 
(2019) and Kim (2020)—explain regime dynamics and survival after 
democratisation in light of the mechanisms which promote autocratic regime 
stability. Accordingly, the dissertation fills this gap. 
 Finally, the first and third paper examine the determinants of judicial 
independence in dictatorships and post-authoritarian party politics from the 
power distribution perspective. The second paper incorporates the pattern of 
legitimation into the explanation of varying levels of health spending in 
dictatorships. Thus, the dissertation has a range of implications for the two 
strands of research on authoritarian regimes: power-sharing (Albertus and 
Menaldo 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013; Bonvecchi and Simison 2017; Frantz 
and Stein 2017; Magaloni 2008; Reuter and Remington 2009) and legitimation 
strategies (Dukalskis and Patane 2019; Gerschewski 2013; Kailitz 2013; Kailitz 
and Stockemer 2017; Mazepus et al. 2016; Von Soest and Grauvogel 2017) in 
understanding the inner logic of autocratic regimes. 
Further work needs to be completed to exactly establish how legacies 
from contested autocracies affect new democracies in the manner that the 
dissertation does not demonstrate here. We need to consider a more 
sophisticated causal pathway that can link judicial independence, health 
expenditure, party politics, and succeeding democratic survival. In contested 
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autocracies, when in confrontation with a strong regime party, the opposition is 
expected to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’, unite divergent social forces, 
and hold alliances together or build up a more organised party (Kanté 1994; 
Oloo 2002; Rigger 2001). As a result, bipolar contestations between the ruling 
party and the opposition decrease the likelihood of a fragmented party system, 
which inoculates subsequent democracies against political instability. 
Furthermore, bipolar contestations compel the ruling party to increase public 
goods provisions and support the protection of property rights to boost 
economic performance in case that the masses defect to the opposition. As a 
result, legal institutions are created to establish credible promises not to exploit 
the masses and expropriate their surplus to the incumbent’s advantage, thus 
laying a solid foundation of judicial independence. 
Additional work needs to be done to identify a contextual variable that 
helps to explain the conditional effect of legacies from contested autocracies 
on new democracies. The dissertation found that dictatorships with a strong 
regime party lead to a strong performance of authoritarian successor parties 
and, thus, have a positive impact on the longevity of succeeding democracies. 
The effect, however, may depend on whether these parties are former 
autocratic ruling parties or parties that are newly created by high-level 
authoritarian incumbents in preceding ruling parties, and whether former 
autocratic ruling parties opt for democratisation. Miller (2019) notes that former 
autocratic ruling parties are more likely to succeed in democracy if they accede 
to democratisation rather than being overthrown prior to democratisation. This 
is partly due to their benefitting from greater continuity and influence on 
democratic design. It also depends on whether a strong regime party is able to 
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survive multiple leadership transitions. When a strong regime party is unable to 
survive beyond the founding leader’s peaceful departure, it performs 
significantly worse on outcomes such as economic growth and conflict 
prevention (Meng 2019). Therefore, we expect that these parties lack resource 
advantages or organisational strength after democratisation and, in turn, are 
generally less endurable. 
The dissertation found that dictatorships with an organised opposition 
are associated with a higher level of judicial independence. Yet, not all of the 
cooperation from the opposition parties shares the same characteristics. The 
stable presence of a major opposition party makes divide and rule a less 
effective strategy. This is because its stable existence proves that it is not 
ephemeral and may have enabled the party time to build a reputation for 
robust cooperation (Gandhi and Reuter 2013). Moreover, opposition parties 
that are more reliant on activists are less likely to be co-opted into the regime 
by increasing the party’s ability to effectively mobilise their supporters as well 
as extract concessions from the incumbent (Buckles 2019). Future research 
should explore whether the effect of opposition unity on the judicial institution 
is conditional on the stability of the major opposition parties and the strength of 
the party’s activist base, both of which would be of influence if the dictator 
requires increased concessions. 
This dissertation has some limitations, one of which is that the data on 
the dependent and independent variables of primary interest do not span the 
full range between 1945 and 2010. For example, the data set available on 
opposition unity is for the period between 1975 and 2010 while covering the 
value of health expenditure worldwide from 1995 to 2010. Therefore, it would 
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be difficult to examine an integrated pathway that links the type of regime, 
judicial independence, health expenditure, and post-authoritarian party politics 
to succeeding democratic survival. In future research, we could test the validity 
of proposed arguments when more complete data become available. Another 
limitation is selection bias. The first paper only focuses on electoral 
autocracies, so it provides little basis for the generalisation of results to entire 
dictatorships. Theoretically speaking, elections serve an informational role that 
provides political actors with information about opposition unity. Empirically, it 
is impossible to calculate the sum of the squared seat shares in the opposition 
as a measure of opposition unity in dictatorships without holding elections. 
Nevertheless, we also recognised that further work needs to be done to 
construct a new index of opposition unity for analysing outcomes in autocratic 
regimes disregarding the holding of elections or otherwise. 
Another limitation is the endogeneity issue. Autocratic regimes and their 
institutions or characteristics do not emerge out of nowhere and are hardly fully 
exogenous. This dissertation addresses endogeneity based on instrumental 
variables, lagged independent variables, synthetic control methods, and case 
studies. However, these methods have limitations and should be used with 
those limitations in mind. For example, finding instrumental variables of good 
quality is challenging as political, economic, and social variables that are 
correlated with regime types are very likely to influence outcomes in autocratic 
regimes. Additionally, the current literature showed some reservation 
regarding using an explanatory variable with its lagged value to avoid 
endogeneity problems (Reed 2015). In sum, more work should be done to 
combine different ways to deal with endogeneity concerns. 
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This research has at least two policy implications. First, the strategies 
guiding autocrats toward democratisation might lead to a more sustainable 
democracy if the use of such strategies is conditional on a strong performance 
of the authoritarian successor parties. One way to achieve this is to provide 
these parties (if they are weak) with valuable resources, such as a territorial 
organization and a robust source of party finance, that will help them flourish. 
The other way is to craft a strategy that will allow them (if they were 
incompetent in a past dictatorship) play the role of a constructive opposition or 
return to power (Loxton 2015). Second, scholars studying autocratic 
governance and democratic consolidation should pay close attention to the 
institutional factors which increase the likelihood of forming a strong regime 
party and a well-organised opposition. A feasible way to achieve this is to 
design a parliamentary constitution under which the reliance of the executive 
on the support of the legislature to hold office causes the dictator, as the chief 
executive, to cater to the demand of the elites. As a result, in parliamentary 
systems, elites are more likely to build strong regime used to institutionalize 
access-to-power positions and leadership succession by which the dictator’s 
discretionary power is constrained (Yan 2020). Furthermore, a parliamentary 
constitution can induce opposition parties to coalesce around a single 
opposition candidate or an electoral alliance. In dictatorships adopting 
presidentialism as their constitutional design, the president’s survival is 
independent of the parliament providing the dictator with greater room to act in 
accordance with his wishes. It, subsequently, deters parties from entering into 
a pre-electoral contract because they fear that the new president will use those 
powers to renege on any power-sharing agreement (Gandhi 2008). 
244 
 
This dissertation concludes the three papers with an argument that a 
contested autocracy is likely to be a benevolent dictatorship associated with 
better political and socio-economic outcomes, thus laying a solid foundation for 
its subsequent democratic survival. Lord Acton said, “Power tends to corrupt 
and absolute power corrupts absolutely”, which is also true when applied to 
non-democracies. Only with checks and balances in place, those in power can 
stay humble, take care of people, and promote good governance, compared to 
the ruler with unlimited power. 
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